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This study was an ethical investigation of humanitarian military interventions in developing countries. The 
main argument which is proffered in the study is that the issue of humanitarian military intervention is 
extremely controversial from an array of perspectives. Some of the controversies that have been 
identified in this study are as follows; that humanitarian military interventions which are mostly undertaken 
in developing countries by developed countries have worsened the political and security situation far 
much more than before the intervention, that humanitarian military interventions do violate international 
law especially on those instances when they are undertaken without the authorisation from the 
multilateral bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and its organ – the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), without authorisation from the UNSC the humanitarian military interventions do violate 
International law, whether humanitarian military interventions are acceptable or not, especially in the light 
that such interventions in most cases do violate nation-state sovereignty just to mention a few. 
For conceptualization purposes, the study set the scene by providing a conceptual definition of 
humanitarianism with the aim of delineating the meaning of this term from its use in other disciplines. It 
was asserted that when humanitarian is suffixed with military intervention the implication is that of the 
military intervening in particular socio-political context with the aim of alleviating human suffering. After 
providing this conceptual definition, the study went to provide a brief historical account of humanitarian 
military interventions from ancient times up to modern times. Within the modern era, the study provided 
examples in which it was shown that most of the literature on humanitarian military interventions which 
have been undertaken to date have been entangled in controversies showing that these interventions 
have often worsened the security situation of the intervened country far much more than what it was 
before intervention.   
The study went on to argue that the humanitarian military interventions that have been undertaken by 
powerful countries have been undertaken with the aim of protecting geo-strategic interests in those 
intervened countries. These geo-strategic interests included political influence, extraction of natural 
resources such as petroleum and minerals which are indispensable to the flourishing of the economies 
of powerful countries. In this regard interventions that have been undertaken in the Middle East, North 
and West Africa by powerful countries were based on the need to preserve traditional areas of influence 
for marketing and extraction of raw materials by powerful countries. As an example, it was argued that 
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the current Syrian civil war has resulted in USA and Russia fighting a proxy war for geo-strategic influence 
in the Middle East. This proxy war has caused an unprecedented refugee pool since the end of World 
War 2.  Multilateral efforts to transform humanitarian military interventions from the pursuit of geo-
strategic interests by powerful countries have come in the form of the introduction of the UN doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect. The presumption behind this doctrine is that as a sovereign, each nation-state 
has the responsibility to protect its citizens instead of relying entirely on humanitarian military intervention 
from powerful countries. The study has gone on to demonstrate through examples such as Ivory Coast, 
Libya and Syria that this doctrine has been undermined by powerful countries when powerful countries 
accused leaders of these respective countries of failing to protect their citizens. These accusations are 
mostly used as a pretext of overthrowing sovereign governments. Another attempt at curbing the 
excesses that go hand-in-glove with humanitarian military interventions is based on the attempt at 
emphasising the primacy of nation-state sovereignty. 
The study has shown that whilst those who do not believe in humanitarian military interventions appeal 
to nation-state sovereignty as an absolute binding norm that should regulate international relations under 
international law, some scholars argue against this absolutist position by maintaining that nation-state 
sovereignty should be respected on the condition that the given state is able to protect its citizens from 
gross human rights abuses and genocide. Despite these efforts to subvert humanitarian military 
interventions by the powerful on developing countries, the study went on to argue that the pursuit of 
national interests by the powerful countries poses ethical problems on the justifiability of humanitarian 
military interventions. An action can only be ethical when it helps to promote the wellbeing of the other. 
An action that promotes the wellbeing of the other is usually regarded as altruistic. The study argued that 
since humanitarian military interventions are not based on altruistic motives, these interventions do not 
have anything to do with morality but the pursuit of national interests. Whilst the prevalence of national 
interests dominates humanitarian military interventions in a way that undermines the existence of ethics 
in international relations, the study made the following recommendations among others;  
• That the conduct of HMI should be regulated by the use of regional organisations and non-
interested parties with the UN acting as the supreme regulator. Coupled with this should be the 
production of an agreed upon HMI template to regulate the conduct of the intervening countries 
and their service personnel in order to limit or curtail abuses of HMI.  
• The creation of an international HMI fund that will be accessed and used in HMI.  
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• Special training on the conduct of HMI to military as well as civilian personnel. This 
recommendation was influenced by the fact that in the conduct of HMI is different from 
conventional warfare.  
• That the pursuit of national self-interest within the community of nations should be done only 
through the authorisation of the UN if it is to promote the interest of the whole nation state.   
• The establishment of rules and regulations that would also allow for the prosecution of personnel 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1  Background to the Study 
The issue of Humanitarian Military Intervention (HMI) has remained a controversial one within the domain 
of peace and security studies and international relations hence there is a lack of agreement among 
scholars and political practitioners on whether HMIs are acceptable or not. The major areas of the 
controversies have ranged from but not limited to; the acceptability of the definition of HMIs, abuses, 
violations of state sovereignty, legality, acceptability, legitimacy and interpretation among others.  
Advocates of International law further question whether International law should permit states to 
intervene militarily to stop genocide or comparable atrocity without authorization from the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). For instance, in Kosovo and Iraq and the non-intervention in Sudan and 
Rwanda.  Most HMIs to date have been in the form of unilateral, multilateral and coalitions of the willing 
sometimes with, and sometimes without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
In the context of the United Nations (UN), the UNSC authorizes international military intervention in a 
foreign country when events obtaining in that target country pose a threat to international peace and 
security. The UN Charter Article 2 (7) states that ‘nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize 
the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. In the same 
vein, UN Charter Article 2 (4) states that, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. However, in some instances the 
UNSC is arm-twisted to authorize HMIs by powerful countries (intervening states) in pursuit of their 
national interests.  For example, in the case of Iraq, Tony Blair and George W Bush misrepresented their 
intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in order to invade Iraq and get rid of Saddam 
Hussein (Blix: 2004). (http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/18_blix.shtml). Blix 
accused USA President George W Bush and British Prime Minister of acting not in bad faith, but with a 
severe lack of a ‘critical thinking’ (Powell: 2004) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3596033.stm).  
In Libya, the UN authorized UN Resolution 1973 which was abused to the benefit of the intervening 
states notwithstanding the motive of the same resolution.  In the same vein one would question whether 
France’s intervention in Ivory Coast was humanitarian or not given its past colonial history and later the 




Researchers on the subject of HMI have mainly dealt with the legality and legitimacy of HMIs; (Cassese 
(1999); Simma (1999); Holzgrefe (2003) and Farer (2003)), and not much has been said or established 
on the influence and role of self-interest in HMIs.  The problem arises, however, when HMIs conflict with 
the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. 
It must be noted that most of HMIs have been undertaken in countries that can be described as weak 
militarily and economically. According to J. L. Holzgrefe (2003) humanitarian intervention is: 
The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights 
of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied. 
In this case HMIs undertaken by different powerful countries like the United States of America (USA), 
Britain and France in Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999), Ivory 
Coast (2010-11) and Libya (2011) are arguably typical examples of the practice falling within this 
category. 
While the above noted HMIs were based on the ethical imperative to prevent national authorities from 
perpetrating human rights abuses against their citizens, the international community ignored gross 
human rights abuses and genocide in a number of instances most notably in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur 
(2003). These examples demonstrate the inconsistent application of HMI principles. Such inconsistences 
can be viewed as application of double standards by powerful states in the international society so as to 
maintain their hegemony. This has led to some scholars like Köchler (2001) to question why interventions 
are conducted in some regions and countries and not in others. The selective and inconsistent nature of 
interventions by the intervening countries has raised a number of ethical questions, most importantly on 
whether it is ethical imperatives or interests that motivate HMIs. These inconsistences in the application 
of HMIs have motivated the researcher to question the ethical principles that lead countries to undertake 
HMI missions in other countries and regions and neglect others. This thesis, therefore is concerned with 
exploring the role of self-interests in undertaking HMIs and questioning the compatibility of national self-
interest with humanitarianism.  
When the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) was created in 2001, the authorizing mandate for HMI was exclusively given 
to the UNSC. The R2P doctrine states that in the case of gross human rights violations the international 
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community through a UNSC authorization can undertake HMI guided by the need to stop human rights 
abuses and rebuild physical and non-physical institutions for sustainable peace and respect of human 
rights (ICISS, 2001). Whilst the R2P was touted as a new approach to protecting populations from mass 
atrocities and genocide, the legality of this doctrine needs to be analysed in line with HMIs and whether 
the doctrine advances the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends. 
Ethics, real or perceived, have always been part of the human societies, hence, in politics, social contract 
thinkers and philosophers like Grotius (1625), argued that leaders had a duty to be benevolent to their 
subjects, and leaders who brutalized their subjects were seen to have abandoned the law of nature (the 
original law which is sometimes referred to as God’s law, that arrogates each individual basic human 
rights) and hence could not claim protection from the law of nations. In such a case any compassionate 
leader/s could fight the brutal leader to restore the law of nature (Grotius, 1625). The social contract 
theory brought in the subject of HMI in international relations, whose ethical drives are critiqued in this 
thesis. 
The most common presumption among many scholars like Ferdinand Teson and Gareth Evans is that 
countries participate in HMI for altruistic reasons whereby the main motive is presumed to be about 
protecting human lives against an oppressive tyrannical government (Teson: 2003).  Contrary to this 
popular view among scholars of peace and security studies in international relations, there are those like 
(Köchler, (2001); Ayoob, (2002: 81 -102)) who have maintained that national interest is the main 
motivating factor behind HMIs. These interventions are not undertaken for altruistic purposes. Iraq and 
Libya are perfect examples where situations escalated after HMIs and to date the situations in these 
countries have remained volatile and chaotic. Given the above background, the thesis will question 
whether intervening states are not exploiting humanitarian exceptions to justify the pursuit of their national 
interests.  The thesis will further explore whether HMIs are not a tool to camouflage the pursuit of national 
self-interests by the powerful countries. 
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
In light of the empirical evidence, from the above HMIs that have taken place thus far, this study will 
argue that if,  HMIs were aimed at alleviating tyranny and gross human rights abuses, why then have the 
situations in the intervened countries deteriorated from where they were before the HMIs? 
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1.3  Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this study is that national self-interests are the main motivating factors in the 
undertaking of HMIs. 
1.4  Preliminary Literature Study and Reasons for Choosing the Topic 
In light of the above discussion, the issue of HMIs remain a highly contested terrain among scholars.  In 
this regard one finds that there are three notable schools of thought. The first one is the Interventionist 
school of thought which tends to support the HMI as a moral practice that cannot be restricted by nation 
state sovereignty.  When a national leader becomes brutal towards his or her subjects in a manner that 
undermines the law, it is argued by Interventionists that other countries have a legitimate right to 
intervene and restore the observance of human rights (Holzgrefe, 2003: 26).   
 
Interventionists recognize HMI as a right action that should be undertaken by states in case of a threat 
to human life in the form of mass murder of civilians or genocide. Scholars in this school argue that the 
international community is based on both laws and ethics.  Teson (2003: 96) contend that, “Humanitarian 
intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases … Sovereignty serves valuable human ends, and 
those who grossly assault them should not be allowed to shield themselves behind the sovereignty 
principle”. Teson acknowledges the fact that international law in general bans the use of force, he 
contends that, “cases that warrant humanitarian intervention disclose … serious violations of international 
law; genocide, crimes against humanity and so on”.  Similarly, Julius Stone (2003:37) contends that 
‘Article 2 (4) does not forbid the threat or use of force simpliciter; it forbids it only when directed against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state hence if a genuine humanitarian intervention 
does not result in territorial conquest or political subjection … it is a distortion to argue that [it] is prohibited 
by Article 2 (4).  Moreover, supporters of humanitarian intervention argue that even within the article 
itself, there is an exception that ‘this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII’   Thus, military intervention could be authorized by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the Charter if (a) Security Council determine ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression’; and (b) the Security Council deem the measures to be taken as 
‘necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.  Counter-interventionists also point 
to Article 1 (3), 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.  Christopher Greenwood (2002: 141-175) rightly argues 
that ‘it is no longer tenable to assert that whenever a government massacres its own people or a state 
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collapses into anarchy international law forbids military intervention altogether’.  The interventionist 
school of thought argues that while sovereignty is a necessary principle in international society, it cannot 
be used as a defence by those who brutalize their citizens.  
 
Weiss (2007: 96) argues that when the former United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan 
was faced with the difficulty of state sovereignty in relation to military intervention, he redefined the notion 
of sovereignty by arguing that sovereignty was no longer viewed as a preserve of the state leadership, 
but as a right of the people and a duty of the state to look after its population. Annan (1999) during his 
address to the UN General Assembly on 20 September called on the international community to accept 
that the international system was transforming, hence the need to respond to developments in 
international relations which he said: 
Demand of us a willingness to think anew … about how the United Nations 
responds to the political, human rights and humanitarian crises affecting so much 
of the world; about the means employed by the international community in 
situations of need; and about our willingness to act in some areas of conflict, while 
limiting ourselves to humanitarian palliatives in many other crises whose daily toll 
of death and suffering ought to shame us into action. 
Relatedly Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild and Zartman (1996) popularized the concept of ‘sovereignty 
as responsibility’. Under the concept of Sovereignty as Responsibility, with particular reference to Africa, 
Deng et al (1996: 1) argued that while it is accepted that internal conflicts within individual states and 
their consequences fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the concerned state, hence a subject of the 
national sovereignty of that state, “it is also recognized that sovereignty carries with it certain 
responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are accountable not only to 
their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community”.  
The argument that was brought about by Deng (et.al) (1996) centred on the need to transform the 
concept of internal control and accountability of a state to a global level, where the international 
community will act as a watchdog on those leaders who ‘abuse’ sovereignty to commit crimes against 
humanity. These scholars argue that in situations of internal conflicts, especially those that are 
perpetrated by the state, it is impossible for the state to be a peace broker in a case in which it is a part 
to the conflict.  
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The concept of sovereignty as responsibility to protect was buttressed by the development of the doctrine 
of the international community by the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. In his address to the 
Chicago Economic Club in 1999, Blair stated that:  
We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to 
participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political 
ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts 
and the violations of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure 
(Blair, 1999). 
Blair (1999)’s doctrine of the international community is based on the argument that the world has 
become intertwined through the developments in information and communication technology which have 
led to increased human movement across the previously rigid boundaries including the transfer of 
conflicts from conflict zones to relatively peaceful regions. The doctrine of the international community is 
therefore an intervention doctrine that seeks to increase the role of the international community in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states. 
Apart from the interventionist school of thought we have the Non-interventionists school of thought which 
does not recognize HMI as a practical solution that can be undertaken without being driven by national 
self-interest. Scholars like Ayoob, Booth and Köchler cite selfish national interests as the reason for 
intervention. Booth (1994: 58-59 & 62) argues that governments are driven by interests that put 
themselves first against any other person or country and use media propaganda to court domestic and 
international support by presenting exaggerated facts. Köchler (2001: 34-35) argues against the human 
rights narrative which he sees as power political tool:  
The most powerful nations arrogate to themselves the right to act in the name of 
humanity or of the international community. While enjoying a monopoly on definition of 
these terms, the global actors have resorted to arbitrary action against the sovereignty 
and independence of other states whenever they deem such action appropriate to serve 
their interests. Humanitarian intervention has become one of the key terms to legitimize 
what otherwise would have to be called act of aggression or interference in internal 
affairs. 
 
Non-interventionists premise their argument on the duty to respect state sovereignty as well as the UN 
Charter which annulled the use of force in international relations except in the case of self defence or in 
the case of a UNSC authorizing against a threat to international peace and security. The non-
interventionist school also argues that sovereignty in its classical state cannot be revised as it is the last 
garrison for weak states against the encroachment by bigger powers into their affairs. It is from this light 
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that scholars like Köchler views the HMI doctrine as a veil to legitimize aggression.  According to non-
interventionists, any interference in the affairs of the sovereign state in the name of “humanitarianism” 
directly breaches the UN Charter.   
 
The realist argue that this could lead to abuse, since interveners only pursue their “national interests” 
hence they may use issues regarding human rights as a pretext for intervention in order to achieve their 
political objectives.  Ian Brownlie, argues that, “…humanitarian intervention, on the bases of all available 
definitions, would be an instrument wide open to abuse … a rule allowing humanitarian intervention … 
is a general licence to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial intervention (Ramsbotham and  
Woodhouse, 1996:64).  There is no doubt that the problem of abuse (and selectivity) could damage the 
already fragile issue of legality and legitimacy, however, this does not mean that force should not be 
used when governments massacre their own citizens.  What would happen if governments use 
‘sovereignty as a licence to kill’? (Baylis, and Smith, 2005: 556) 
 
Ayoob (2002) viewed the application of the politics of intervention as somewhat a return to Europe’s 19th 
Century concepts of the civilized and non-civilised races and peoples in which only the Europeans had 
the right to impose their will on others, specifically Africa. In respect to the R2P doctrine that was rising 
at the end of the 20th Century and state sovereignty as related to intervention, Ayoob (2002: 84) argued 
that;  
Without denying the considerable moral force of the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ approach, 
one cannot help but notice echoes of the ‘standard of civilization’ argument in this proposition. 
According to this latter thesis, which was the prevailing political wisdom in Europe until the end 
of nineteenth century, only those countries that had reached a certain standard of civilised 
behaviour had the right to attain sovereign status and interact with each other on the basis of 
mutual recognition of sovereignty. The others, being barbarians if not savages, were to remain 
subject to, or under the tutelage of, sovereign (European) powers. Where they could not be 
subjugated… rules of European international law that enjoined the reciprocity in interstate 
interactions did not apply to them. This denied them the protection of norms that had been 
developed in Europe to govern interstate relations, the chief among them being the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. 
 
The third school is the legalist school of thought. Proponents of the legal school are not in agreement on 
what international law advises on the practice of HMI. Those who support non-intervention base their 
argument on the classical conceptualization of the concept of sovereignty. Luttwak (1999/2000, 57) 
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argued against HMI as it was incompatible with the independence of countries specifically in Africa. He 
viewed the revision of the concept of sovereignty as “Kofi’s rule” that was specifically influenced by the 
push for intervention by the USA (Luttwak, 1999/2000). 
 
Proponents of non-intervention also base their argument on the strict adherence to the explicit 
interpretation of the UN Charter (Eisenhamerova, 2011: 15). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that, 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.” There are only two instances in which the threat or use of force is 
explicitly accepted under the UN Charter as stated in articles 42 and 51 which empowers the Security 
Council to use force to restore international peace and security in the case of failure through peaceful 
means and for individual states or groups of states in the case of an armed attack by another state, 
respectively.  
Cassese (1999) supports the argument that any military intervention that is not explicitly authorised by 
the UNSC is illegal in international relations. He notes that, the use of force by NATO in the Former 
Yugoslavia was illegal and that “Under the UN Charter system, as complemented by the international 
standards which have emerged in the last 50 years, respect of human rights and self-determination of 
peoples, however important and crucial it may be, is never allowed  to put peace in jeopardy.” Legal 
thinkers argue that in the case of the HMI by NATO in Kosovo, the intervention can be seen as having 
been illegal but legitimate (Simma, 1999: 1; Cassese, 1999: 791; The Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo; 2000: 4).  
However, legal scholars like Brown (2000) argue that HMI can be seen as legal basing on the implicit 
interpretation of the UN Charter and customary international law. Brown (2000: 1697) argues that, “The 
argument for humanitarian intervention assumes that, at least in appropriate cases, the protection of 
human rights is a higher priority than the defence of national sovereignty from armed intrusion. It follows 
that when the human rights situation is serious enough, the proportionate use of armed force to remedy 
this problem should be legal.” Brown (2000: 1698) goes on to state that:  
The rules prohibiting genocide and crimes against humanity are peremptory norms from 
which, in theory at least, no derogation is permitted. What then is to be done when 
widespread violations occur and the territorial state is either unwilling or unable to 
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prevent them? If diplomatic initiatives fail, military intervention may be the only way to 
prevent the continuing slaughter of innocents. 
This section of the legal school argues that the UN Charter was not meant to be a static document but a 
document that could be interpreted in light of changing international events (Eisenhamerova, 2011: 17). 
Legal interventionists also argue that the practice of HMI was established as a customary international 
practice long before the establishment of the UN hence could not be limited by it (Eisenhamerova, 2011: 
21).  
However, the argument can be countered by the notion that the traditional practice of HMI had been an 
elitist one conducted by European powers only to intervene in areas of interests (Richards, 1986: 155). 
This thesis sought to bring to light the relationship between self-interest and altruism in HMIs. While a 
number of researches have been conducted with respect to legality and legitimacy, there has not been 
exhaustive studies conducted specifically on the field of major powers’ conduct of HMIs in relation to the 
interplay between morality and pursuit of national self-interests.  In addition, the thesis was also 
influenced by the continued contradiction of practice and theory in relation to HMI on emerging conflicts. 
The cases of Libya, Syria, Ivory Coast and the non-intervention in Rwanda are emerging issues which 
have not been exhaustedly researched and hence warrants the reopening of the practicability of an 
ethically driven HMI. 
1.5  Research Objectives 
The research sought to: 
1.  Establish the different contentious reasons purportedly used by intervening states for 
undertaking Humanitarian Military Interventions.  
2.  Analyze the role of national interest in the context of Humanitarian Military Interventions.  
3.  Assess whether self-interest is compatible with humanitarianism.  
1.6  Research Questions 
The broader question upon which the research is based is, what role do national self-interests play in the 
undertaking of HMI? From this broader question a number of questions are constructed as follows: 
1.  What have been the reasons used by powerful states in support of HMIs?  
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2.   Is the concept of national self-interest compatible with humanitarianism?   
3.  Is it possible to have a HMI case that is free from the influence of national self-interests? 
4.  How can future HMIs be conducted without national self-interest controversies? 
1.7  Principal Theories upon which the Research is Constructed 
This study is based on the theories of Political Realism, Altruism and International Society. These 
theories will be discussed with specific reference to HMI.  
1.7.1   Political Realism 
Political realism, is a theory that views international relations as a competitive arena whose major 
signpost is the struggle for power (Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, online, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/). Political realists argue that there is no place for 
morality in international relations hence any act undertaken by a state is strictly calculated to increase its 
influential abilities in the international system. This theory is sometimes referred to as the power theory 
due to its emphasis on power and national interests in its explanation of international relations. Political 
realists contend that politics is governed by objective laws of selfishness and struggle for power that have 
their roots in human nature (Donnelly, 2000: 7).  
The theory translates that states as international persons act in ways that increase their power and 
dominance in the international system and counter such power gains by other states. Major Powers1 
seek to maintain their hegemony while lesser powers seek to increase their power and rise to the 
positions of hegemonic powers either regionally or internationally. The international arena, due to the 
sustained competition for economic and political gains by states to increase their power, becomes an 
anarchical arena where ‘idealistic’ moral rules are only accepted and obeyed to the level that they are in 
line with the pursued interests of different countries.  
From the foregoing, HMI becomes  a tool to increase one’s power in the international system and is only 
directed to areas that either increase the hegemonic dominance of major powers or counter the influence 
                                                            
1 A major power is a state that dominates other states in a given region at a given time. This power is 
derived from the aggregate composition of political, socio-economic and military capabilities. This 
power is manifested in the states’ ability to influence other states in the international system or the 
specific region in which the state is geographically located. (Morgenthau, 2006, 31 – 33). 
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of a rival power or limit the rise of a lesser power to a rank of a hegemonial power. The theory of Political 
Realism maintains that it will be irrational for a country to undertake a humanitarian military initiative and 
incur the costs simply because such a state feels morally obliged to protect the citizens of the target state 
without the intervening state having a lot to gain from such interventions.  
Morgenthau (2005: 5) states that, “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through 
the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”. “Realism 
assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally 
valid” and has stood the test of time since the time of the antiquity historian, Thucydides. While the theory 
accepts the role of ethics in influencing international relations (Mearsheimer, 2006: 74) such an influence 
is only limited to the point when it does not conflict with the survival of the state. Hence as Morgenthau 
(2005: 5) puts it:  
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with 
the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and 
opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted – 
and few have been able to resist the temptation for long – to clothe their own 
particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. 
The concept of self-interest under the theory of realism denotes that states can only undertake 
intervention if they provide them some gains that will offset the costs of intervening. National interests 
holds that, “the essential, perennial relationship among states is one of competition and self-help, hence 
moral considerations are irrelevant” (Maxwell 1990: 11).  The realist believes that a nation’s survival 
comes first and second is the furtherance of its interests. In such cases, the notion of humanitarianism 
will be used as a smokescreen to cover up the hidden motives.  
1.7.2  Altruism 
Altruism can be seen as operating at the extreme opposite of Realism. The term altruism refers to those 
actions that are intended and motivated to benefit the other/s without necessarily benefiting the acting 
part/persons, and in some cases undertaken at the expense or self-harm of the acting part/persons 
(Krieg, 2013: 48). Bar Tal (1986: 5) states that, “altruistic behaviour (a) must benefit another person, (b) 
must be performed voluntarily, (c) must be performed intentionally, (d) the benefit must be the goal by 
itself, and (e) must be performed without expecting any external reward.” 
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Altruists argue that there are always “group interest” (Margolis, 1982: 11) that may motivate actions by 
persons for the benefit of others and not necessarily themselves. Even Adam Smith who is revered for 
his advancing of the concept of self-interest in liberal economics stated that, “How selfish so ever man 
be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of 
seeing it” (Smith, 1969: 47).  
The theory of altruism had a special position in this research given that it can be seen as the basis upon 
which the concept of moral HMI is based as noted by Krieg (2013: 48) that “the concept of altruism found 
its way into international relations, particularly since humanitarian intervention has emerged as an act 
with the primary purpose of helping others.”  
However, different groups have different attitudes and response to other groups perceived as outsiders. 
While a certain group may be guided by ethical rules in internal interactions, the ethical rules are 
sometimes disregarded when dealing with people seen from the outside groups. Even in the animal 
kingdom where elements of altruism are exhibited in the form of compassion among group members, 
such compassion is lost when the group/species is confronted with other groups. Hence, there is need 
to explore how group consciousness impact on altruism and ultimately on leaders getting concerned with 
the abuse of the rights of strangers and taking a risk of sacrificing the lives and resources of their peoples.  
The thesis used the theory to deduce if it is possible for a state to pursue a policy in international relations 
that is purely based on morality, in contrasts to the realist argument that such a policy can only result in 
self-destruction and in worst cases extinction of such moral states. The thesis also questioned if it is not 
possible for a state to pursue both a moral policy in conjunction with pursuit of its self-interest. In short, 
the central question was whether it is possible to marry altruism with national self-interest in HMI.  
1.7.3  International Society 
The theory of International Society was developed on its greater part by the English School of 
international relations. Proponents of this school include Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan who argue that for 
there to be an international society, states must move from the concept of international society by 
establishing contractual rules guiding their conduct especially on war and peace. Buzan (1993: 330), 
citing Bull and Watson defines the idea of the international society as a, “group of states ... which not 
merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations 
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of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the 
conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.”  
The theory attempts to explain the manner in which states are organized and relate to each other in a 
bid to minimize the effects of anarchy “(understood  not as chaos but as the absence of government” 
(Linklater, 2010: 2)). In defining the international society, Linklater (2010: 3) states that, “At its heart is 
the observation that states have a common interest in establishing and maintaining international order: 
they have a shared recognition that their security and survival depend on a general willingness to control 
the use of force, to respect sovereignty, to observe the principle of non-intervention, and to ensure that 
treaties are kept.” Bull (1977: xxxiv-xxxv) notes that the true institutions that were put in place as the 
foundation of the international society are balance of power, international law and diplomacy. He goes 
on to state that “to find the basic causes of such order as exists in world politics, one must look not to the 
League of Nations, the United Nations and such bodies, but to institutions of international society that 
arose before these international organisations were established, and that would continue to operate 
(albeit in a different mode) even if these organisations did not exist.” These institutions are the ones 
mentioned above as balance of power, international law and diplomacy. 
Having developed from an exclusive composition of European ‘international’ state system which viewed 
itself as the only civilised society encircled by non-civilised ones, the concept of the international society 
sought to give direction on how the different members can co-exist in their diverse cultures and different 
conceptualisation of rights. 
Linklater (2010) notes that the majority of scholars in the English school are against HMI as it is seen not 
as immoral but a disturber to the rules based system as it threatens sovereignty and the stability in the 
society of nations (Bull, 1977: 151). However, the theory accepts HMI as a moral act that can limit state 
brutality. The hesitation on supporting the intervention concept is driven by the fact that it is seen as a 
European construct and the theory encourages the minimisation of forceful internationalisation of 
European values (Linklater, 2010: 1 - 13). 
1.8 Methodology 
From what has been said thus far, the research methodology is qualitative in nature. Qualitative research 
methodology refers to interpretive based research (Creswell, 2009: 176) that has no or little use of 
numerical data. The research utilized data collection tools/techniques such as primary and secondary 
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data sources and in-depth interviews. The researcher used books, journal articles, UNSC resolutions 
related to the subject, protocols governing HMIs, scholarly/academic material, and electronic sources 
useful to the study.  
HMI is a practical exercise that is authorized by political leadership with influence from different power 
constituencies like business community, non-governmental organizations and media community, and 
conducted by military personnel in conflict-rife areas. The targeted sample size for the research was fifty 
respondents. The researcher, therefore conducted in-depth purposeful interviews with thirty three 
respondents selected from politicians, political analysts, ambassadors, academics, peace activists and 
military personnel2. Respondents who were selected using purposive sampling3 from different 
constituencies were selected for the following reasons: 
Politicians are part of the main policy making machinery that decide on whether to undertake a HMI 
mission and when to undertake the mission. It is also the voice of politicians that is the most pronounced 
in state relations. They are also a central part of the national interest formulation groups. 
Ambassadors are part of a country’s governing machinery. They act as advisors of their governments on 
foreign policy with respect to the country in which they are posted. They are also the link between the 
country and the foreign governments and they represent the head of state of their countries. 
Political analysts and academics were selected specifically because of their deep and continuous 
research in politics and international relations. The continuous research which they have been 
undertaking was valuable as it widened the horizons of the researcher. 
Peace activists/NGOs were important to the researcher as they possess information of conflict issues 
and peace studies. They also influence policy and decisions of governments and international 
organizations. The information they provided was pertinent to the study. 
                                                            
2  For some specific details on the respondents who agreed to their names appearing in the research 
list of interviewees, see appendix 4. There was no specific criteria that was used to come up with the 
thirty three respondents. This number was reached based on the availability of the key respondents 
that the researcher contacted on the basis that they are versed with issues that were under interrogation 
in this research. The researcher did not pay much attention to the number of the respondents but to 
their understanding and experience on the issues under interrogation. 
3  Purposive sampling refers to the selection of participants based on the fact that the researcher is 
aware that such participants can provide the researcher with the information he/she is looking for due 
to their experience with the subject under interrogation and review.  
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Military personnel were chosen because they advise the political leadership on issues to do with active 
undertaking of HMI. They were also chosen because of their proximity to wars which made them 
instrumental in providing information on the quantification of casualties and how such casualties are 
declared to the public as well as the types of weaponry that can and sometimes is used and the effects 
of different arms to civilians in a war zone.  
Content analysis was the main method of data analysis. Content analysis refers to different methods and 
ways of interpreting text/content, which in this case were written words from primary and secondary 
sources, questionnaire responses and spoken words from the interview respondents (Neuman, 1997, 
272-273). Content analysis can be defined as, “any technique for making inferences by objectively and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics within a text” (Holsti, 1969: 85). Lasswell (1949:120) 
simplifies the definition by stating that content analysis means “Who says what, to whom, why, to what 
extent and with what effect?”  
With the exception of chapter 1, which is an introductory chapter, all the chapters are a continuous 
presentation and analysis of the research finding and information gathered. This analysis is synthesized 
in chapter 10 (Research findings and Recommendations). This follows Creswell (2009: 184) who notes 
that “qualitative data analysis is conducted concurrently with data gathering, making interpretations, and 
writing reports.” 
 
1.9 Limitations of the Study 
 
The study was only limited to HMIs and not other forms of humanitarian interventions such as the 
distribution of emergency relief and securing humanitarian space for the operations of aid agencies, 
facilitating conflict resolutions post war rebuilding processes aimed at preventing relapse, alleviating 
disease and hunger and natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. This thesis was only 
concerned with the coercive combat military intervention undertaken in another country on the basis that 
the citizens in such a country are facing gross human rights violations by their leaders or groups aligned 
to the national leadership of the subject country. The thesis, therefore, does not deal with other areas 
that are in some instances defined as ‘HMI’ which include the role of the military in peace operations 
after having been invited by sitting governments and mandated by the UNSC. It also excluded the role 
of the military in assisting with humanitarian aid or guarding international aid workers in conflict zones or 
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assistance rendered by the military after natural disasters and catastrophes like earthquakes, landslides 
and tsunamis and diseases as in the West African Ebola disaster. 
 
1.10 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction. 
This chapter covers the proposal of the study.  It provides the background to the study, Statement of the 
problem, hypothesis, preliminary literature study and reasons for choosing the topic, research objectives, 
broad research questions, principal theories upon which the research will be constructed and 
methodology. 
Chapter 2:  Conceptual Definition of Humanitarianism. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a conceptual definition of humanitarianism.  The chapter further 
explores the evolutionary processes that humanitarianism has gone through tracing different civilizations 
in the world.  It covers the definition of humanitarianism, Christian influence on humanitarianism and the 
concept of HMI. 
Chapter 3: An Historical Analysis of Humanitarian Military Interventions (HMIs). 
After providing the study with a conceptual definition of humanitarianism, in this chapter the aim is to 
provide with an historical account of Humanitarian military interventions (HMI). The Chapter demonstrate 
how HMIs evolved with specific reference to the modern era, and also how HMIs were discussed within 
the world multilateral organisations such as the League of Nations, and the UN. The chapter shows how 
the pursuit of national interests has always overshadowed HMIs. 
Chapter 4:  The Pursuit of Strategic Resources under the Guise of Humanitarian Military 
Intervention. 
The chapter looks at the historical analysis of HMIs with the aim of looking at HMIs in the Roman Empire 
and HMI during the Cold War.  It further looks at HMIs after the end of the Cold War, controversial 
interventions in Kosovo and Iraq which was justified as a HMI mission after the failure to secure WMDs 
by the Coalition of the willing leaders, Tony Blair and George W. Bush.  It further explores interventions 
in Africa such as the Libyan intervention and non-intervention in Rwanda. 
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Chapter 5: The Creation of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P). 
This chapter traces the rise of R2P from the creation of the responsibility to protect doctrine at the turn 
of the 21st Century.  It gives the historical analysis of HMI and why the concept became a justification of 
the military interventions in the post war period.  The chapter further argues that R2P was realised due 
to the support it got from influential leaders at the time.   
Chapter 6: State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Military Interventions. 
The chapter analyses state sovereignty and HMIs.  It further defines state sovereignty from Westphalia 
to the UN era, sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect doctrine. 
Chapter 7: An Investigation of the Role of National Self-Interest in Humanitarian Military 
Interventions.  
The Chapter assesses the relationship between national self-interest and HMIs.  The aim is to understand 
and define self-interest, self-interest in economics, national interest and HMI. 
Chapter 8:  An Ethical Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Humanitarian Military 
Interventions. 
The chapter critically analyses the ethical challenges and role of self-interests in HMIs. It attempts to 
answer whether it is possible for powerful states to undertake HMIs in the affairs of weak states without 
anticipating any benefit from the intervention (national interests). 
Chapter 9:  Summary Conclusion, Research Findings and Recommendations. 
The chapter gives a summary conclusion of the study, research findings and recommendations by linking 
all the issues discussed and thus creating a crystallized conclusion. 
Chapter 10      General Conclusions and Recommendations 




CHAPTER 2:  CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIANISM 
2.1  Introduction 
The concept of Humanitarianism, as already been discussed and stated in the previous chapter is subject 
to different interpretations and understanding by different people depending on their orientation.  For 
example, academics, the clergy, politicians, theorists, scholars and even institutions have a different 
perception and understanding of the concept of HMI and humanitarianism.  It is because of this reason 
that conceptualization of the humanitarianism concept remains elastic and debatable, hence often 
abused to suit individual or group interests.  Conceptualization of humanitarianism from the various 
philosophies and scholars at this stage is therefore critical as it is from this understanding that the concept 
is then linked to HMI which is the main objective of this study. 
This chapter will therefore explore the development of Humanitarianism as a concept from the Greek 
Philosophers up to its current understanding in HMI.  Furthermore, it explores the conceptualization of 
humanitarianism from the philosophical, economic, religious, ethical and secular facets points of view.  
Throughout this study the understanding of humanitarianism is limited to that which distinguishes 
interventions that are aimed at rescuing indigenous people from the harm that is perpetrated or is about 
to be perpetrated to them by the state authorities who should be responsible for their protection. 
Humanitarianism can be in the form of assistance given to victims of natural or manmade calamities like 
earthquakes, diseases, tsumanis and floods, or simple assistance given by one individual to another or 
groups assisting those facing hunger and starvation. For example Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 
and Ebola in Sierra Leone just to mention but a few.  In the light of this study, however, the term 
‘humanitarian’ is used to mean combat military assistance to civilians of a foreign country in cases of 
their human rights being grossly abused or about to be abused by their leaders especially the right to 
life, hence its marriage to the term ‘military intervention’ and coming up with the term ‘Humanitarian 
Military Intervention’. 
2.2  Definition of Humanitarianism 
The term humanitarianism is derived from the adjective ‘humanitarian’. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary (2000: 586) the term is defined as, “Concerned with reducing suffering and improving the 
conditions that people live in”. The Macmillan Dictionary defines the term as, “Relating to efforts to help 
people who are living in very bad conditions and are suffering because of a war, flood, earthquake etc.” 
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Macmillan Dictionary further defines the term as, “Caring about someone who is in a very bad situation 
or receiving unfair treatment” (Macmillan Dictionary). 
The two dictionary definitions (Oxford and Macmillan) of the term, ‘humanitarian’ as given above show 
that the term means assistance rendered to those in need. The definitions do not inform or differentiate 
on how the assistance is rendered and by who. The major thrust of the two dictionary definitions of the 
term ‘humanitarian’ as given above is on civilian assistance given to those in need who would have been 
put in appalling situations by natural or manmade disasters like wars, famines, floods and tsunamis 
among others. 
Encyclopedia Britannica (https://www.free-ebooks.net/ebook/Encyclopedia-Britannica) defines 
humanitarian intervention, which is derived from the term ‘humanitarian’, as “actions undertaken by an 
organization or organizations that are intended to alleviate extensive human suffering”. The definition is 
open to different interpretations by different persons or groups of people. By ‘alleviating extensive human 
suffering’ there is no clarity on whether the assistance can be of a civilian or military nature. While civilian 
humanitarian workers argue that humanitarian intervention and assistance should not be militarized, this 
thesis specifically refers to HMI as the combat military intervention to counter the humanitarian excesses 
of a government to its citizens which is different from the plain understanding of the term when viewed 
from the dictionary and encyclopedia definitions as given above.  
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action (OCHA, 2011: 4), is of the opinion 
that “Humanitarian assistance (which also refers to humanitarian intervention), broadly defined, seeks to 
save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity in response to need”. OCHA further notes that, 
“Humanitarian assistance is guided by the core principles of humanity, impartiality and independence 
endorsed by the General Assembly” (OCHA, 2011: 4) As with the Encyclopedia Britannica definition 
given above, the OCHA definition is open ended and allows for multiple and different interpretations. 
However, the concept by OCHA is water-tightened by making it guided by the principles of humanity, 
impartiality and independence. These principles guard against the encroachment of self-interest and 
selective application of humanitarianism especially in conflict situations as was the case with Operation 
Restore Hope in Somalia in 1991 (UNOSOM 1). 
The meaning of the term humanitarian has been a subject of debate by scholars like Benthall (2003) who 
argues that, “In the West, the term ‘humanitarian’ has become elastic. It can be a straight synonym for 
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‘compassionate’; or it can embrace a wide spectrum of aid based on a commitment to a shared humanity; 
or it can refer more specifically to the technical delivery of relief in zones of disaster or conflict.” In 
agreement with Benthall on the difficulty to settle for a single meaning and a single root of the term 
‘humanitarian’, Davies (2012: 3) argues that:  
Humanitarian’ was invoked to assert the human nature of Christ, but it also referred to 
those who replaced Christianity with ‘humanity’ as the supreme object of worship. At 
the same time, ‘humanitarian’ designated a concern for the whole of mankind, a 
compassion and kinship with all living creatures, and it was applied to describe the 
efforts of those who advocated for human welfare.  
The term ‘humanitarian’ can be used in pure charitable work, or socially in approaching other people 
amicably in line with moral values or in other cases using military means to salvage those seen as being 
brutalized by their leaders. 
2.3  Socio-Religious Conceptualization 
Under the socio-religious conceptualization, the concept is traced from social practices and beliefs as 
well as religious belief as borrowed from religious texts and practices. It is argued by altruists that human 
beings have a natural feeling of attachment to other human beings (Sorabji, 2007: 20). This perceived 
natural feeling of attachment by human beings to each other can be seen as humanitarianism, which 
when translated to physical actions can be called altruism. The notion that human beings have a natural 
feeling of attachment to each other is supported by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2003: 12) which argues that:  
Altruism is traced to family and kinship obligations to protect one’s own and offer 
hospitality to strangers. These behaviours are extensions of basic human drives to 
self-preservation and protection of one’s offspring, so it is not surprising that altruistic 
customs are a virtually universal feature of human societies.  
The Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions played a major role in shaping the concept of humanity. From 
the Judeo-Christian and Islamic teachings, humanity is a single entity drawn from a single God and from 
a single parentage of Adam and Eve. This is based in part on the Biblical verse (King James Version) 
(Genesis, 1: 27-28) which states that, “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God 
created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, be 
fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth”, and the Koran (4: 1) which among other many verses, says 
that, “O mankind! Be dutiful to your Lord, Who created you from a single person (Adam), and from him 
(Adam) He created his wife [Hawwa’ (Eve)], and from them both He created many men and women; and 
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fear Allah (God) through whom you demand (your mutual rights), and (do not cut the relations of) the 
womb (kinship).” From this perspective which is also shared by the different African traditional religions 
in their belief in the Supreme Creator e.g. (Musiki/Musikavanhu, Shona words meaning the Supreme 
God) human beings are commanded by this Creator to act righteously towards each other, failure of 
which results in different forms of divine punishments.  In this respect therefore, people have tended to 
assist each other in times of need. 
Practically however, the application of the concept of humanity was accepted selectively by European 
powers, with only the Europeans being viewed as human while other races were seen as sub-humans. 
This assertion is supported by the fact that slavery was practiced by the European countries at a time 
when the Christian doctrine had developed strong roots in European societies. European thinkers like 
Gregorio, Aristotle and Sepulveda did not view Africans and American Indians as equal beings to 
Europeans basing either on the natural skin pigment or on other conjured scientific justifications, or their 
failure to adhere to Christian values (Sorabji, 2006: 22-23). This proves that political consideration also 
had a major influence on defining humanity. This argument is raised here given that when the Europeans 
popularized the concept of HMI in the 19th Century, they argued that the Ottoman Empire was mistreating 
Christians (Köchler, 2001). However, as noted by Köchler (2001), the European leaders were guilty of 
the same crime as they were inhumanely treating their colonial subjects in Africa, Asia and Latin America.  
Given this argument therefore, one would conclude that there was selective application of the norm 
humanitarianism based on skin colour. 
Douzinas (2007: 1) questioned the whole notion of humanitarianism as we know it today. He further noted 
that the concept of humanity is an invention of modernity, and that its application was selective in the 
Roman Empire. He postulated that: 
The Romans inherited the idea of humanity from Hellenistic philosophy, in 
particular Stoicism, and used it to distinguish between the homo humanus (free 
men, citizens or refined men), the educated Roman, and the homo barbarus 
(unrefined peripheral men). The ‘human man’ was regulated by the jus civile, had 
some knowledge of Greek culture and philosophy and spoke in a cultivated 
language – he was like a graduate who read Greats at Oxford and speaks with a 
slightly posh accent. The homo barbarus was subjected to the jus gentium, lacked 




While there was an acceptance of the respect of humanity in the Roman Empire as it was in Greece, it 
was selective. It distinguished between the Romans who were seen as subjects to the idea of being 
human people and barbarians who could otherwise be viewed in the Roman Empire as semi-humans 
and not subject to being treated with the morals applied to other humans. Such selectivity gave a moral 
backing for the inhumane treatment that could be meted on non-Romans (Sorabji, 2006: 23). It was this 
selectivity that was imported by the European countries when they moved into the colonized world. The 
selectivity strengthened the assertion that the application of the term humanitarian by Europeans and the 
Western world as we know it today is a recent invention. 
Relatedly, it is noted that humanitarianism has gone through an evolutionary process since antiquity. It 
developed from the notion of humanism, from the secular world perspective, and religious righteousness 
from mostly the Judeo-Christian tradition and Islam as well as other religions in the world, both bringing 
up the concept of humanity (Douzinas, 2007: 2). According to Douzinas (2007: 2) humanism refers to 
the viewing of a human being as a species in existence “without differentiation or distinction in his 
nakedness and simplicity (from other human beings), united with all others in an empty nature deprived 
of substantive characteristics except for his free will, reason and soul”. On the one hand, humanism is 
pessimistic on the existence of a superior deity and puts faith in human beings as the source of human 
goodness (Evans, 1999: 1-2). On the other hand, the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions draw the 
concept of humanity from the religious parentage of Adam and Eve (The Bible (King James Version), 
Genesis 1: 27; The Koran, 4: 1). Hence, from the Abrahamic (a term used to refer to the three religions 
that trace their roots to Abraham, namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam) religious perspective all human 
beings are one nation. This religious world view command human beings to be good to one another as 
members of a single family, hence being the foundation of humanitarianism.   
In the field of international military relations, the concept of a single humanity, which is seen as the 
viewing of different peoples in the world as one with universal rights, can be seen to have influenced the 
development of HMI (Franck and Rodley, 1973: 67). HMI is used to justify the intervention by powerful 
countries into another country, mostly weak ones to stop the excesses or brutality of a government 
against its own people (Krylov, 1995: 367). The concept was accepted as ethically right and justified by 
international law thinkers like Hugo Grotius (1625: 247). The concept was used by European powerful 
countries to militarily intervene in the affairs of the less powerful countries specifically the Ottoman Empire 
and in the crusades which began after Pope Urban II’s speech in 1095. 
23 
 
The moral justification is however contested by political realist thinkers who view humanity as individually 
fragmented and in pursuance of individual happiness. They advance that HMIs are prone to abuse 
(Krylov, 1995: 403). However, proponents of the Solidarist International Society theory have a different 
view from the Realist thinkers. Wheeler (2001: 309) forwarded a case for a moral justification for HMI 
when he argued that, “there is often a compatibility between protecting the national interest, promoting 
international order, and enforcing human rights.” Belloni (2002: 37) puts forward that Solidarists “argue 
that intervention is a duty in cases of extreme human suffering. Intervention is thought to actually 
strengthen the legitimacy of the society of states and deepen its commitment to justice.” 
However, not all proponents of the International Society theory subscribe to the moral imperative of HMI. 
Pluralists, including Hedley Bull, “believe that states can agree only on a minimum set of rules of 
coexistence, in particular sovereignty and non-intervention. … Humanitarian intervention is a violation of 
these rules safeguarding the independent choices of other political communities, and is inherently open 
to the possibility of abuse by the strong trying to coerce the weak” (Belloni, 2002: 36-37). Hence, the 
concept of HMI has been divisive among the International Society theorists. 
2.4 Philosophical Conceptualization 
 
In the Greek philosophical thought, humanitarianism is debated in the concept of whether human beings 
are naturally self-interested or act in altruism and are driven by morals on their interactions with other 
human beings (Lauren, 2010). Greek philosophers like Plato and the Stoic school of thought did not 
support the concept of individuals having no moral thought and only acting in self-interest. Acting only in 
self-interest was regarded as the expression of the weak nature of human beings. Lauren (2010: 110) 
quotes Plato when he argued that: 
Mankind must give themselves a law and regulate their lives by it, or live no better 
than wild beasts. There is no man whose nature ensures that he shall discern what 
is good for mankind and be able to put it into practice. It is hard to perceive that 
welfare must be concerned with the community before the individual, because 
common interest cements society and private disrupts it. Man's frail nature is 
always tempted to self-aggrandizement and self-seeking. 
Plato’s assertion forwarded the primacy and supremacy of community interests over the interests of an 
individual. A selfless human being was the best human being in a society, while self-interest was viewed 
as a sin of avarice. According to Plato, neither one’s person nor property was his/hers, but belonged to 
24 
 
the whole lineage, including the past and future generations (Lauren, 2010: 111). Cicero (1967) agrees 
with the argument that human beings should be guided by ethical rules when he said that:  
How can we say that a youth is a young man of great promise and high character, 
when we judge him likely to study his own interests and do whatever will be for his 
personal advantage? Do we not see what a universal upheaval and confusion 
result from such a principle? It does away with generosity and gratitude, the bonds 
of mutual harmony. If you lend a man money for your own advantage, it cannot be 
considered an act of generosity; it is usury and no gratitude is owing to a man who 
lends money for gain. 
This postulation is important in analyzing the concept of humanism especially as it comes up with the 
issues of generosity, gratitude and mutual harmony. The three issues are central to the solidarity of a 
society and in cases where they are disregarded society plunges into turmoil. Altruistic actions became 
the cement of society, hence a society could view itself as a single entity. Cicero distinguishes between 
lending money for no interest as assistance and doing the same act of lending money but for personal 
gain as not assistance but usury (Lauren, 2010: 157). The Stoic School of thought also argues that 
human beings should act according to morals and ethics. In describing the teachings of Zeno, the founder 
of the Stoic School, Bryant (1866: 21) notes that, “the first Stoic fixed his thoughts chiefly on moral 
conduct” which is the basis of altruism.  
The Stoic School borrowed from philosophers like Cicero who taught the importance of human beings to 
live virtuous life and shun the pursuit of self-interest. Bryant (1866: 21) in his analysis of the Stoics notes 
that:  
To live according to his true nature is to live godly; godly life is virtue. This is itself 
true happiness, independently of pleasure in the common acceptation of the terra; 
because the supreme good is to follow what the law of nature points out as being 
good. Virtue having its seat in the soul, outward circumstances cannot reach the 
good man. As he can distinguish good from evil, he is wise; and this suffices for 
him. … All vices are equal in degree, because they run counter to the one law of 
virtue. 
While there was an acceptance of the concept of humanity from the Greek philosophers, it also needs to 
be questioned who were the subjects of such humanity. As argued by Douzinas (2007: 1) Romans took 
the idea of humanity from the Greeks and used it to distinguish between the civilized humans and 
barbaric humans who were not subject of ‘the law of the civilized’ humans. There was, therefore 
selectivity on the application of the concept in Greece between the civilized Greek and the barbarian. It 
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therefore stands that the application of the concept of humanity in European and other world civilizations 
was minimal and exclusive, hence allowing for inhumane practices like slavery to be part of morally 
unquestionable societal practices. 
It is proven by history that the application of the concept of humanitarianism as understood from the 
Greek concept of civilized human beings and the barbarians was selective until the end of the 
decolonization of Africa. The colonization of Africa, Asia and Latin America was justified on the basis that 
people in the colonized world were barbarians and therefore deserved no mercy as given to the civilized 
human beings of Europe. In Africa, racial segregation was the primary policy of separate development. 
This policy was notorious in South Africa where it was pushed by the colonial minority under the term 
apartheid (Hopkins, 2015: 241-242). 
However, the argument of the altruistic nature of humans has not gone without its critics. Arguing on the 
natural relations of human beings in 300 BC, the Epicurean school of thought advocated that it is natural 
for individuals to seek individual pleasures and hence self-interest and self-preservation is the primary 
goal of human beings (Sorabji, 2006: 26).  In describing the Epicureans, Bryant (1866: 4) notes that they 
“were advocates of the doctrine of the absolute freedom of the human will to choose what is agreeable 
to it. They denied the providence of God, or that he concerns himself at all about human affairs.” This 
school of thought maintained that, “happiness consisted in the pursuit of pleasure, and, as all wish to be 
happy, all should seek after the greatest amount of pleasure to be obtained” (Bryant, 1866: 5).  
This line of argument which supports self-inclination rather than societal inclination of humankind is also 
supported by Mauss (1967: 1) who argues that there is nothing like a free gift. Mauss (1967: 1) notes 
that, “In Scandinavian and many other civilizations contracts are fulfilled and exchanges of goods are 
made by means of gifts. In theory such gifts are voluntary but in fact they are given and repaid under 
obligation”. Therefore in real terms there is no free gift. 
There are unwritten rules in societies, specifically in the Scandinavian countries, that for the cordial 
relations in the society to flourish, there is need to extend ‘gifts’ which should be returned in kind (Mauss, 
1967: 1). While there is nothing wrong in having reciprocal gifts, the problem comes when the extending 
of such gifts is done with a predetermined notion of beneficial returns, an act which Cicero referred not 
as an act of altruism, but ‘usury’ (Lauren, 2010: 157).  
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2.5 Political Conceptualization of Humanitarianism 
The notion of human beings acting under the influence of self-interest brings in the realist argument that 
the interactions between human beings and groups of human beings is driven by power politics. Under 
realism, states are seen as individual entities competing with each other for ‘personal’ gains as stated by 
Mearsheimer (1995: 569) that, “Daily life is essentially a struggle for power, where each state strives not 
only to be the most powerful actor in the system but also to ensure that no other state achieves that lofty 
position.” If one is to borrow from Hobbes’ (1651: 77) argument that human beings fight for competition, 
dividends and glory, it becomes apparent that realism views human beings as self-interested.  
Realism does not deny that there is a place of humanitarianism among either human beings or nations. 
However, humanitarianism is accepted on two instances. Firstly, humanitarianism is only accepted in as 
much as it does not affect the wellbeing of the individual or nation in question (Mearsheimer, 2006: 74). 
This conceptualization is problematic given that most acts of humanitarianism affect the social or financial 
wellbeing of the one assisting. Secondly, humanitarianism is seen as a tool to be used in pursuing self-
interests. Hence, in other words, the notion in realist thinking can only be used as a façade to cover for 
the practical pursuance of power politics. Morgenthau (2006: 12) puts a concluding statement on the 
realist conceptualization of humanitarianism when he stated that:  
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the 
moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it 
distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted – and few have been 
able to resist the temptation for long – to clothe their own particular aspirations and 
actions in the moral purposes of the universe. 
In contrast to the above, from an African traditional view, humanitarianism can be seen as accepting the 
co-existence of altruism and personal gain. In support of the African traditional notion that acts of altruism 
can be pursued with the ultimate objective of personal gains, Bryant (1866, 8) points out that:  
We cannot deny, on the other hand, that men act from a feeling of self-interest. To 
obtain pleasure or escape pain is motive enough to make men pursue a certain 
course instinctively, without weighing accurately, or even caring at all for the 
motives which prompt them. When men see that virtue brings in its train present 
blessing and eternal hopes, shall we deny that this is a strong reason why they 
should pursue it? 
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This element of returns brings one to the notion of self-interest. In some cases, while individuals may act 
philanthropically, such individuals will expect beneficial returns. Even from an individual perspective it is 
hard for one to justify pure humanitarian gesture that is not undertaken with hidden self-interest motives.  
 
2.6 Humanitarian Military Intervention (HMI) 
 
HMI is a combination of two terms, namely ‘military intervention’ and ‘humanitarian’. The conjoining of 
the two terms denotes that a combat military adventure being undertaken by an uninvited external force 
(presumably powerful country) into the internal affairs of another country (mostly weak one) is not based 
on self-defense or invasion but undertaken to alleviate the suffering of the ordinary citizens from an 
inhumane and brutal leader. HMI is a controversial adventure. These controversies include but are not 
limited to definitional issues, the question of authorizing power, the issue of killing innocent civilians, 
sometimes referred to as collateral damage and the question of it being a façade for the pursuit of the 
national self-interests of the intervening country. 
 
The definition of HMI has been transforming from its traditional understanding to suit the current nature 
of international relations. The old definition, noted that HMI: 
…is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed 
at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights 
of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose 
territory force is applied (Holzgrefe, 2003: 18). 
Teson (2003: 94) defined HMI as “the proportionate international use or threat of military force, 
undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, 
welcomed by the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of double effect.” The two scholars noted above 
have the same conceptualization on HMI. However, they differ on the fact that while Holzgrefe does not 
stipulate the nature of the government that should undertake intervention, Teson specifies that the 
intervening power(s) should be liberal, and in extension should not be found committing the same 
atrocities in their countries. 
The old definition was identified by the lack of regulating authority to sanction the intervention. It was the 
discretion of an outside force to determine whether or not to intervene. If the outside force deemed it 
necessary, it took a cue from no other authority to embark on the HMI mission. This open ended nature 
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of the doctrine left it prone to abuse by expansionist leaders in Europe where the doctrine was used in 
many cases to justify imperial adventures and self-interests. 
The contemporary conceptualization of humanitarianism in war times is credited to Jean-Henri Dunant 
(Douzinas, 2007: 5). After witnessing the scourge of war after the battle of Solferino in 1859, Dunant 
spearheaded the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1864 which sought to bring relief to suffering 
combatants, protect civilians in warfare and also to protect prisoners of war. At its inception, this new 
humanitarianism was not concerned with the justness of any war but to alleviate the impact of such wars 
on the non-combatants and combatants who would have been taken captive. The principles of humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality and independence were the basis of humanitarianism (Douzinas, 2007: 5). 
Humanitarian workers who assisted those suffering in times of warfare had to do so without supporting 
any side and without having been an arm of any military involved in the war. This concept has however 
transformed to the current embrace of HMI. 
The concept of HMI is derived from the general understanding of the term ‘humanitarian’. The 
transformation comes from the use of military action in alleviating those who are in need of assistance 
specifically suffering from massive abuse of sovereignty and brutality from their leaders. The concept 
differs from the general understanding of humanitarian action because it is mostly applied in political 
situations where the citizens of a sovereign country are being brutalized by their leaders (Krylov, 1995: 
368). HMI therefore is a combination of military intervention and humanitarian aid in the affairs of another 
state but such military intervention not being undertaken for conquest by the intervening country or 
countries (Douzinas, 2007: 8-9) hence the intervention is humanitarian in nature. Kreig (2013: 37) notes 
that, “The term ‘humanitarian’ describing an intervention aimed at providing relief for individuals in danger 
grants the concept of humanitarian intervention a rather charitable, philanthropic or even altruistic 
connotation”. 
In some instances, military intervention is conducted not only to stop the excesses of a tyrannical leader 
but to assist in opening safe passages for humanitarian aid in war zones as was the case in ‘Operation 
Restore Hope’ in Somalia in 1991 (Ramuhala, 2011: 36) or for the military to assist humanitarian aid 
workers, without the conduct of war as was the case with Haiti in 2010 (The White House (Office of the 
Press Secretary), 2010).  
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The birth of the UN created the first relatively effective supra-authority in international relations. While 
the UN has failed to reign-in all countries, specifically the powerful ones, in their international conduct, it 
has managed to be the forum on which sanity could be brought in international relations, hence the 
creation of an International Society as advanced by the English school led by Hedley Bull. Its creation, 
and its subsequent illegalization of the application of force except in self defence after being attacked or 
after having been sanctioned by the UNSC under Chapter 7, to stop a conflict that has the capacity to 
disturb international peace and security, meant that the conduct of HMI was no longer a matter to be 
determined by individual countries and acted upon.  The contemporary definition of HMI therefore has to 
accept the existence of a supreme authority that regulates the behaviour of states outside their borders.  
A focus was made on African countries since it is in Africa where most interventions have been 
witnessed. 
HMI cannot be seen as a total imposition from outside Africa without Africa’s input or acceptance after 
humanitarian considerations. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), adopted the classical concepts 
of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries. Article III (1-3) of the 
OAU Charter states that African countries in their mutual interactions were guided by the principles of 
“the sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence”. 
The non-intervention principles were further emphasized by Article VI which stated that, “The member 
states pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present 
Charter.”  
This strict adherence to sovereignty and non-interference saw the African continent experiencing a 
number of civil wars and state-sponsored mass human rights abuses. The civil wars in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), civil wars and mass killings in Rwanda and Burundi and the Sudanese civil 
war are some of the crises that left a dent on African humanitarian history. The strict adherence to non-
interference is exemplified in the case of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda. The OAU condemned 
Tanzania’s entrance into Uganda even though it had been invaded by Idi Amin first (Acheson-Brown, 
2001). The Continental body did not take into consideration the mass atrocities that Idi Amin had 
committed against Ugandans.  
Africa’s strict adherence to the concept of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs was shaped 
by its long history of colonialism. It was interference in the affairs of other societies (which later became 
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countries) that led to colonialism, one can argue. Hence, in order to guard against future colonialism and 
the dominance of the affairs of the new countries by the powerful countries in the post-colonial era, 
African leaders might have seen it wiser to adhere to the strict rules of sovereignty and non-interference 
in the internal affairs of another country. However, this policy created new problems for the continent. 
Some of the new leaders used brutal means to hold on to power with their peers not having the power 
or will to take such brutal leaders to task. The OAU earned a notorious picture of being seen as a league 
of despots.  
The notion of an attempt to come up with a modern institution, in line with the concepts of the International 
Society paradigm in the name of the OAU and adhering to old classical state centric politics meant that 
there were contradictory actions by African founding fathers. The creation of a rules based institution 
automatically created an interactive relationship between African states under which transformations in 
one state would have impacts and shockwaves in another. The attempt to ignore the birth of an African 
society was therefore going to fail as was later seen in the Ugandan case under Idi Amin. The 
contradictions between the African Society and attempts to remain in primordial state-centric politics were 
witnessed when Tanzania intervened in Uganda, a case which was unpalatable to most leaders in the 
OAU and later on from the destabilizing effects of the Somali Crisis in East Africa. 
The rebirth of the continental body changed the non-interference policy. The African Union (AU) which 
succeeded the OAU in 2002 established new rules on sovereignty and non-interference. Article 4(h) of 
the Union’s Constitutive Act states, “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.” A complete reading of the Constitutive Act shows that while the Union undertook to 
respect territorial integrity of member states and to refrain from the threat or use of force among member 
states (Article 4 (g) and (f) respectively), this respect was now subject to the member country not acting 
in a manner that made it lose its claims to sovereignty. 
This thinking came about due to the continental experiences as noted earlier and the push from leaders 
whose countries suffered state led mass atrocities with no response from the continent such as Uganda 
and Eritrea (Kioko, 2003: 813). In an address to the 22nd Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 1986, the Ugandan President, Yoweri 
Museveni stated that, 
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Over a period of 20 years three quarters of a million Ugandans perished at the hands of 
governments that should have protected their lives … I must state that Ugandans … felt 
a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent … the reason for not condemning 
such massive crimes had supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the internal affairs 
of a Member State, in accordance with the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations. 
We do not accept this reasoning because in the same organs there are explicit laws that 
enunciate the sanctity and inviolability of human life. 
The push by African leaders and changes in the global world can be seen as the major reasons for the 
intervention policy change. Africa had been embarrassed by the humanitarian catastrophes in Uganda, 
Rwanda and Somalia among a number of humanitarian cases. The pro-intervention clauses in the 
Constitutive Act signalled a theoretical transformation which would take time to be implemented 
practically. The genocide in Darfur of 2003 and the slow responses to Ivory Coast (2010-11) and Libya 
(2011) showed that the continental body still had a big task ahead of it to operationalise the pro-
intervention clauses of its Constitutive Act and its African solutions for African problems principle.  
However, under the new Constitutive Act, the continental fathers managed to deal with the theoretical 
and practical contradictions between the created African Society as a component of the International 
Society and the rules governing sovereignty and non-intervention. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The concept of humanitarianism has been the core of this chapter. In the chapter, it was discussed from 
socio-religious, philosophical and political facets. From the philosophical facet, the chapter noted that 
under the Greek philosophy, the subject was contested between the Stoics and the Epicurean Schools 
of Thought. The Epicurean School of Thought argued that human beings by nature were driven by self-
interests, while the Stoic School of Thought propounded that altruism was the natural endowment of 
human beings and those who acted under the motivation of self-interest were driven by avarice.  
Under the socio-religious facet, it was pointed out that the kinship bond created among different peoples 
due to family ties brought about the issue of natural attachment and compassionate feeling for each 
other. This compassionate feeling when acted upon becomes altruism. Hence the social rise of 
humanitarianism. It was further noted that the concept of humanitarianism was influenced by different 
religions, specifically the Judaic-Christian and Islamic doctrines as they trace humanity from a single 
parentage of Adam and Eve.  
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The chapter ended by discussing the intercourse of humanitarianism and military intervention. It noted 
that the use of the term ‘humanitarian’ in military intervention is derived from the fact that such a military 
intervention will not be driven by the needs of self defence, self-gain or assistance to another sovereign 
state that would have called for assistance, but driven by ethical desires to save civilians in distress. In 
contemporary times, the chapter traced the application of humanitarianism in warfare to Jean-Henri 
Dunant who advocated for humanitarianism in war after witnessing the scourge of war in the aftermath 
of the battle of Solferino in 1859.   
While Dunant’s humanitarianism specifically targeted creating moral rules for the treatment of 
combatants and non-combatants in war, HMI specifically targets to relieve civilians who are subjected to 
gross abuse by their leaders. The chapter also discussed the African position on HMI. It argued that HMI 
was initially not accepted on the basis that the OAU saw non-intervention and non-interference as the 
primary defence against recolonization by powerful countries. However, as noted such a policy gave 
room for some African leaders or those aligned to leaders to commit heinous human rights abuses 
without being taken to task by fellow Africans. In the creation of the AU, African leaders substituted non-
intervention with non-indifference. While the AU reaffirmed its adherence to non-intervention and 
sovereignty of individual countries, sovereignty would only be accorded to those who respected human 
rights.  
This chapter discussed the evolution of humanitarianism and how it was influenced by socio-political and 
religious factors. It ended by defining HMI which is derived from humanitarianism. It also had a deliberate 
discussion on HMI and Africa given that Africa has been at the centre of HMI debate and practice. One 
just has to look at the Somali, Rwandese, Sudanese and Libya among many examples to see the 




CHAPTER 3:  AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
3.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the conceptualization of humanitarianism. This chapter gives a historical 
analysis of humanitarian military interventions and why the concept became grounded in history to the 
extent of being a justification of some military interventions in the post-Cold War period. The chapter 
discusses the ancient origins of humanitarian military interventions during and after the Cold War. 
Chapter 3 is motivated by the fact that the HMIs cited as examples have been difficult to be justified by 
the leaders of those countries that undertook them.  Military interventions that were justified as 
humanitarian by countries that undertook them have also been criticized as military adventures for 
national interest camouflaged as humanitarian. The chapter begins by discussing what has been argued 
as humanitarian military interventions by Grotius (2001: 241).  It will then discuss cases that have been 
cited as humanitarian military interventions during and after the Cold War and conclude by discussing 
whether such interventions could be called humanitarian or not. 
Documentation of military interventions that could be termed military humanitarian in ancient times have 
been a challenge. This applies to all continents. However, there are some wars that were justified by 
national or military leaders that could be argued to be based on humanitarian grounds.  The heritage of 
the notion of humanitarian military intervention can be traced to the works of International Law writers 
such as Francisco de Vitoria (1532), Hugo Grotius (1625), Francisco Suarez (1679) and Emer de Vattel 
(1758).  According to Knudsen (1997: 46) it is Grotius in his treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis who strongly 
put forward the notion that States have the right “vested in human society” to act on behalf of oppressed 
individuals, thereby advocating the full use of force to end human suffering. Though humane in theory, 
the practice has been used since ancient times to camouflage national self-interests by the interveners. 
In ancient times, some Christian church fathers beginning with Augustine of Hippo wrote on just and 
unjust wars according to the Christian doctrine. These writings added to the doctrine of humanitarian 
military intervention that was developed in Europe. However, as shown in this chapter, the cases which 
are referred to as the pioneer cases of humanitarian military intervention were not justified as such by 
those who called for them or commanded the wars. In most cases they were seen as religious wars that 
would bring salvation to the ‘Christian warriors’. The doctrine of humanitarian military intervention gained 
precedence in 19th Century Europe (Köchler, 2001: 3-7). As in the pioneer cases, it was biased in support 
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of Christians and Christianity with little or no application of the doctrine in cases where non-Christians 
were the victims of persecution. Parallels can be drawn on the fact that when the European powers were 
engaged on popularizing the doctrine in support of Christians under Muslim sovereigns, they were also 
involved in persecution of non-Christians in Africa, Latin America and the Far East (Köchler, 2001: 3-7). 
3.2 Humanitarian Military Interventions from the Roman Empire to the Turkish Empire 
One cannot pinpoint exactly when the first humanitarian military intervention occurred in human history. 
However, Grotius argues that “Constantine took up arms against Maxentius and Licinius, and other 
Roman emperors either took, or threatened to take them against the Persians if they did not treat 
Christians with humane practices” (Grotius, 2001: 247). This traces the practice of humanitarian military 
intervention to 324 AD. 
3.2.1 The Roman Empire 
The examples forwarded by Grotius create questions given the fact that at the time wars were accepted 
as a means of territorial expansion both in the Roman and Persian empires. With respect to Constantine’s 
wars against Maxentius and Licinius, the wars had self-interest connotations. Power struggles had 
emerged in the Roman Empire around 309 BC and Maxentius and Constantine both laid claims to the 
throne, with Constantine controlling the North and Maxentius controlling the South while Licinius had a 
high political rank over the other two who became jealous to serve under him (Hickman, 2013; Gearey, 
1999: 6). The battle of the Milvian Bridge which resulted in the death of Maxentius was started by 
Constantine in an effort to counter a possible coalition between Maxentius and Licinius (Gearey; 1999: 
8). The examples given by Grotius do not satisfy the requirements of humanitarian military intervention 
which are just cause, right intention, proportionality, the prospect of success and the war being 
undertaken as a last resort (Wheeler, 2001: 5-11), but were wars for power, hence the pursuit of self-
interest.  
Even though Constantine had developed attachment to Christianity, his wars were driven more by the 
desire to attain total control of the Roman Empire and the wars could be viewed as civil wars against 
rivals to the throne (www.orderofconstantinethegreat.com/milvian_bridge.htm). Gearey (1999: 12), citing 
Eutopius, notes that “Constantine wanted to rule the world and so made war on Licinius.” 
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With respect to the war between Constantine and Licinius in 324, different accounts of history have 
presented different causes to the war. On the one hand, Christian sources, specifically those written after 
Constantine’s victory depict Licinius as an “evil Persecutor” and that Licinius had begun persecuting the 
Christians hence Constantine had legitimate reasons to go to war to save the Christians (Gearey, 1999: 
13 and 16). However it should be noted that Licinius was a Christian and Gearey (1999: 1) notes that he 
was a “protector of the church”. On the other hand, pagan historians do not seek to justify the war 
between the two on moral grounds (Gearey, 1999: 16) but in the political quarrels that were obtaining in 
the Roman Empire at the time. 
3.2.2  The Crusades of Pope Urban II 
Judging on some of the main reasons for its calling, the Crusade of 1096 can be argued to have been a 
humanitarian military intervention. The Crusade of 1096 was called upon by Pope Urban II in November 
1095. Pope Urban II justified the war arguing that it was holy assistance to the Christians who were under 
persecution by the Muslims (Jones, 2004: 12). In extension, the invasion would also ‘liberate’ Jerusalem, 
a Christian holy land. Jones (2004: 13) quotes Pope Urban II that: 
Know, then, that anyone who sets out on that journey, not out of lust for worldly 
advantage but only for the salvation of his soul and for the liberation of the Church, 
is remitted in entirety all penance for his sins, if he has made a true and perfect act 
of confession. This is because he has dedicated his person and his wealth to the love 
of God and his neighbour. 
While Pope Urban II’s speech had humanitarian sentiments, a humanitarian military intervention is not 
only judged by the declared intentions but by other undeclared motives and the methods of war as well 
as the manner in which the soldiers conduct themselves during the humanitarian military intervention. 
Munro (1906: 236-240) argues that there were many more reasons than just the need to protect fellow 
Christians that led Pope Urban II to call for the Crusade and that there were also other personal interests 
that influenced the crusaders to take up arms in the fight. To understand Munro’s (1906) judgment, it is 
necessary to understand deeply the situation that was obtaining in Europe at the time when the Crusade 
was declared, as well as the situation that was obtaining in the Holy Lands. 
There had been a battle for supremacy between the Byzantine Empire and the growing Islamic Empire 
in Eastern Europe. Since the Byzantine defeat by the Muslims in the battle of Yarmouk in 636, the battle 
for control and dominance ensued. The Byzantine Empire lost control of Palestine to the Muslims and 
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successive caliphates of the Umayyad, Abbasid and Fatimids controlled the ‘Holy Lands’ (Andrea, 2004: 
28- 30). Such a political situation was untenable to the Christians outside of the Holy Lands.  
At the same time, political control of Western and Eastern Europe by the Pope was under threat. There 
were doctrinal, theological and language differences that led to the break up between the Roman Catholic 
and the Eastern Orthodox churches in 1054. The break up was popularly termed the ‘schism’. The break 
up led to the excommunication of the Eastern Europe Orthodox Church leaders from the Catholic Church. 
The political and religious problems that were unfolding in Europe presented serious challenges to the 
Papacy which was battling to stamp universal jurisdiction in Europe.  
In 1095, the Byzantine Emperor, Alexios I, from Constantinople sent an ambassador to Pope Urban II to 
request for military support against the growing military threat by the Turkish Emperor who had assumed 
control of the Islamic Empire from the Fatimids (France, 2002). The Pope immediately responded to the 
request as he found in the plan, one would argue, some benefit for the Papacy given that Rome was 
having antagonistic relations with Constantinople. He gave a speech at Clermont in which he ordered 
the Christians of Europe to fight in support of their brothers in the East for the forgiveness of their sins 
(Jones, 2004: 13). This was an official declaration of the Crusades that began in 1096. While the stated 
intention for the declaration of the crusade by the Pope was to liberate the Holy Lands, there were real 
and undeclared motives that led Pope Urban II to respond to the Byzantine ‘distress code’ with such 
urgency (Vicari, 2002: 7).  
There was no occupation or mistreatment of the Jews and Christians in the Holy Lands by the Muslims 
and the Muslim rulers of the Holy Lands regarded resident Christians and Jews as “people of the book” 
and treated them with respect while cultural intercourse and intermarriages were common (Findley, 2005: 
73). There could have been restrictions of Christian pilgrims from outside the Turkish Empire who had 
intended to visit the Holy Lands. Such discrimination cannot be used to ethically justify a humanitarian 
military intervention given that the ethical rules governing the conduct of humanitarian military 
intervention states the prevalence of massive abuse of internal residents of a state to warrant an 
intervention.  
The lack of a truly ethical reason to justify the ‘just humanitarian war’ in the name of the Crusade leads 
any scholar and analysts to establish the undeclared motives of the military interventions. Vicari (2002: 
v) states that there were secular motives that were both political, religious and economic that led to the 
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declaration of the Crusades. Politically, Pope Urban II saw the Crusade as a rallying cause that would 
unite the European princes who were fighting each other by giving them a common enemy and fight a 
unifying battle (Munro, 1906: 236-239). Undertaking the crusade against the Muslims demanded 
coordinated command of the war which was a unifying experience. The experience of the war itself 
creates comradeship among the fighters; hence war becomes a unifying experience. Relatedly, giving 
European princes and bishops a war to concentrate on had the capacity to allow Pope’s power to flourish. 
The Princes and bishops who were competing with Pope for power and influence had their attention 
diverted. The attention of the armies and their power was also diverted and would be reduced due to the 
casualties of the war.   
The major benefit of the Crusade to Pope Urban II was the reunification of the Western Christendom with 
the eastern Christian branch under his overall leadership. The idea of a Crusade to unite the Christian 
communities that had been torn apart by the schism of 1054 was not new. Vicari (2002: 7) opine that:  
Gregory did wish to take advantage of the opportunity, however, by means of a 
crusade. He hoped that this would renew the religious union between West and East, 
with the former in control, of course. Being a gifted statesman, Gregory crafted a new 
plan”, and this plan is stated by Runciman (1951-1954: 99) as, “The holy war, which 
was being so successfully waged in Spain (against the Moors), should be extended 
into Asia… His troops would drive the infidel out; … (and) the Christians of the East 
would resolve their quarrels in grateful humility and acknowledge the supremacy of 
Rome.  
While Pope Gregory VII did not live to witness the fruition of his plan, Pope Urban II saw in the idea a 
great plan to stamp the power and influence of Rome in both eastern and western Europe. Andrea (2004: 
28) noted that, “...nothing immediately came of Gregory's plan. But his successors (Pope Urban II) did 
not forget the dream of armed intervention to aid eastern Christians against the Muslims.” 
Andrea (2004: 30) sums up the desires of Pope Urban II for the establishment of the power of the Pope 
in Europe from the Crusade when he argued that: 
Pope Urban II's appeal for the First Crusade must, therefore, equally be seen within 
the context of a radically reformed and revitalized papacy that wished to rescue fellow 
Christians in the East and "return" them to what it perceived as right order, 
subservience to papal authority. 
The foregoing argument sought to justify that the 1095 declared Crusades in the Holy Lands were not 
humanitarian military interventions. Even though the war was declared on the basis that there was need 
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to free the holy land from the domination by the Muslim Turks, such a justification cannot warrant a 
humanitarian military intervention. The war was requested by the Byzantine Emperor who feared the 
growth of the power of the Turkish Emperor. France (2004: 35) even rejects that the Byzantine Empire 
was under an imminent threat of attack from the Turks who were embroiled in succession disputes at the 
time. He states that Alexius I wanted to “take military advantage of the (succession) chaos in the Islamic 
land, but he lacked the troops to reconquer Asia Minor” and hence “he sent an embassy to Pope Urban 
II to appeal for soldiers to aid the Christian Empire of the East”. Hence the original call for the war had 
no humanitarian intentions. The prompt response by Pope Urban was driven, not by the need to save 
Christians in the Holy Lands because they were not being brutalised4, but by the religious and political 
desires by the Pope to reunite the Western and Eastern Christian branches that had broken up in 1054, 
and to stamp the authority of the papacy in Europe. 
The conduct of the crusaders also justify the argument that the Crusades cannot be accepted as pure 
cases of ethical humanitarian military intervention that was not diluted by the self-interests of the 
intervening forces. France, (2004: 36) notes that different reasons motivated different groups of people 
and individuals to undertake the intervention. Crusaders from the lower tiers of society saw economic 
glory and acquisition of lands. Others were “promised church protection of their lands and the remission 
of their sins” (France, 2004:  36) hence taking part in the Crusade did not only guarantee their property 
rights but also spiritual returns in the forgiveness of sins. Some European princes who had political 
problems at home looked up to their taking part in the war to solve their internal problems.  
The Crusaders fought the war in the most unjust means. After the fall of Jerusalem, both Muslims and 
Jews who failed to escape the city were massacred, while some hundreds of Jews were burnt in a 
synagogue they had taken refuge in (France, 2004: 47). Such conduct including the Jewish massacres 
in Germany in Europe by the crusaders on their way to the Holy Lands (Chazan, 1996: 59-60) shows 
that the Crusade fell off the just war paradigm from both the reasons for the declaration of the war and 
the conduct of the war itself. Hence it would be absurd to list the Crusade as a historical example of 
                                                            
4  There were only isolated cases of Christian maltreatment like the strict Islamic codes that were 
imposed on the Christians by the Caliph of Egypt where Christians were denied among other things, 
not to employ Muslims and purchase slave, and the destruction of the Holy Church of Sepulchre 
(France, 2004, 34) which was constructed by Constantine’s mother, which at best can be taken as 
pretext to a military invasion according to the doctrine of humanitarian military intervention. 
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ethical humanitarian military intervention. At best, the war was a self-interest driven war that was 
influenced by political and religious struggles. 
However, this argument is not meant to have a blanket dismissal of some altruistic motives that could 
have influenced some individuals to take part in the Crusade. France (2004: 39) states that, “What we 
know of the major leaders suggests a mixture of motives. The counts of Toulouse, Blois, and Flanders 
were already immensely rich and it is difficult to see anything other than religious reasons for having 
taken the cross.” 
The argument that is put forward is that while there were some who took to the war for humanitarian 
reasons after the call by Pope, the reasons for the declaration of the Crusades were not humanitarian 
but simply conquest, to satisfy the imperial designs of Emperor Alexius I, while other undeclared reasons 
included Pope’s desires to unite Christendom under his command, while some individuals sought 
financial and military glory. The Crusade was therefore driven by a cocktail of intentions and motives 
most of which were influenced by the self-interests of the participants. In such a case, it will be hard to 
classify such a military adventure as an ethical humanitarian military intervention.  
3.2.3  European Intervention in the Ottoman Empire 
The doctrine of humanitarian military intervention was popularized by the European powers in the 19th 
Century (Köchler; 2001: 3-7). It was popularized through a number of military interventions beginning in 
1826 by European powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire that were justified under 
humanitarian terms (Köchler, 2001: 2-3).  
Beginning with the intervention in Greece in 1826, Britain, France and Russia went on an intervention 
spree in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the 20th Century because of its alleged 
inhumane treatment of Christians (Köchler, 2001: 2-8). History records that Britain intervened militarily in 
Greece in 1830 and Crete in 1866 to stop human rights violations and similarly France intervened in the 
Syrian and Lebanese war in 1860 justifying it through humanitarian inspirations. It must, however be 
noted that the persecution of the Greeks was a Turkish retaliation to the atrocities committed by Greeks 
against the Moslems in Morea which could have amounted to genocide (Richards, 1986: 157).  
The Greek question should also be analyzed against the political environment that existed at the time in 
Europe. Turkish retaliation was as a result of the Greek war of independence. Under customary 
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international law the Turkish sovereigns had the right to end the Greek ‘revolt’. The European powers 
were against support of any revolutions, a practice that was advanced by Metternich (Richards, 1986: 
57). A number of revolutions had taken place in Europe that is in France, Italy and in Germanic states 
that were suppressed with either the support or consent of European powers. That the European powers 
would support a revolution in the Turkish Empire against the prevailing European custom is questionable. 
Given the events that were obtained in Europe as argued above, the interventions by European states 
in the Ottoman Empire were driven by national interests with humanitarian arguments of saving the 
minority Christians and the civilians from abuse by their Turkish sovereigns being used to moralize the 
interventions (Benjamin, 1992: 128-9). 
Köchler, in his analysis of the development of the concept of humanitarian military intervention in 19th 
Century Europe concluded that, “Far from qualifying as disinterested action popularis, humanitarian 
military intervention in its actual practice in the 19th Century was dictated by the geopolitical interests of 
the then European powers” (Köchler, 2001: 3). This conclusion resonates with Richard’s assertion that:  
The traditional British attitude was the preservation of the power of the Sultan as a 
bulwark against a possible Russian advance to the Mediterranean… Turkish 
misgovernment did not greatly concern most British statesmen compared with the 
advantages of keeping a great military power like Russia from capturing 
Constantinople, one of the most strategically important cities in the world.  
One can therefore conclude that while genuine reasons for intervention could have existed in 18th Century 
Europe, the concept of humanitarian military intervention was applied selectively specifically for 
geopolitical interests with the genuine reasons being used as a camouflage for the national interests of 
the then European major powers.  
The origins of the doctrine of humanitarian military intervention as it is known in history and exemplified 
in the cases of Constantine and the Crusade of 1096 are grounded in Christian and power politics 
doctrines. If one is to accept the basis of Grotius that Constantine’s wars against Maxentius and Licinius 
were humanitarian, then one ought to note that Grotius clearly pointed out that Constantine only 
intervened because those who were under persecution were Christians (Grotius, 2001: 247) a minority 
group he had developed attachment with. 
Critical analysis of the cases that are forwarded by scholars like Grotius, as being the classical cases of 
humanitarian military intervention in the ancient times cast questions on the practicability of the concept 
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on purely moral grounds. The development of the concept of humanitarian military intervention is 
grounded in European religious and power politics. The interventions were in isolated cases purely 
‘humanitarian’ but only to the extent that it would have been Christians who were under persecution. In 
most of the cases, humanitarianism was only invoked to justify the wars either to other major powers that 
had the capacity to question the interventions or the citizens at home.  
The creation of a well codified body of law governing the conduct of states in the international system in 
the name of the UN impacted on humanitarian military intervention. Prior to the creation of the UN, war 
was seen as a means to settle disputes, even though there were efforts to codify law to govern the 
conduct of soldiers. The UN declared all wars, except those of self defence, to be unethical and illegal 
under Chapter 2 (4) of the charter. However, given that the charter also called on states to respect human 
rights of their citizens through the universal declaration of human rights, the charter at best can be seen 
to have been silent on the subject of humanitarian military intervention. The following section discusses 
cases which have been argued by scholars like Wheeler and Weiss as examples of humanitarian military 
intervention during the Cold war. 
3.3 Humanitarian Military Intervention during the Cold War 
The two world wars diverted the international attention from human rights issues to issues of power 
politics among different countries. The First World War (WW I) intensified issues of power politics among 
European powers. International politics was centred on managing the balance of power among European 
countries, specifically the need to curb the increase of power among the Axis powers (Germany and 
Italy). 
There has not been any military intervention that has been explicitly claimed by the intervening state to 
be humanitarian during the Cold War era except for the Indian case which gave a quasi-humanitarian 
justification to its intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). However, scholars like Wheeler, Annan 
and Weiss have pointed to three main cases as classical examples of humanitarian military interventions 
during the Cold War era. These cases are; “the Indian intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam 
intervention in Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1979” (Hylan, undated, 
http,//www.kcdme.com/Humanitarian20Intervention1.pdf).5 
                                                            
5  Colonel John Chinyanganya is of the opinion that HMI is a “virgin land” as he argues that HMI started 
after the end of the Cold War. In his opinion those interventions that were previously undertaken by 
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Annan (1998) in a Ditchley Foundation Lecture XXXV stated that: 
Even during the Cold War, when the UN’s own enforcement capacity was largely 
paralysed by divisions in the Security Council, there were cases where extreme 
violations of human rights in one country led to military intervention by one of its 
neighbours.  In 1971 Indian intervention ended the civil war in East Pakistan, 
allowing Bangladesh to achieve independence.  In 1978 Vietnam intervened in 
Cambodia, putting an end to the genocidal rule of the Khmer Rouge.  In 1979 
Tanzania intervened to overthrow Idi Amin’s erratic dictatorship in Uganda. 
However, given that any act of morality or humanitarian gesture should be initiated by a humanitarian 
intention, one ought to question the argument that such actions could be classified as humanitarian 
military interventions.  
It is from this line of thinking that the three military expeditions classified as classical cases of 
humanitarian military interventions during the Cold War should not be classified as such. In all the three 
cases, only India gave a partial justification on humanitarian grounds (Alexandrov, 1996: 208), even 
though from its argument, the major justification was self defence against what it termed “civil invasion” 
(Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurist, 1972: 92) and “military aggression” (UNSC 1606th 
Meeting, 1971, Articles 153, 154, 161, 163 & 175). Vietnam and Tanzania, which are the other examples 
cited as humanitarian military intervention cases, justified their interventions in Cambodia and Uganda, 
respectively, on self defence (Benjamin, 1992: 134). 
3.3.1  Indian Intervention in East Pakistan 
In the Indian intervention in Bangladesh (East Pakistan), the Indian government argued that it had 
generally intervened because of civil and military acts of the Pakistani government in East Pakistan 
(Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurist, 1972: 92 and 98). India’s intervention in East 
Pakistan was prompted by a number of reasons (Walzer, 1977: 105), the major one being the influx of 
an estimated 10 million refugees from East Pakistan into India (Secretariat of the International 
Commission of Jurist, 1972: 92), which threatened economic and political security in India (Benjamin, 
1992: 132). Wheeler (2000: 59) notes that Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi informed Western leaders 
                                                            
powerful countries in weaker one are simply military intervention driven by the realist notion of the 
pursuit of national interests. 
43 
 
that, “The refugee situation was intolerable, the problem was not of India’s making, but if necessary India 
would take action”. 
While “refugee aggression” was the major cause of the intervention, specifically due to the instability that 
it threatened in India, India also noted that it also intervened out of humanitarianism at the UNSC. The 
Indian ambassador to the UN cited in Wheeler (2000: 63) pointed out that, “Pakistani government’s 
repression of the East Pakistanis was on a sufficient scale to shock the conscience of mankind.” Such a 
selection of vocabulary clearly shows that India was trying to justify its actions under the concept of 
humanitarian military intervention. 
However, one can argue that the Indian intervention was not based on humanitarian reasons given the 
fact that humanitarianism was only raised as a need to buttress what India argued to be its primary 
objective of self defence. Pakistan and India had a turbulent relationship since gaining independence 
from Britain in 1947. The two countries had fought against each other on the question of which country 
should ‘annex’ Kashmir with the final war before the 1971 conflict, in 1965 ending in a stalemate 
(Schweers, 2008: 1). This stalemate has not been resolved to this date. 
Pakistan and India had been major enemies in the region specifically because of the reasons for the 
separation of the two countries, with India being predominantly Hindu and Pakistan being predominantly 
Muslims (Schweers, 2008: 1). Due to this history of antagonism, it is not hard to understand how India 
could fight not only to, geographically, break up Pakistan, which saw India being between the two areas 
under Pakistani control, but also to dismantle it militarily and diplomatically by creating a new country in 
the region that would be aligned to itself (India).   
3.3.2  Vietnam Intervention in Cambodia 
In 1978, Vietnam found itself faced with the Pol Pot government that refused to accept the boundaries 
that were left by the French during the colonial era and called for the cession of Mekong Delta and the 
area around Saigon to Cambodia (Wheeler, 2000: 80). The Vietnamese government made overtures of 
peace and pacific settlement of the dispute by engaging the Cambodian government into a dialogue to 
resolve the border disputes, but the peace initiatives failed due mainly to the negative response by the 
Cambodian government (Wheeler, 2000: 81). 
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Boosted by its alignment to the Chinese government, the Cambodian government invaded Vietnam in 
1977. This military invasion was pushed back by the Vietnamese but did not pursue the Cambodians to 
oust the government from power. The decision to finally invade was made and executed in late 1978 due 
to the militant nature of the Cambodian government. The Vietnamese invasion resulted in the change of 
government ushering in a new government that was aligned to Vietnam (see Deth, 2009: 9 - 19). 
The defeated Khmer Rouge party was responsible for an estimated massacre of between one and two 
million Cambodians during its less than four year rule (Pruit-Hamm, 1994: 187). Pruitt-Hamm notes that 
the Khmer Rouge was described as the worst after Hitler’s Nazi by a special rapporteur of the UN.  
The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was, however not influenced or driven by the need to save 
the Cambodians from a ‘genocidal’ government. The Vietnamese government was driven by the desire 
to protect themselves from attacks by the Cambodian government hence the war was based on self 
defence (Hilpold, 2001: 444). Faced by the need to justify its actions to the international community, 
Vietnam denied responsibility for the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia but an internal uprising 
by the opposition National Salvation Front hence arguing that there were two wars which took place 
concurrently (Alexandrov, 1996: 209). This defence was dismissed by the international community given 
the fact that there were approximately 150 000 Vietnamese soldiers fighting alongside the National 
Salvation Front when the Khmer Rouge was overthrown (Deth: 2009, 9 and 19). The arguments that 
were brought forward by the Vietnamese government show that the government’s intervention was not 
motivated by humanitarian reasons but self defence.  
3.3.3 Tanzania’s Intervention in Uganda 
The Tanzanian government justified its intervention in Uganda on self defence (Hilpold, 2001: 444). 
Tanzanian war against Uganda was in retaliation to an October 1978 Ugandan invasion of Tanzania, 
which on the other hand had been provoked by the alleged Tanzanian support to anti Amin forces that 
were using Tanzania as a launching pad to oust Idi Amin (Cooper and Hubers, 2003). Both customary 
international law as well as the UN law agrees that in the case of an invasion, a state has a right to self 
defence conducted through forceful means.  
However, with respect to this study, one ought to question whether Tanzania was compelled to end the 
war soon after driving back Idi Amin’s forces across the border or still had the right to topple him on the 
same reasons of self defence. Given that aggression is recognized as the major crime which any state 
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can commit against another state, Tanzania had a right to pursue Amin even in Uganda and bring him 
to justice. 
However, scholars have classified the Tanzanian intervention as a humanitarian military intervention 
besides the fact that it was a counter aggression war. Acheson-Brown (2001: 2) asserts that, “whereas 
the first stage of the war was characterized by Tanzania exercising its right to self-defense, the second 
phase extended the war with the rationale of humanitarian intervention.” This classification, as with the 
other two cases of Vietnam in Cambodia and India in East Pakistan, is based on the fact that the 
governments in the intervened states had committed and were in the process of committing war crimes 
and crimes against humanity that would warrant an intervention if weighed against the justification of 
humanitarian military intervention by Grotius. 
3.4  Humanitarian Military Intervention after the End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War resulted in the end of balance of power since the USA and NATO dominated 
the world political scene. The agenda of a monolithic political and economic system became political and 
economic liberalism. The end of the Cold War brought in a new dispensation of optimism in international 
relations. There was hope, at least from the optimists, for an international order guided by morals and 
ethical behaviour among states.  As the world became unipolar, humanitarian military intervention “has 
been given a qualitatively new and different thrust” which has seen it being “increasingly defined in terms 
of purposes or goals which are radically different from the traditional objectives” prior to 1990. The goals 
were now classified as humanitarian and universal, and being undertaken on behalf of the international 
community, even when the mission is executed by a single state or a coalition of states (Ayoob, 2002: 
83). Jameson (2011: 365) notes that:  
With the end of the Cold War in 1989-90 hopes were widespread that power politics 
would increasingly be replaced in international relations by moral and ethical 
considerations, mediated by the newly non-polarized United Nations and imposed, 
where necessary, by its Security Council.  
Proponents of an international human rights regime also saw the new dispensation as an opportunity for 
the globalization of human rights.  
A number of leaders in the developing world had managed to gain and retain power through the use of 
violence against their people during the Cold War due to international animosity between the two major 
powers of USA and the then Soviet Union. “The end of the Cold War unblocked the international 
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community to exert itself against the continued struggle for power by means of violence” (Collier, 2010: 
3). The Cold War was therefore seen as an albatross on the neck of the international community to stop 
the perpetration of genocide and human rights violations in civil wars.  
The end of the Cold War, therefore, witnessed an upsurge in humanitarian military intervention cases. 
This increase in the cases of humanitarian military intervention cases created questions of the morality 
of such interventions given that most of them were undertaken by powerful countries in less powerful 
countries. Some of the interventions were undertaken without clear authorization from the UN, while in 
some instances tragic cases which needed international intervention were ignored. These cases will be 
the subjects of the following sub-sections.  
3.4.1  Controversial Interventions, Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) 
In the post-Cold War era, many of interventions were undertaken by different powerful states in 
developing states across the globe. However, the Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) interventions were 
regarded as controversial because of the lack of a mandate from the UNSC authorizing the interventions 
and the use of humanitarian and human rights justifications, in the case of Iraq, after the failure of the 
initially stated reason of looking for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). With respect to Kosovo, 
Russia and China were against the intervention and contested it, with Russia sponsoring a UNSC 
proposed resolution to call off the intervention. 
The Kosovo conflict threatened European peace and security, especially if weighed against the historical 
precedence that the Balkans had been the trigger of major European conflicts specifically the first world 
war (WW I). The crisis created massive refugees (Greenwood, 2002: 147) which had the capacity to 
threaten stability in other states. The UN, however, could not act due to tensions and disagreements and 
mistrust between the veto powers, specifically Russia which had already indicated that it would veto any 
resolution that sought to authorize military action (Greenwood, 2002: 172). 
NATO states took it upon themselves and the organization went on to undertake military action against 
the Kosovo regime in March 1999. States who were against the intervention saw it not as a humanitarian 
mission to save lives, but as an invasion that was a trump on international law. Russia (supported by 
Belarus and India, which were not members of the UNSC) brought forward a draft resolution to the 
Security Council on 26 March 1999 that sought to prove that the intervention had no support of the 
international community and therefore was both immoral and illegal (Greenwood, 2002: 151-2). However, 
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the resolution was defeated by twelve votes against three votes in favour of it. States which supported 
the intervention put forward that the results of the resolution was in fact a legal and moral support of the 
intervention by the Security Council (Greenwood, 2002: 155).  
In support of the intervention as legal, the British Ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, quoted by 
Greenwood (2002: 158), stated that, “In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds 
of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable.” Then British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, quoted by Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks (2006, 36: note 51), in his response to 
the House of Commons argued that NATO actions were legally legitimate when he stated that: 
Under international law a limited use of force can be justifiable in support of 
purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the Council’s express 
authorization when that is the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming 
humanitarian catastrophe. Any such case would in the nature of things be 
exceptional and would depend on an objective assessment of the factual 
circumstances at the time and on the terms of relevant decisions of the Security 
Council bearing on the situation in question. 
Such justifications, whether be they taken from the British arguments or the post intervention resolution, 
are misleading and can set a wrong precedence in the international community. Greenwood (2002: 155) 
argues that the justification by NATO is misplaced because “non-condemnation is not the same as 
authorization”. As later stated by the Kosovo Commission, the intervention was illegal, even though it 
can be regarded as morally justifiable (Hardy, 2014: 3).  
However, the morality of it should be weighed against the real reasons for the intervention, and the 
number of civilians killed by NATO aerial bombardments. NATO’s intervention could be read as more of 
muscle flexing than humanitarian given that it had issued threats to intervene had the Yugoslav 
government not complied with Security Council resolutions of which failure to act would have made it a 
toothless organization. However, the intervention, even though seen by some as a mission in pursuance 
of hegemonic interest, events on the ground satisfied the need for an intervention from its moral 
justification. The only major problem of the intervention was one that was lamented about by the then 
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (1999) that: 
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when States and groups 
of States can take military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing 
international law, one might ask, Is there not a danger of such interventions 
undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after the Second 
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World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a 
clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents, and in what 
circumstances? 
The Iraq war of 2003 could not have been a controversial example of humanitarian military intervention 
had it not been justified by Tony Blair as such. The Iraq war was declared by the coalition of the willing 
led by USA and Britain on the basis that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction 
which posed a threat to USA and its allies including through sponsoring terrorism and terrorist groups 
like Al Qaeda (De Nevers, 2007: 7-8). After undertaking the invasion weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) were not found and leaders of the invasion described the war as a humanitarian military 
intervention because Saddam Hussein was a dictator who oppressed his own people (Heinze, 2006: 20). 
The problem with the Blair defined intervention in Iraq is that it fails to meet all the classical set rules for 
a humanitarian military intervention which are, “just cause, last resort, good over harm, proportionality, 
right intention and reasonable prospect of success (Wheeler, 2001: 5-11).” Basically for an intervention 
to be warranted, the leader should be in the process of grossly violating the basic rights of his/her 
subjects. There must be a willing by the oppressed to stop the oppression but failing due to the 
monopolization of the machinery of war by the ruler or leader (Walzer, 1977: 106), and the intervention 
should be called for by a legitimate authority, which in the current era is the UN through the UNSC 
(ICISS,2001: xii).  
The intervention in Iraq was carried out when Saddam Hussein had long stopped to grossly violate the 
basic rights of the Iraqis.6 Saddam Hussein had grossly violated the rights of the Iraqis, specifically the 
Kurds in the aftermath of his defeat by the USA forces under the UN banner after he had invaded Kuwait 
in 1991, but was stopped by the intervention of the international community through the institution of a 
no fly zone and demilitarized zones as well as creating safe passages for international aid to the affected 
regions under the operation code-named ‘Provide Comfort’, (Rudd, 2004:42) through the international 
interpretation of the UNSC Resolution 688 of 1991. During the 2003 intervention, no evidence of gross 
violation of human rights was put forward and the major reason for the war as explicitly stated by the 
USA and Britain was the need to clean Iraq of WMD. 
                                                            
6  It should be stated here that there is no universal definition or classification of what can be termed 
basic human rights. In the light of this research, basic human rights refer to the right to life, food, shelter, 
and enjoying basic privileges provided for by the state. 
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Given that Saddam Hussein’s government was not a ‘criminal regime’ or a regime practicing international 
criminal acts like genocide at the time of the invasion, the intervention, had it been warranted, should not 
have resulted in a direct regime change by the intervening powers because regime change falls in the 
realm of self-determination, and as such it is a preserve of the citizens of the country that is subject of 
intervention. 
The justification of the invasion of Iraq as a humanitarian military intervention after the invasion, as with 
the case of the Kosovo intervention, specifically being undertaken by major powers, create a bad 
precedence which can be used in the future to justify non-humanitarian interventions. It is because of 
these reasons that the Kosovo and Iraq interventions are judged to be controversial. 
3.4.2  Interventions in Africa 
Like any other developing continent, Africa has been a ground of humanitarian military interventions. 
Beginning in colonial times, until the French intervention in Ivory Coast and Libya in 2011, major powers 
that have intervened in Africa have argued that they have undertaken the missions guided by moral 
considerations. However, critics of the interventions have argued that such interventions resemble 
Western powers’ pursuit of hegemonic interest under the guise of ethical international relations. 
The argument has been partly based on the practice that in most cases it is former colonial masters who 
undertake or lead interventions in their former colonies. France’s interventions in Ivory Coast and British 
intervention in Sierra Leone in 2002 are cases to note. However, there are other instances in which non-
former colonial masters have undertaken intervention in other states. Nigeria led an ECOWAS 
intervention in Liberia in 1990 which could be viewed as a regional hegemonic intervention, while USA 
led an intervention in Somalia in 1992 after being given permission by the UNSC Resolution 794 of 1992.  
While a number of interventions were undertaken, the African case is one that has raised more questions 
than answers with regards to humanitarian military intervention. Beginning with Rwanda at the turn of the 
last decade of the 20th Century, the world’s humanitarian attention on Africa is tainted by neglect of the 
Rwandan case, the Somali and Sudanese crises. Ramuhala (2010: 59) states that:  
Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur are epitomes of unsuccessful cases of intervention, given 
that in Rwanda intervention never, or happened much too late after the death of almost 
a million people; while Somalia is an extreme case of an ongoing conflict amidst 
numerous military interventions and an almost totally collapsed state. Darfur on the 
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other hand represents a case which followed Rwanda, where in the latter case 
pronouncements were made to avoid a repeat of the former. 
The international community’s response to the crises, specifically the powerful states who had the 
capacity to stop the conflicts and humanitarian crisis was simply to shy away or pay lip service to crisis 
that needed dedicated response.  
The Somali crisis, though it lost international attention, is one of the neglected humanitarian scars on the 
face of Africa. The crisis was triggered by the fall of the country’s longtime dictator, Mohammed Siyad 
Barre to armed opposition groups in January 1991 (Farah, et al, 2007: 4). Farah (et al) (2007: 9) noted 
that, “the fall of Siyad Barre from his power base in 1991 would lead to the eventual break-up of the 
country into clan-based fiefdoms run murderously by warlords. Of course, the warlords claimed to be 
fighting in the name and interests of their clan families – which they were not, they were interested in 
seizing power.” 
After the fall of the Somali dictator, in 1991, the international community led by the USA initially reacted 
to allow humanitarian aid by NGOs to flow to the targeted people and stop warlords from killing civilians. 
The major warlords in the crisis were Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Farah Aideed. However, 
the international community’s intervention was short lived because the USA withdrew after its eighteen 
rangers were killed by Somali militias.  
The international humanitarian military intervention was triggered by the exposure to the international 
community of the gross human suffering in the Somali crisis between the war factions and Barre’s forces 
which continued after the fall of Barre when the country fell to warlords (Mohamed, 2009: 60). The 
humanitarian crisis was noted by Moller (2009: 12) who states that: “By March 1992 the population of 
Mogadishu had been decimated: at least 300 000 people having died of hunger and related diseases 
and the direct death toll from the fighting amounting to around 44 000.” The Somali case was a truly crisis 
situation that every moral human being had to develop a feeling to assist: especially given the fact that 
the famine which was the greatest killer was also induced by the civil war. 
Initial intervention was by humanitarian agencies to help people who were suffering from the effects of a 
famine and the war. However, the humanitarian agencies such as the International Confederation of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) faced difficulties in operating in a stateless nation the agencies ended up requesting 
for assistance from the warlords, who were the culprits in the humanitarian disaster, a situation which 
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legitimated the operations of the warlords and also created further problems of alleged favouritism of 
different clans. The move to deal with warlords also compounded the crisis through the use of food as 
baits to gain support by the warlords (Moller, 2009: 12). These problems compounded the crisis and led 
the UN and the USA to intervene under a moral duty to create humanitarian corridors for food aid and 
other essentials. However, the mandates of the missions were not static and changed from creating 
humanitarian corridors to demobilizations and to a manhunt for Muhammed Farah Aideed, one of the 
powerful warlords in the conflict (Moller, 2009: 12). The manhunt culminated in the battle of Mogadishu 
of 1993 which was a near disaster because the American mission failed and the war resulted in the death 
of eighteen American Special Forces known as the rangers, which influenced an American withdrawal 
that was completed in 1994. Ahmad and Green (1999: 121) concluded that the USA and UN intervention 
in Somalia “was tragically late” and resulted in a tragic failure. For the USA, the lives of its service 
personnel, no matter how few, was more superior than the thousands of innocent Somalis who had died 
and were being threatened by imminent death due the humanitarian crisis. Colonel John Chinyanganya7 
argued that, “the USA pulled out of Somalia because there were no tangible interest for the USA. There 
was nothing so compelling to lose American troops. And the same question comes that what was there 
in Kigali for America to lose its troops.” 
After the USA withdrawal, the African Union (AU) has attempted to remain on the ground with 
peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). However, 
the mission is more of a humanitarian military intervention as it is guided by the need to restore Somalia 
to peace and guarantee the protection of civilian lives and property. Again, the intervention has not been 
an ethical one. Major players in the intervention are Ethiopia and Kenya. These two countries have vested 
territorial interest in their relations with the Somali question. As noted by Farah (2007), Ethiopia is more 
interested in a weaker Somalia or one it can control due to border disputes. This animosity has its roots 
in history.  
The Ethiopians and the Somalis have had unstable and poor relations. The two nations have ethnic and 
religious differences, the Ethiopians being predominantly Christians while Somalis are predominantly 
Muslims. The Somalis regard Ethiopian as one of the colonial powers that partitioned and occupied 
Somalia. Ethiopian King, Menelik, in 1891 wrote a letter to the European powers that partitioned Africa 
demanding a share from colonies, arguing that, “Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian 
                                                            
7Interview in Harare on 31 march 2015 
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island in a sea of pagans. If the Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I 
do not intend to remain an indifferent spectator” (Geshkter, 1985: 7). Ethiopia was given the Somali 
region of Ogaden and other territories as a response to his demands to the European powers who 
partitioned Somalia.  Since then, Somalia and Ethiopia have had border clashes due to the disputed 
territories of Ogaden. The 2006 military intervention, though it was requested by the Transnational 
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was seen by the Somalis as an invasion and classified by Farah 
et al (2007: 11) as “interventions”. For now, Somalia can be classified as a perennial humanitarian 
disaster that has lost attention from the international community. 
The Rwandan genocide came soon after the USA withdrawal from Somalia. The genocide took place in 
1994. However, the crisis that led to the genocide had been brewing and the international community 
was equally aware of the unfolding events from different sources including intelligence personnel, UN 
peacekeepers and the media (Power, 2001).  
While the roots of the Rwandan genocide can be traced back into its colonial history, the events that led 
to the genocide were unfolding since 1990 when the Tutsi refugees in Burundi and Uganda started an 
insurgency that sought to overthrow the Hutu led government. By 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) had intelligence of massive arms purchases including guns, grenades and machetes (Van 
Haperen, 2012: 107). Previous events like the massacre of the Tutsi in 1959 and 1963 were clear lessons 
that the international community had to learn from that the movement of the general small arms and the 
conflict that was being supported by the Hutu extremists like the Interahamwe was in preparation of mass 
killings. According to the report of International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the Rwandan Genocide 
(2001: 123-133), “There can be not an iota of doubt that the international community knew the following, 
that something terrible was underway in Rwanda, that serious plans were afoot for even more appalling 
deeds, that these went far beyond routine thuggery, and that the world nevertheless stood by and did 
nothing.”  
What the international community had only managed to do before the genocide was to assemble the 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), led by Canadian General, Romeo Dallaire. 
The mission had limited mandate only to supervise the implantation of the Arusha Accords between the 




In 1994 the genocide started with the full knowledge of the international community as noted earlier that 
the international community had a number of channels that fed them with information on unfolding events 
in Rwanda. However, there were no actions from the major powers to stop the genocide even in its 
formative stages. Some commentators have postulated that the scary experience in Somalia led the USA 
to develop cold feet on Rwanda (Strauss, 2006: 50, Panajoti, 2009/2010: 83). However, most of the 
scholars and politicians who were interviewed argued that the Rwandese case was ignored due to lack 
of national self-interests of major powers8, while Salim Ahmad Salim postulated that the case was simply 
ignored because the crisis never threatened the ‘white race’ putting forward that intervention is either 
undertaken for national self-interests of powerful countries or when a crisis threatens the lives of 
Caucasians. Salim Ahmad Salim opined that military “intervention is guided by interest as well as race 
and colour … Other races are not willing to come to Africa. Draw parallels of Kosovo and Rwanda. They 
are not so willing to come to Africa.”9 
Ayoob (2002: 89) questioned the moral inclinations of USA interventions and actions at the UNSC by 
drawing comparisons between USA support for intervention in Haiti (during the same year as the 
Rwandan Genocide), which had a number of refugees flowing to USA due to inhumane treatment, while 
it blocked efforts to strengthen a UN Force in Rwanda at the beginning of the genocide even though 
more refugees were moving to other regional states neighbouring Rwanda. The Rwandan case has been 
described as “a terrible demonstration of what can happen when there is no intervention, or at least none 
in the crucial early weeks of a crisis” (Annan, 2014: 201). It is no longer feasible for the international 
community to claim that it was not aware that the genocide had been planned. Des Forges (1999: 188-
230) elaborates on the signals that were picked by military intelligence officers and Attaches of major 
powers in Rwanda from 1993 until the start of the genocide, specifically the training of militias by the 
Presidential guards and purchase and distribution of weapons to the militias, which was a major sign of 
an imminent genocide. The international community simply turned a blind eye to a case it had intelligence 
that a genocide was in the making due to either the fatigue of Somalia (Strauss, 2006: 50; Panajoti, 
2009/2010: 83), or simply because there was no major economic or political interest of the big powers.   
                                                            
8  Scholars, military practitioners and politicians who argued that the Rwandese genocide was ignored 
due to lack of any major interest of powerful countries include Colonel John Chinyanganya, Professor 
Kurasha, Simon Badza, Sydney Sekeramayi and Salim Ahmad Salim. 
9Interview with Dr. Salim Ahmad Salim, Addis Ababa, 23 June 2015 
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Another case that easily come to mind is Sudan, on the brutalities perpetrated in the Darfur region. Even 
though some USA officials defined the case as amounting to genocide (Strauss, 2006: 50), a clear case 
which legitimately calls for an intervention, and no preventive measures were undertaken and the best 
the international community could do was to allow the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict the 
Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir in 2009. 
The Darfur civil conflict in Sudan started in 1985 due to a plethora of reasons, chief among them drought 
and ethnic struggles for land control. The Khartoum government managed to put down the civil war then 
but it erupted in 2003 as an emboldened internal insurgency led by two rebel movements, the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA) (Paglia, undated; 6, 
http,//www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/pdf/sudan0807.pdf). The government reacted by 
unleashing its army and militias known as the ‘Janjaweed’ which committed war crimes that resulted in 
the death of between 70 000 and 300 000 people in Darfur according to the United Kingdom House of 
Commons International Development Committee (2005: 3) with Grono (2006: 624) putting the death 
statistics at 200 000. While there has been clear documentation of the Darfur crisis, the international 
community did not undertake a humanitarian military intervention mission which was needed to stop 
“genocide” and crimes against humanity. 
It is because of the Rwandan and Sudanese ignored cases that some people may argue that 
humanitarian military intervention is simply a camouflage for national interest by the powerful states. 
In Libya, the intervention by NATO was celebrated as “a textbook case of the [R2P] norm working exactly 
as it was supposed to” (Garwood-Gowers, 2013: 594). The international community quickly reacted and 
the UNSC passed resolution 1973 which, under article 4 allowed the members of the UN that would have 
notified the Secretary General to adopt all necessary means and measures to protect civilians. The threat 
by Muammar Gaddafi to launch a blitz on the city of Benghazi to clean up opposition against his rule that 
had turned violent was seen as a threat of genocide and mass murder which gave the international 
community the duty to intervene. 
However, during enforcing of the Resolution 1973 by NATO, a number of states, including those that had 
voted for the resolution like South Africa (Africafrique, 2011) condemned the manner in which NATO 
interpreted the resolution to become a part of the opposition forces from Benghazi. The intervention 
effectively became a regime change mission which did not only end with the fall of Gaddafi, but also his 
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assassination at the hands of opposition forces who had contacts with NATO forces, which was 
prejudicial. The Libyan intervention has now been seen as not the most praised textbook style of 
intervention given that it proved to be a regime change mission that was driven by geopolitical and 
economic interests of intervening NATO member states (Xian, 2012: 2-3). The intervention was driven 
by a number of reasons which included the desire by France and Britain to control Libyan oil, given that 
Libya has the ninth largest proven oil reserves in the world, marketing the new weapons to international 
buyers (Gibbs, 2011) (http,//www.counterpunch.org/2011/09/15/power-politics-nato-and-the-libyan-
intervention/) and take control of events in the Libyan uprising which was now taking a different course 
to that of Tunisia and Egypt because Gadhafi was now defeating the rebels (Xian, 2012: 2). The 
intervention negatively impacted on the Syrian crisis with China and Russia arguing that they could not 
support another resolution on Syria which could be used as a pretext for regime change (Ferdinand, 
2013: 6-7). This issue will be further discussed in chapter 5 under the Responsibility to Protect. 
3.5  Conclusion 
The development of the concept of humanitarian military intervention is grounded in the Christian 
doctrine. Its development was also, like the development of the concept of human rights and humanity, 
exclusive. Intervention was mostly justified in cases where Christians were being persecuted by non-
Christian sovereigns and being denied the right to practice their religion freely. It has also been argued 
in the chapter that there has been a considerable influence of self-interest even in the initial stages and 
development stages of the concept. 
The argument that the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia 
and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda are classical cases of humanitarian military intervention during 
the Cold War should be questioned. The intervening countries did not structure their intervention on 
humanitarian plans and did not justify their military interventions as such.  
In the Vietnamese case, Vietnam acted out of self defence against military incursions from the Pol Pot 
government, and in the Indian intervention, India acted to protect itself from the influx of refugees into its 
territories, while to a lesser extent it was driven by religious relations given the argument that it was the 
minority Hindus who bore the greatest brunt of Pakistani misrule. In the case of the Tanzanian invasion 
of Uganda, the case was purely of defence against an invasion that had been launched by Uganda and 
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pursuing Idi Amin after crossing the Ugandan/Tanzanian borders was justified to dispel the threat he 
posed to Tanzania. 
While it has been noted that the only country that had a quasi-humanitarian justification was India in its 
intervention in East Pakistan, it is important to note that in all the three countries that military intervention 
took place, there were humanitarian concerns that would have warranted a humanitarian military 
intervention according to the Grotian tradition. The interventions, though as argued, not undertaken for 
humanitarian reasons, achieved humanitarian outcomes. 
However, achieving humanitarian outcomes does not warrant the categorization of a military intervention 
as humanitarian. A military intervention can only be classified as humanitarian if it is driven by a 
humanitarian intention and should also be conducted by guiding humanitarian military intervention rules 
like proportionality, limiting civilian casualties and a considerable chance of success. 
In the post-Cold War era a number of interventions were undertaken on the pretext of humanitarian 
military intervention. While some were justified, as was the case with the Kosovo intervention, intervening 
states always hesitated to justify the military interventions under the concept of humanitarian military 
intervention. Most of the cases were justified under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, thereby describing them 
as threats to international peace and security.  
The chapter also noted that the concept was also tainted by the justification of the Iraq invasion as a 
humanitarian military intervention. In Africa, the concept was tainted by neglect of the neediest cases of 
Rwanda and Darfur, while the Libyan intervention and the uprisings in the Arab states only brought back 
the memories of the pursuit of self-interest even in humanitarian cases. While humanitarian military 
intervention as a concept is meant to protect civilians against tyrant leaders, powerful states have tended 
to abuse the concept for national self-interests, rendering the interventions unethical and immoral. The 
following chapter will discuss how intervening states pursue strategic resources through the guise of 
humanitarian military intervention. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PURSUIT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES THROUGH THE COVER OF 
HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 provided a brief synthetic historical analysis of humanitarian military interventions from ancient 
times where religious and political motives played an enormous influence in humanitarian military 
interventions. However, it is critical to note that emphasis was put on contemporary time’s humanitarian 
military interventions which were undertaken with certain motives which were not entirely humanitarian 
at all. Sometimes ideological, economic and political commitments motivated most of those military 
interventions. Powerful countries intervened in those developing countries whenever they deemed that 
their national interests are at stake. Here examples that were given in this regard were Iraq, Kosovo, 
Rwanda and Libya, just to mention a few to demonstrate how geo-strategic interests of the developed 
countries or superpowers masked themselves as humanitarian military intervention. 
In this chapter my concern is to show how the pursuit of strategic resources played and continue to play 
critical roles in humanitarian military interventions in the contemporary times. In the contemporary times 
many resolutions have been passed by the UNSC on the pretext of humanitarian military interventions. 
In the aftermath of these humanitarian interventions it dawned in the minds of many scholars that the 
mantra of humanitarian military intervention had been appealed to by powerful countries so as to have 
access to resources such as oil and other precious minerals. The war over Kuwait and the subsequent 
invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein as President of Iraq, the invasion of Libya and also the 
overthrow of Gaddafi’s government are all instances where powerful countries used the mantra of 
humanitarian military intervention with the hidden intention of having access to cheap oil. The current 
civil war which currently is raging on in Syria is thus identified as another example where humanitarian 
military intervention is used for geo-strategic purposes because any country that controls Syria will have 
access to the whole of the Middle East, hence both Russia and the USA are positioning themselves 
militarily within this Syrian conflict, not necessarily to safeguard human lives, but in pursuit of their geo-
strategic interests. Sometimes humanitarian military interventions are pursued in order to maintain the 
balance of power among the superpowers by protecting allies regardless of appalling human rights record 
of the country which has been identified as an ally of one of the superpowers. Related to humanitarian 
military intervention in our contemporary times is the need to protect hegemonic interests of the 
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superpowers whereby a state that acknowledges the hegemony of a particular superpower is usually 
protected by this superpower from any criticism or military invasion. 
This chapter is structured as follows: The first section discusses humanitarian military intervention with 
reference to economic interest as a contributory factor to humanitarian military intervention. In the second 
section it is argued that humanitarian military interventions are a strategy whereby major powers assert 
their geo-strategic interests. In this regard the section provides the reader with examples where the 
pursuit of these geo-strategic interests by the super-powers have played themselves out during our 
contemporary times. In the third section focus is on how the major powers have used humanitarian 
military interventions to curtail the possibility of smaller states becoming major powers who can challenge 
the interests of the major powers. In the fourth section it is argued that humanitarian military interventions 
are used to maintain the hegemony of moral, cultural and political values throughout the world. In this 
chapter, as we shall see, it is important to note that most of these sections are intertwined on the grounds 
that they all demonstrate how the interests of powerful countries manifest themselves in different modes.        
4.2  Economic Interest 
Military might is not built on military might for military might. Economic might and strength can be seen 
as a pre-requisite for a nation to be classified as a major power. Different economic resources can be 
transformed into military resources at different times. Some economic resources are a necessity for a 
state to have if it is to claim to be a dominant power in the international system. However, as states 
develop industrially and militarily, they exhaust their internal resources, or develop bigger industries that 
cannot be fully supported by their internal resources. The study argues that the economic and military 
development of states, and the need to secure resources for these industries led countries to become 
imperialistic. The desire for economic resources leads powerful countries to intervene in developing 
countries where resources are abundant. This is partly the reason why HMIs are more prevalent in 
developing countries. 
Imperialism as an adventure was done and supported by governments who anticipated economic gains 
and prosperity. For instance, the French led intervention in Libya was motivated by the anticipated 
economic gains that would be derived from oil production (The Guardian 2011). 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/01/libya-oil). It is for this reason that the morals and ethical 
consideration played second fiddle to the primary need to gain control and extract raw materials. 
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Imperialism, like any other self-interests’ driven military adventure, was given an ethical humanitarian 
face. Imperialism in Africa and Latin America was justified in part using the just war doctrine as the 
interventions were declared as evangelism burden for the Europeans. The burden was justified on 
allegations that African and Red Indians were barbarians who practiced human sacrifices and 
cannibalism, hence the Europeans took the missions to save those who were suffering from the brutality. 
Colonialism, it can be argued, was seen in part as just war interventions as argued by Sepulveda in the 
Valladolid debate (Reynolds, 2010: 18-25). Moralism was therefore used as a justification for the 
resource driven colonial adventures in the developing world. 
However, the irony of the imperialist military interventions at the time was that they were used in some 
areas like Africa to trade in human beings, popularly known as the trans-atlantic slave trade, and other 
inhumane and genocidal wars that Africans and other colonized people have suffered from. These 
included the German genocide of the Nama and Herero tribes in Namibia (Rivera, 2012: 102-105) and 
the scotched earth war tactics used to defeat the Shona tribes in the first Chimurenga in Zimbabwe 
(Smith, 1998: 338). Hence imperialism was an adventure by the economic and military powers of the 
world for economic and political growth. The general reasons for undertaking the imperialistic adventures 
was to gain access to the vast raw materials from the global south that had not been industrially 
developed, and not the usually stated reasons of saving human kind.  
In the contemporary times, strategic resources like oil, and minerals have become a reason for greater 
powers to compete and even undertake military interventions in the name of humanitarianism. 
Imperialism has not died. Bade (2013: 31-32) notes that former colonial masters have maintained an 
indirect control of their erstwhile colonies for economic reasons.  Furthermore, he notes that France has 
remained active in its former colonies specifically to maintain its economic hold and for hegemonic 
purposes. It can also be argued that Britain took a more non-confrontational approach by creating the 
Commonwealth group which sustains the colonial relationship between the former colonial master and 
its colonies after they had gained independence. This is the reason why in most cases when a problem 
happens in the erstwhile colonies, the former colonial master intervenes, not necessarily for the 
protection of civilians but for protecting its economic interests.  
4.3  Geo-Strategic Interest 
In an attempt to define the term ‘geo-strategy’, Rogers and Simon (2010) states that:  
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Geo strategy is about the exercise of power over particularly critical spaces on the 
Earth's surface; about crafting a political presence over the international system. It is 
aimed at enhancing one's security and prosperity; about making the international system 
more prosperous; about shaping rather than being shaped. A geo strategy is about 
securing access to certain trade routes, strategic bottlenecks, rivers, islands and seas. 
It requires an extensive military presence, normally coterminous with the opening of 
overseas military stations and the building of warships capable of deep oceanic power 
projection. It also requires a network of alliances with other great powers who share 
one's aims or with smaller 'lynchpin states' that are located in the regions one deems 
important. 
Due to different interests of different powers, different Major Powers have areas they consider 
strategically located whose control or disturbance will have a major impact, positive or negative, on their 
interest in the same region or in other regions. Major Powers have always undertaken military 
interventions in defence of these areas, specifically for economic ends.  For example, the Korean 
Peninsula, South China Sea, Middle East just to mention but a few. 
It is not possible for any scholar to define areas that can be regarded as strategic given that such kind of 
definition can be given by individual powers in relation to their national interests which are constantly 
changing. For instance, while prior to the year 2000 Zimbabwe was regarded as an ordinary state in 
relation to the USA’s interests in Africa, when it embarked on an internal and African policy that called 
for the repossession of land from whites and give it to indigenous Zimbabweans and propagated the 
policy of looking east and value addition, the USA government defined it as a threat to American national 
interests (Chidza, 2015) (https,//www.newsday.co.zw/2015/06/16/zim-remains-threat-to-us-policy/). 
Hence, former USA Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, listed Zimbabwe among countries she 
referred to as “outposts of tyranny”, (BBC, 2005) not because of the moral issues of democracy and 
human rights, given that the USA has had many allies who were notorious abusers of human rights like 
Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire and Mohamed Sisi of Egypt, but due to its policies that threatened 
American hegemony.10 The USA supported the British sponsored UNSC draft resolution in 2008 that 
sought to legalise sanctions on Zimbabwe. 
                                                            
10  Interview with Colonel Chinyanganya a Senior Directing Staff, National Defence College, Zimbabwe. 
Colonel Chinyanganya went on to argue that Zimbabwe’s ideology was a threat to American 
survivability in the international system. He stated that, “Zimbabwe’s land reform of post 2000 and the 
look east policy which it attempted to export to other African countries created the threat of what I 




On the journey in history, almost all the territories have been contested zones by different Major Powers. 
Contested areas, which can be referred to as geo-strategic areas, either contain strategic resources like 
minerals or oil which are important for the survival of a certain industry or the major industries of Major 
Powers. Other areas are important routes that can be of vital importance in cases of military adventures, 
or a trade route whose loss will disrupt the industries of the Major Powers in question. The geo-strategic 
areas include the Middle East, the Mediterranean Sea including the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and 
the Caucasus region (The American Presidency Project, Online). These regions have had different geo-
strategic importance to different Major Powers in different eras. In stating the importance of the Middle 
East to USA. Former USA President, Jimmy Carter in his 23rd January 1980 State of the Union Address, 
stated that:  
The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic 
importance, it contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet 
effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of 
the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of 
the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic 
position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. 
This situation …demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the 
Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely 
on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. 
Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic 
sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to 
preserve the security of this crucial region. Let our position be absolutely clear, an 
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded 
as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault 
will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force (The American 
Presidency Project, Online). 
One can note that in most military interventions that the USA undertakes justified wholly or partly on 
humanitarian terms, the need to safeguard oil resources and oil trade will be central. These interventions 
include Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011). The Middle East has always been a contested 
geo-strategic region since the discovery of oil in the region. The region is home to the majority of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member states which holds 80 percent of the 
world’s proven oil reserve of which 66 percent of these reserves are found in the region (OPEC, 2015). 
Besides it being an oil production zone of the world, the region also houses geo-strategic zone like the 
Suez Canal and the straits of Hormuz which are important for commercial and military sea travel. The 
geo-strategic importance of the Middle East is the reason why Jimmy Carter said that, “an attempt by 
any power to control the region would be taken as an assault on USA’s vital interests which would be 
62 
 
repelled by all means necessary including the use of force.” One could argue that this could be the reason 
why USA and Britain led a coalition of the willing in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. While Iraq was not an 
outside power that sought to dominate the Middle East, it attempted to have control of Kuwait in 1990, 
an attempt that was foiled by an intervention by the UN in protection of the sovereignty of Kuwait. Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein also planned to change the oil currency from the petro-dollars to petro-euros 
(Gokay, 2005: 46). Such a change had the capacity to destroy the foundation of the strength of the US 
dollar from being the dominant international currency due to its sole petro-dollar status to being like any 
other major currency like the Euro, British Pound or South African Rand (Simura, 2014: 19 and 44). The 
need to protect the foundation of the USA economy became one of the major influences for the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 (Simura, 2014), which was not, as is argued in the following chapters, not a mission to 
protect the Iraqis or the international community from a brutal leader or a sponsor of international 
terrorism as argued by Blair and Bush but protection of a geo-strategic zone as had been pronounced 
by President, Jimmy Carter in his 23rd January 1980 State of the Union Address. Kurasha (2015) noted 
that “Ethics have very little to do with HMI in Iraq. That is why they use international law and not ethics 
when they intervene. Only in cases when a situation has gone out of hand like in Iraq that ethics may 
then be used to justify the intervention.”11 This line of argument was also put forward by Badza who 
posited that, national interest are at the core of statecraft and military interventions even when disguised 
as humanitarian.12Therefore, the wars in the Middle East were driven by the need to protect USA’s vital 
interests and not human lives as argued by states leaders in public fora.  One can argue, that many lives 
are being lost now in Iraq as compared to the lives lost during Saddam’s reign. 
The survival of Israel is also another important USA’s interest with regards to the Middle East. Two former 
USA Presidents, John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter described the relationship between USA and Israel 
as “a special relationship in the Middle East” (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998: 231). The importance of the survival 
of Israel is driven by, among other reasons, the need to maintain a bulwark against an unchecked Arab 
power in the Middle East. This interest saw the USA doing all it can in order to save Israel given the 
animosity that had risen and culminated into a series of Arab – Israeli wars of 1948–49, 1956, 1967, 
                                                            
11  Interview in Harare on 20 August 2015 
12  Simon Badza, in an interview in Addis Ababa on 19 June 2015, put forward that, “The reasons for 
the existence of a state is national interest both at home and abroad. Even if it means undertaking a 
war disguised as a humanitarian war, it will still be done. For me I will always take national interests to 
be the core guiding line. In real politics, altruism is wishful thinking. National interests is at the core of 
all military interventions under humanitarian umbrella.”   
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1973, and 1982 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). The USA has used its veto power at the UN more than 
40 times since 1972 to bar any condemnation of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories of West Bank and Gaza (Jewish Virtual Library, 2015). 
The USA government also aligned itself with military leaders of Egypt to be ‘protectors’ of the Camp 
David Peace Accords (1979) and guarantee Israel’s survival and the agreements have seen Egypt being 
the recipient of the second largest amounts of foreign aid from USA after Israel (Sharp, 2011: 265). It 
can be argued that, this is the reason why USA took a lukewarm support of the Egyptian uprising when 
it started even though it gave open support to the Libyan and Syrian uprising. The other reason could be 
that the USA was not sure if it could trust any leader ushered in by the revolution. This fear was proved 
true when Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood candidate won Egypt’s first democratic elections in 
June 2012.  Morsi showed his open support for the Palestinians and Hamas (Weber and Craig, 2012: 6-
7), a stance which could also have been read as being unpalatable to the security of Israel. Hence, when 
the Egyptian military led by retired Field Marshal, Abdel Fattah el Sisi launched another coup in July 2013 
that deposed Morsi, the USA government failed to adhere to its moral stand point of not supporting coup 
governments and failed to declare the Egyptian military take over as a coup as commanded by its laws 
(Ilavarasan and Weinstein, 2013: 2-4) in order to keep the military aid flowing for the security of Israel. 
The same double standards exhibited in the face of a coup in Egypt are the same double standards 
witnessed in HMIs that interests come first ahead of humanitarianism.  Largely therefore, where there 
are minimum or low national interests, HMIs may not take place. For example, in the case of Rwanda. 
The Egyptian case is a classic example which shows that in time of a conflict between international ethics 
and the geo-strategic interests of a state, ethics are relegated to play second fiddle to the pursuit of geo-
strategic interests. The Egyptian coup was not a peaceful one. It came with gross military brutality and 
death of civilians as well as the incarceration of many more including journalists (Hamed, 2014). 
However, the USA did not condemn the coup and took a policy that was reminiscent of its policy towards 
uprisings in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain during the Arab Spring. One can therefore argue that the reason 
for supporting the Sisi coup government and turning a blind eye to military brutality under Sisi’s watch 
was driven by the higher stakes of the need to preserve Israel and maintain a government in Egypt that 
would be responsive to the Israeli interests first before that of the Palestinians. 
The situation is also similar with Russia on the need to protect its borders from western incursions. In the 
manner that the USA declared a Monroe Doctrine that regarded the Americas as closed areas from 
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western interference and influence in 1823 (https://utahlinks.org/learn/docs/Monroe.pdf), Russia 
considers the Caucasus Region as its geo-strategic zone specifically against the encroachment by the 
NATO (International Crisis Croup, 2008: i). Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, Russia had battled to 
assert its control of the Black Sea as proven by its incursions in the Ottoman Empire (King, 2008: 3). In 
contemporary times, Russia has pursued a geo-strategic policy that seeks to create a buffer zone 
between itself and NATO member states. Any former Soviet state that attempts or chooses to join NATO 
is dealt with ruthlessly. This policy has seen Russia fighting Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili in 2008 
after Tiblisi chose to join NATO in 2006 (NATO, 2013: 1). Russia also intervened militarily in Ukraine in 
2014 after the fall of Viktor Yanukovych who was Moscow’s ally and the takeover by Olexander 
Turchynov as Interim President and later by Petro Poroshenko as Elected President who were in support 
of joining the European Union, a move that Russia interpreted as the encroachment by the West into its 
geo-strategic sphere of influence (Rutland, 2015: 136-138). A war of proxy raged on in Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions while Crimea was annexed due to its geo-strategic location in the Black Sea (Galeotti, 
2015: 161). While Russia has been the champion of the protection of the ethic of state sovereignty as 
exemplified by its stance and condemnation of NATO interventions in Kosovo and Libya, when its geo-
strategic zone was under threat, it disregarded the sovereignty of Ukraine and used force to protect its 
interests. 
In the military intervention in Georgia, Russia argued that its adventure was in part a HMI mission (Ruys, 
2010: 232) because of the attacks on the South Ossetians by the Georgian government while it denied 
having a part in the military strife in Ukraine (BBC, 2015). On the question of the annexation of the 
Crimean region, Russia argued that due process was undertaken because the move to re-join Russia 
was made by the residents of Crimea without Russian influence (Putin, 2014). However, the Russian 
soldiers took part in the Ukrainian crisis donning unmarked uniforms while the rebels were using Russian 
made arms (Gayle, Irvine and Stewart, 2014).  
The Russian interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) proved, as were the USA and European 
responses to the Arab Spring, that there are times when HMI is used as a façade to cover the pursuit of 
geo-strategic interests (Georgia) while in some extreme cases ethics and morality are simply discarded 
in pursuit of national self-interests (Ukraine). In the Georgian crisis, humanitarian military intervention 
was partly used as justification for the military incursion (Petro, 2008: 1524) while in the Crimean crisis, 
the Russian President, Vladimir Putin openly stated that Crimea has always been a part of Russia and 
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its annexation was a return home (Putin, 2014). Hence, the Major Powers in the world have always 
guarded their geo-strategic zones even with military force when necessary either under the camouflage 
of a humanitarian military intervention or through a clear disregard of international ethics.  
4.4  Protection of the Balance of Power and Threat Diffusion 
Powerful states are always wary of other Major Powers getting too powerful, or smaller states developing 
to become Major Powers with the capacity to challenge their interests in different regions in the 
international system. While it takes long for a weaker state to develop into an international Major Power, 
it takes a relatively shorter period of time for a state to develop into a regional power with a capacity to 
frustrate the interests of global powers in the region. Major Powers therefore strive to frustrate the efforts 
of other states to develop into influential regional powers or Major Powers. From a realist point of view, 
the conduct of business in the international arena is a zero-sum game, where a win by one party 
translates into a loss for the other competing parties, hence a loss of hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2006: 
72). While the zero-sum assertion does not fully explain state behaviour especially in relation to the 
growth of regional powers, given that in some cases, some international powers have backed the rise of 
friendly regional powers against the perceived rise of unfriendly regional powers, it gives an insight on 
how major powers feel threatened by the rise of regional powers.  
In history, there has been cases in which major powers have fought rising powers to stop them from 
invading their space. The rise of Iran, as a regional power in the Persian Gulf has seen the USA and its 
western allies challenging Iran in a bid to contain it. The International Gas Union (Task Force 3) (2012: 
85) notes that:  
Broader geopolitical concerns as well as regional security issues, compel the US to 
remain deeply involved in the region’s (Middle East) security, and by extension, compel 
the US to try to contain Iran’s regional ambitions. These ambitions also include gas 
flows. For example, the US actively discourages the construction of Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline, even though Iran appears to be going ahead with the pipeline’s construction to 
Pakistan alone. US geopolitical concerns are also centred on Central Asia and the 
‘rimland’ more generally, where Iran is seen as a threat to US abilities to control this 
geo-strategically vital region. 
This was done through allegations that it was building nuclear capabilities and weapons of mass 
destruction (Jain, 2014: 1). Iran was slapped with economic sanctions that would paralyse its economy 
(Toumaj, 2014: 4) a situation that would result in stalling its military development. The Western sanctions 
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on Iran were not implemented with considerations of their impact on human lives. The sanctions were 
therefore influenced by the interests of Western Powers to diffuse Iran’s military growth rather than the 
ethical rules to guard against human suffering. The use of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy 
by the West while disregarding humanitarian concerns of the Iranian people flies in the face of the ethics 
and morality of humanitarian military intervention. 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein was also a weaker power that sought to expand its influence in the Middle 
East. Initially the USA saw Iraq as a useful tool to check the growth of Iran in the region due to the deep 
rooted sectarian differences between the Sunni dominated Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the Shia led 
theocratic Iran. However, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, a move that would 
have given him greater control of oil, he was seen as the Hitler of the Middle East, and coupled with his 
plans to accept the Euro as an oil currency, the USA, with the support of the international community, 
saw it fit to initially check his advances, while in 2003 it saw it imperative to protect its interests of 
preserving the dollar as the sole petrol currency by removing him from power (Gokay, 2005: 46), through 
an invasion that was partly justified in humanitarian terms.   
The rise of China in East Asia was not also smooth sailing because it was seen as a challenge to Western 
interest in the region specifically the USA allies of Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Taiwan. In order 
to counter the dominance of China in East Asia, the USA continued military deals with Taiwan which 
China protested (Pomfret, 2010, Blanchard and Martina, 2014) arguably as it saw as an interference in 
its sphere of influence. The USA has also undertaken military muscle flexing in support of its East Asian 
regional allies especially in relation to the contested islands of Senkaku (Japanese)/Diaoyu (Chinese) 
(Smith, 2013). At a time when China was asserting its regional mighty in the North China Sea, “an area 
that is rich in hydrocarbons and natural gas and through which trillions of dollars of global trade flow” 
(Council on Foreign Relation, online), the USA passed its warships in a pure display of power and a 
challenge to the rising global power which was described by the Chinese ambassador to the USA as “a 
very serious provocation, politically and militarily” (Sciutto and Hunt, 2015). The act of the USA was in 
part to show support to its regional allies of Japan and the Philippines, while in another part to flex its 
muscle and demonstrate to China that it remains the sole dominant international hegemon. 
Hence, it can be safely concluded that Major Powers are not comfortable with the rise of lesser powers 
into the ranks of regional or international powers. The rise of new players into the rank and file of Major 
Powers offsets the balance of powers in the international system and creates competition which Major 
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Powers are not comfortable with. Hence, it is one of the primary interests of major powers to diffuse any 
rise of less powerful states to become regional or international powers. 
4.5 Political Hegemonic Interests 
The term hegemony originates from the ancient Greek ‘Hegemonia’ literally expressing the dominant and 
oppressive status of one element in the system of others.  According to Gramsci, hegemony represents 
the status of the most powerful country in the international system or the position of a dominant state in 
a specific region (Barrett, 1997: 239).   He further notes that hegemony entails “cooperation ensured by 
force, combining social and political supervision, force and consent”.   Cox (1981: 16 – 155) postulates 
that hegemony enabled the dominant state to spread its moral, political and cultural values around the 
society and sub-communities.  This is done through civilian society institutions which consist of the net 
institutions and practices that are partly autonomous from the state.  He further notes that hegemony is 
used to produce social and political systems that are to be applied on the nations targeted. 
On the other hand, Volgy, (2005: 1-2) defines hegemony as the position of having the capability and 
power to change the rules and norms of international systems based on one’s own motivations and 
desire.  “If you don’t have enough power to affect global events in line with your own road map that will 
be a dangerous elusion” (Volgy: 2005).  According to Strange, (1989: 165) hegemony requires two kinds 
of strengths; relational and structural based.  Relation based power is the strength to persuade and force 
the other actors one by one or in groups.  Structural power is the essential capacity to realise the desired 
rules, norms and operations in the international system.  A hegemony creates or maintains critical 
regimes to cooperate in the future, and reduces uncertainty while other states are in pursuit of their own 
interests.  There are many ideas about the relationship between hegemony and imperialism.  Imperialism 
is defined as enlarging the dominance of one nation over the other by way of open political and 
economical instruments (Heywood, 2007: 392). To explain the basic difference between imperialism and 
hegemony, Keohane says that, “As hegemony manipulates the relations with no superior body, imperial 
powers set their superiority with a senior political body” (Keohane, 1991:435-439).  He further notes that 
imperialists have an approach for expansion by conquering new territory.  Snidal (1986: 579 – 614) 
separates hegemony into three; hegemony implied by conviction, kind but forceful hegemony and 
colonialist hegemony based on force.   
According to Wright (2004), discrimination between hegemony and dominance is another subject that 
has been argued by many scholars such as Machiavelli, Gramsci and Nye.  According to this trio, a major 
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power should not just rely on dominance, force, and hard power.  Machiavelli advocates “respects” as a 
source of obedience to a major power. Nye believes that a superior power becomes hegemonic power 
by persuading others to cooperate. Persuasion will be ensured by the utilisation of soft power that makes 
other countries believe in common interests.  However, according to hegemonic stability theory, major 
powers achieve their position unilaterally with the deployment of hard power but retaining consent and 
conviction (Keohane, 1984:11).  For instance, the deployment of the coalition of the willing to dispose 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 
Given the above discourse, developed states ensure their hegemonic capacity through their own 
structural power enabled by security, production, finance and knowledge capacity in international 
economy – politics.  This can also be testified by the deployment of NATO forces in strategic regions of 
the world.  In Africa and in the Middle East we have seen the USA maintaining its hegemonic presence 
by deploying AFRICOM. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the actual tangible interests of Major Powers that define their military interventions 
in weaker developing states. These interests were grouped into three categories namely economic 
interests, protection of geo-strategic zones and regions, and protection of the balance of power and 
diffusion of the rise of antagonistic regional and international powers that will challenge the hegemony of 
the dominant powers internationally or regionally. These three group of interests have a greater influence 
on the decision by Major Powers in undertaking HMIs. 
Under economic interests, it emerged that, Major Powers undertake humanitarian military intervention to 
protect strategic resources that are important for their survival. These resources include petroleum and 
minerals. Regions that have these vast resources and have been subject to great power competition for 
control include the Middle East, North Africa and Central Africa, while West Africa is also rising as an 
influential producer of oil. Other economic interests may be based on the preservation of traditional areas 
of influence for marketing and extraction of raw material. This may explain the asserted gentleman’s 
agreement among former colonial powers and dominant western Major Powers that have seen a former 
colonial powers undertaking HMIs in its former colonies, while the USA leads in the HMIs in South 
America and the Middle East. In this regard, as noted in the chapter, France leads in HMIs in the former 
francophone African region which includes Ivory Coast and Central African Republic (CAR) while Britain 
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leads in former Anglophone Africa which includes countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. In some 
cases, where stakes had been high, Major Powers have come together to undertake HMIs specifically 
to secure economic concessions, as was the case in the 2011 Libyan intervention by NATO (Stratfor 
Global Intelligence, 2011: 6-12). 
Under geo-strategic interests, it has been argued that different powers have different regions that they 
consider to be of vital interests to their nations. The accordance of such importance is determined by 
economic and defence needs of the Major Powers. The major geo-strategic regions in the world have 
been the Panama Canal for the USA and the Middle East for USA, Russia and Britain, while the 
Caucasus Region is considered a geo-strategic region for Russia. The importance of geo-strategic 
regions is noted in the actions of Major Powers where they either ignore all moral rules, or use 
humanitarian military intervention as a façade to intervene to either maintain stranglehold on the region, 
to get control of it or deny another Major Power or regional power exclusive dominance of the region. 
Russian purported interventions in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century were influenced by the need 
to gain accesses to the Mediterranean Sea and have total control of the Black Sea. However, in a geo-
strategic counter move, Britain, France and Austria joined the humanitarian military adventure not 
because of the need to protect civilians but to counter Russian advances into the Mediterranean Sea. 
In the cold war era, USA declared the Middle East a region of vital interest. This saw the USA curving its 
own sphere of influence that it has jealously guarded against any encroachment, either from external 
powers or from internal regional powers like Iraq and Iran. This dominance was challenged by Russia in 
Syria. The Syrian crisis can be seen as a geo political war by proxy between USA and Russia in general 
but also including regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and Iran. In this regard, contending 
powers have disregarded the need to protect Syrian humanitarian concerns as they have continued to 
militarily sponsor their sides, (the government being supported by Russia and Iran, and the armed 
insurgence being supported by the West, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia) with arms that are used to 
attack civilians. (BBC, 2015) (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587). The crisis has led 
to the creation of the greatest humanitarian catastrophe and migration crisis which the international 
community has only condemned in public but stalked covertly. 
The final cluster which the chapter noted is that of the need to preserve the balance of power and deter 
ambitious weaker states from becoming major regional or international powers. It has been noted that 
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while it takes relatively a longer period of time for a state to rise from being a weaker state to become a 
hegemonic global power, it is relatively easier for states to rise and be regional powers. Regional powers 
have the potential to scuttle the interest of Major Powers in their areas of influence. Hence international 
Major Powers continue to monitor the rise of less powerful states especially those known to be 
nonaligned to such Major Powers. It could be because of this competition of interest between a Major 
Power and a regional power that the USA has had a turbulent relationship with Iran in the Middle East. 
The rise of Iran, which is antagonistic to USA interest and the interests of USA allies like Saudi Arabia 
and Israel in the Middle East has seen the creation of a conflict which has also manifested itself in the 
Syrian proxy war, while Saddam Hussein was toppled because he exhibited hegemonic tendencies 
against a USA ally and sought to influence the change of the global petro dollar to a petro euro.  
What can be generally deduced from the foregoing discussion in relation to the contending theories upon 
which the research is based, is the dominance of the presumptions of the realist paradigm against that 
of the international society paradigm. The argument by realists that the basic principle of states’ 
interaction is survival and pursuit of interests was proven in the arguments.  The drivers and conduct of 
colonialism was devoid of morality and this is specifically proven by the fact that the arguments that 
Africans and American Indians were barbaric and needed redemption was not less heinous to genocide, 
slavery and resource expropriation which the European powers did to the colonized world. Equally, the 
argument that states like Iran and other non-nuclear states cannot have nuclear arms capabilities whilst 
powerful countries like the USA, Britain, France, Russia, China, India and Pakistan can have the 
capabilities only proves the gross moral void of international politics and the triumphant of interest driven 
politics. The argument by the Realists, therefore seems to have been carrying the day. As noted by 
Morgenthau (2005: 5) that:  
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the 
moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so 
it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted – and few have been 
able to resist the temptation for long – to clothe their own particular aspirations and 
actions in the moral purposes of the universe. 
The morality of the International Society theory seems to have been just a theory. It has been very difficult 
to find an HMI mission that can be seen to have been in the confines of the International Society theory. 
The major issue that has led to animosity is that the major powers that have sought to advance morality 
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in international relations, when it comes to HMI, are seen being driven more by interests than by morality, 
hence the mistrust of the concept of HMI. 
In summary, the chapter attempted to bring to light and illustrate how national interests are the end goal 
or the hidden objectives in humanitarian military interventions. The discussion on interest of major powers 
in less powerful states was also meant to give an understanding of what the thesis means when it argues 
that HMIs were not conducted in a certain country due to non-availability of Major Power interests. 
These interests are simply the pursuit of economic benefits, protection of geo-strategic regions and 
fighting to bar the entry of other countries into the ranks of regional and international powers and it is 
these interests that are camouflaged under HMIs. The following chapter, will be a discussion of the 




CHAPTER 5: THE CREATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DOCTRINE (R2P) 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter 4 discussed the pursuit of strategic resources through the guise of humanitarian military 
intervention. This chapter moves a step further by focusing and analyzing efforts to transform 
humanitarian military intervention from its primordial notions to the new concept popularly known as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the turn of the 21st Century. This chapter traces the rise of R2P from 
the interventions that took place after the Cold War which were justified under humanitarian reasons. It 
will also discuss how cases that warranted intervention, but ignored by the international community, also 
contributed to the codification of R2P.  
The chapter argues that R2P was realized due to the support it got from influential world leaders at the 
time. These leaders included former USA President, Bill Clinton, former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 
and former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. In its approach, the chapter will question the sincerity of 
the Western leaders in driving for the formulation of a new doctrine that would entrench humanitarian 
military intervention as a moral response to gross human rights violations. It will also analyze the 
response by third world leaders to R2P, given that it is the less powerful and developing states that are 
subjects of intervention which have in previous cases sought protection from undue interference through 
the non-interference clause of the UN Charter. The major question is whether or not R2P is a sincere 
moral doctrine that seeks to protect civilians or just another guise doctrine to pursue strategic and national 
self-interests by the major states. 
5.2  Background to Responsibility to Protect, International Events that Influenced 
Responsibility to Protect 
The creation of the R2P as a doctrine that sought to bring sanity to humanitarian military intervention and 
redefine humanitarian military intervention as an international moral and legal act was influenced by a 
number of processes and events. While the 1990s were celebrated as a decade of intervention (Simura, 
2014: 3), some of the interventions, and in other cases, lack of them, were controversial. The 
controversial intervention or the lack of intervention, in some cases, influenced the codification of the 
R2P document (Stromseth, 2003: 233). 
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The Somalian crisis, military intervention in Kosovo (1999) and failure to intervene in Rwanda (1994) and 
other areas like Darfur and massacres in the former Yugoslavia are some of the major events that 
influenced the creation of R2P. Somalia started as a success story which, however, failed when the USA 
pulled out of the mission after its eighteen rangers (soldiers) were attacked by militias led by Muhammad 
Farah Aideed (Meek, 2013: 1). The problem with Somalia was that the USA government showed that 
when it came to the case of ‘saving strangers’ as later coined by (Wheeler, 2000), few American lives 
mattered most against the survival of a nation. The impact of the Somali case on the USA is captured by 
Clarke and Herbst (1996) who argued that the Somali nightmare scared the USA from committing to 
avert or save Rwandese ‘strangers’ from the Hutu militias, when a humanitarian military intervention was 
needed to protect Tutsis and moderate Hutus from the Hutu militias. 
The Rwandan genocide remains the dark spot on the international moral face. Warnings were sent to 
the western capitals and to the UN that a genocide was looming (Thompson, 2003: 6-7). Close to one 
million civilians comprising of Tutsi and those referred to as moderate Hutu sympathetic to the ‘Tutsi 
cockroaches’ were massacred by the Hutu militia with the support of the Rwandese state machinery 
(O’Donnell, 2014: 567). However, no action was taken to avert or stop the genocide before it started.  
Rwanda was one of the major reasons advanced by proponents of the (R2P) to call for an international 
moral doctrine to protect innocent civilians. 
On the other hand, Kosovo is a direct opposite of Rwanda. While the international community was 
charged of having done ‘too little too late’ in Rwanda, in Kosovo it was charged with ‘too much too early’ 
(Mitrovic, 2010: 88). NATO was also charged for taking action without UNSC authorization (Allain, 2004: 
252). Britain defended the role of NATO and itself in Kosovo arguing that, “In these circumstances, and 
as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is 
legally justifiable” (Jeremy Greenstock cited in Stromseth, 2003: 236). While the UNSC draft resolution 
that was later sponsored by Russia arguing that NATO should pull out of Kosovo was defeated by three 
votes in favour to twelve votes against (Franck, 2003: 224), the controversy that the action was taken 
outside its legal bounds remained, while NATO justified its actions as based on international morality. 
The International Panel (Independent International Commission on Kosovo) that was set up to investigate 
the legality of the intervention in Kosovo advised for the codification of rules that would govern 
international intervention to bridge the gap between morally compelling interventions and legality 
concerns (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000 :10).  The advice was heeded and 
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the government of Canada sponsored the International Commission Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) in September 2000 which came up with the R2P document. 
The ICISS in its final document argued that a state had a R2P its citizens from gross suffering and torture 
as a result of its claim to sovereignty. Failure by the state to protect its citizens would automatically 
transfer the responsibility to the international community which could intervene militarily (ICISS, 2001: 
xi). The ICISS sought to put its recommendations within the confines of international law. It therefore 
recommended that interventions can only be approved by the UNSC (ICISS, 2001: xii). The 
recommendation was influenced by the need to abide by the post WW II power politics reality in which 
the veto wielding powers continue to seek to dominate and protect their interest by influencing all major 
events that impact on the international community to which humanitarian military intervention is one. This 
was proven by the fact that the USA has vetoed every UNSC resolution that sought to reign in Israel on 
the Palestinian question, while Russia used its veto multiple times to protect Syria, all because of vested 
national self-interest in the Middle East. 
5.3  Liberal Support for Responsibility to Protect 
The codification of R2P was a success owing to the support of influential liberal scholars and world 
leaders. These leaders include former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, former USA President, Bill 
Clinton, and former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The support for humanitarian military intervention 
by these leaders and recommendations forwarded by different international panels culminated in the 
Canadian government constituting the ICISS which codified the R2P document in 2001. 
The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is arguably one of the influential sponsors of R2P. The 
former Secretary General used the UN pulpit to push for a change in how states can claim their 
sovereignty as a bulwark against intervention and encouraged the international community to view 
humanitarian military intervention as better than non-intervention in cases of extreme human suffering. 
(Annan (2014) Annan (2000: 48) gave a widely quoted speech that, “…if humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica 
– to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” 
He implored world leaders to accept new developments in international relations which he said: 
demand of us a willingness to think anew … about how the United Nations 
responds to the political, human rights and humanitarian crises affecting so much 
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of the world; about the means employed by the international community in 
situations of need; and about our willingness to act in some areas of conflict, while 
limiting ourselves to humanitarian palliatives in many other crises whose daily toll 
of death and suffering ought to shame us into action (Annan, 1999). 
Annan noted that while sovereignty was a cardinal pillar for international order (Annan, 2014: 194), it 
cannot be used as justification for failure to protect the civilians in need by both the claimers of 
sovereignty (Annan, 1998: 197) and members of the international community (Annan, 1998: 195-6). 
However, while supporting intervention to defend the respect of human rights, Annan saw a major 
challenge in states conducting humanitarian military intervention without a clear mandate from the UN. 
He concluded that while the interventions in Cambodia, Bangladesh and Uganda by Vietnam, India and 
Tanzania, respectively, during the Cold War had humanitarian outcomes, they were condemned by the 
international community because they were not approved by a competent authority (Annan; 1998: 199). 
Annan (2014, 199) sarcastically questioned that,  
Can we really afford to let each State be the judge of its own right, or duty, to 
intervene in another State’s internal conflict? If we do, we will not be forced to 
legitimize Hitler’s championship of the Sudeten Germans or Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan? 
The drawing of parallels between unauthorised interventions with Hitler’s invasion of Sudetenland shows 
how Annan abhorred any military intervention, even humanitarian, without UN authorization. 
This abhorrence is understandable given that Annan grew in the UN and understood its centrality in 
maintaining international order. He therefore made the topic of humanitarian military intervention topical 
in the UN and in the academic arena which had an impact in the codification of R2P (Weiss, 2004: 38).  
His battle for UN authorization was also important in giving any future intervention moral legitimacy 
against the challenges that faced international action in Somalia and Kosovo, as well as failure to act in 
Rwanda. Annan (1999) stated that he envisaged an international community that was not defined by the 
inactions on the Rwandan genocide and the divided world that rose from the Kosovo intervention (Annan, 
1999). In a speech to the UN General Assembly that can arguably be viewed as one of the major shapers 
of R2P, Annan (1999) stated that, “The State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, 
and not vice versa.”  
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His calls for the reform of intervention rules in the UN found support in liberal world leaders, chief among 
them Bill Clinton of the USA and Tony Blair of Britain. Bill Clinton intensified the use of USA forces in 
humanitarian military interventions. Clinton defended the use of USA forces in humanitarian military 
intervention cases when he stated that the USA will intervene against gross human rights violations even 
when no direct threat has been posed on USA’s cardinal interest (Fyre, 2000: 76). Clinton during visit to 
USA soldiers under Kosovo International Security Forces Troops (KFOR) in 1999 stated that: 
… But never forget if we can do this here, and if we can say to the people of the 
world, whether you live in Africa, or central Europe, or any other place, if somebody 
comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, 
their ethnic background or their religion, and its within our power to stop it, we will 
stop it (Joyner, 2002: 598).  
This became known as the Clinton Doctrine and it added weight to the calls for a transformation in 
international law to take aboard issues of human rights. During his tenure as the USA president, USA 
forces undertook military interventions in Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo which were justified as humanitarian 
military interventions (Valentino, 2011: 62). The interventions were a clear testimony of the policy of 
intervention which the Clinton government had chosen for moral or national interests reasons.  
As early as 1993, in his inaugural speech, Clinton gave signs of a Universalist policy when he stated that: 
There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic. 
The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms 
race - they affect us all…America must continue to lead the world we did so much 
to make” (Clinton, 2004).  
Clinton became a supporter of humanitarian military intervention as enunciated by his support for the 
intervention in Kosovo as well as his statements during the period of intervention. Such support coming 
from the leader of one of the most influential states was instrumental in the creation of the R2P. The 
influence of Clinton’s support to the formation of R2P was captured by Luttwak (1999/2000: 57) who 
argued that Annan’s speech (which ultimately led to the creation of the ICISS) to the UN General 
Assembly, was just an echoe of Clinton’s justification for military interventions. Whether it was true or 
false that Annan’s speech was an echo of Clinton’s speech, Luttwak’s argument illuminates the influence 
of Clinton’s support in the creation of R2P.  
The then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair can also be argued to be one of the ‘proponents’ of R2P. In 
what came to be termed the “Blair Doctrine” by some scholars (Sloboda and Abbott, 2004: 1), Blair 
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argued that everyone in the world has become an internationalist (Blair, 2009: 5). Sloboda and Abbott 
(2004: 2) state that the Blair Doctrine, which Blair preferred to call the ‘Doctrine of the International 
Community’ (Blair, 2009: 5) is based on the just war theory which called the international community to 
undertake wars based not, “on any territorial ambitions but on halting or preventing humanitarian 
disasters such as genocide or ethnic cleansing.”  
Tony Blair (2009: 5) argued that intervention, including military intervention when necessary was justified 
“not only when a nation’s interests are directly engaged; but also where there exists a humanitarian crisis 
or gross oppression of a civilian population.” Blair (1999: 5) stated that: 
Non-interference has long been considered an important principle of international 
order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily…But the principle of 
non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can 
never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of 
refugees that unsettle neighbouring countries then they can properly be described 
as “threats to international peace and security. 
In Blair (1999)’s views, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states was important 
to maintain international order but it could no longer be considered to be sacrosanct. The observance of 
the principle had to be limited to governments and regimes that observed basic human rights. Any regime 
that did not observe the rights would automatically loose the ‘privilege’ of non-interference.  
While internal strives may be seen as internal, they lead to influx of mass refugees into neighbouring 
countries which may create new conflicts. It is because of this reason that Blair (1999) further supported 
his argument arguing that when refugee influx affect outside countries, the conflict should not be 
considered as internal hence the need for international intervention. It must also be recalled that when 
India intervened in East Pakistan in 1971, it cited among its major reasons for intervention massive influx 
of East Pakistani refugees in its territories hence importing conflict into India (Secretariat of the 
International Commission of Jurist, 1972: 92). 
The completion of the liberal support to R2P came from the new intervention rules got from the liberal 
Western states and scholars. Gareth Evans supported the moralization of humanitarian military 
intervention and called it “good international citizenship” (Weiss, 2004: 43), while the Danish and Dutch 
governments sponsored commissions to look into issues of human rights and intervention (Macfarlane, 
Thielking and Weiss, 2004: 981).  
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The researches and recommendations that were brought forward by different commissions of inquiry that 
were commissioned to research on different cases which all were related to humanitarian military 
intervention culminated in the sponsoring of the ICISS by the Canadian government in 2000. This 
research argues that the most influential of the panels of inquiry was the Kosovo Commission. In its 
assessment of the Kosovo crisis and NATO intervention, the commission came up with a number of 
recommendations which could be summarized as recommending for the revision of the international rules 
of intervention and sovereignty to allow for the ethical protection of citizens in distress (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 10-12). 
The sum total of the push by a number of liberal world leaders led by Kofi Annan, Tony Blair and Bill 
Clinton led to the constitution of the ICISS. The commission crafted the R2P document that was accepted 
by world leaders formally at the World Summit of 2005. While the leaders at the summit accepted the 
‘new rule’ they only agreed to follow them on a case by case basis, meaning that no concrete rules of 
intervention were approved by the UN. However, powerful state, specifically the P5 members of the 
UNSC continue to violate the new rules of the R2P because of the powers to determine cases for 
intervention given to them by the ICISS in the crafting of the document. Hence powerful states can 
intervene in cases they allege to warrant intervention even if there are no humanitarian justifications, or 
block interventions in areas where intervention is necessary if such interventions disturb their interests. 
5.4  Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Moral Humanitarian Military Intervention 
R2P report is an intervention doctrine that was produced by the Canadian government sponsored, ICISS 
in 2001. It is seen as an intervention concept that was built from the old age concept of humanitarian 
military intervention (Macfarlane, et al., 2004: 980), but one that tried to be more concise and broad. It is 
an inclusive research work that sought to come up with universally accepted principles for intervention. 
R2P differed from humanitarian military intervention in the sense that while the later only centred on 
intervening militarily to put a stop on a leader perpetrating gross human rights violations that shocks the 
conscience of mankind (Orford, 2013: 97) and should end when the subject leader has stopped his 
‘criminal’ ways, the former is more encompassing. R2P argues that sovereignty cannot be used as a 
protective shield by leaders committing gross human rights violations because sovereignty is a trust from 
the people. Sovereignty was now conceptualized as responsibility of the state to protect its citizens 
(ICISS, 2001: 13). The doctrine further argues that when a state is incapable or has no capacity to protect 
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its civilians, then the responsibility is automatically transferred to the international community (ICISS, 
2001: 17). 
R2P brought about two basic principles which are; state responsibility and non-indifference (Serrano, 
2011: 5). The principle of state responsibility denotes that in the case of gross human right violations, 
genocide, war crimes and crime against humanity being perpetrated in a state, it is the duty of that state 
to protect its citizens (ICISS, 2001: 17). The principle of non-indifference is based on the notion that if 
the state has no capacity then it should seek international assistance or is the one responsible for the 
violations, the international community has to forcibly intervene and not to ignore the crisis arguing that 
it is within the subject state’s sovereign jurisdiction (ICISS, 2001: 17). 
R2P was therefore, built on three pillars namely, “(1) the enduring responsibility of a state, (2) the 
responsibility of the international community to assist states to fulfill their national obligations and (3) the 
commitment to timely and decisive collective action in ways that are consistent with the UN Charter 
(Serrano, 2011: 7). 
R2P also solved the question of authority in deciding when military intervention should be undertaken. 
According to the R2P document: 
There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security 
Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task 
is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to 
make the Security Council work better than it has (ICISS, 2001: xii). 
The construction of the report shows that the commission strived to create an intervention doctrine that 
did not start with humanitarian military intervention and end at withdrawal of forces, but to create a body 
of rules that summarized how a state should treat its citizens, how the international community can 
intervene, and the duty of the international community in rebuilding states emerging from crises (ICISS, 
2001).  
The intervention rules of the R2P doctrine have a number of intervention mechanisms which are different 
from the old humanitarian military intervention concept. The report states that, “… coercive measures 
may include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases – but only extreme cases – 
they may also include military action” (ICISS, 2001: 29). Less coercive measures which can be used 
include the use of international sanctions targeting alleged perpetrators, high level talks through the use 
of seasoned diplomats like the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan who was appointed UN/Arab 
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League envoy to Syria. The judicial mostly means the use of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 
indict, try and incarcerate perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. In cases 
where intervention was justified under R2P like Ivory Coast, Libya, and Kenya the ICC was very active 
as was the use of diplomatic talks. 
The R2P doctrine was accepted with different feelings. There were supporters and critics. Supporters of 
the doctrine saw it as a means to protect the rights of individuals from the excesses and impunity of 
leaders hiding behind sovereignty (Small, 2014: 180). In response to arguments that R2P did not address 
but advanced colonial advantages for the Western developed world, UN Secretary General, Ban Ki 
Moon, opined that R2P was not about history but the present and future. He warned world leaders against 
litigating the past or descend into unproductive political posturing on historical issues (Williamson, 2009: 
3).  
Evans and Sahnoun (2002: 99) argue that the international community had been dented by cases in 
which human suffering was neglected, and while in the current age terrorism has attracted international 
attention, soon cases would arise needing intervention and without the R2P doctrine, such cases could 
be regrettable cases again. The argument has foresight given that at the end of 2010 and in 2011 Ivory 
Coast, Libya and Syria plunged into crises that drew the attention of the international community with 
questions on how to respond being discussed in regional and international organizations. Evans and 
Sahnoun (2002: 101) go further to argue that the new doctrine transformed the debate on intervention 
from being oriented on the right of the interveners, to focus on those in need of support by using the term 
‘responsibility’. 
Critics of the doctrine saw it as nothing new. Macfarlane, et al. (2004: 980) state that some scholars 
argue that the R2P report is “simply a reformation of Augustine’s doctrine of just war.” The doctrine is 
seen as just a twist of vocabulary with no practical mechanisms to solve the fundamental problems of 
insufficient political will from capable states to intervene especially in countries where there are no 
economic or political interests (Macfarlane, Thielking and Weiss, 2004: 980). Chesterman (2011: 5) 
argues that R2P is a political move by Britain and Canada (who funded the ICISS) to have a justifying 
document for their intervention in Kosovo in 1999 which they defended on humanitarian grounds. 
Simura (2014: 83) argues that the only major change that the ICISS invented was the proposal for an 
explicit legalization of humanitarian military intervention given that other clauses like the listed crimes 
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and rules governing intervention had already been documented by international law writers and had been 
contained in the charters of international tribunals from the Nuremburg to the International Criminal Court 
(Rome) statutes.  
However, while the criticisms hold water, R2P came at the opportune time to answer questions on 
intervention and bring sanity on the laws of humanitarian military intervention. While the doctrine has not 
been perfected to give efficient direction on humanitarian cases, it has given a first step that international 
morality can attempt to control the lust for national interest driven interventions as well as limiting the 
abuse of civilians by their leaders.  
5.4.1 Responsibility to Protect Cases, Ivory Coast, Libya and Syria 
Scholars have put forward a number of cases of military intervention as R2P cases. These cases include 
the international intervention efforts in Darfur, Kenyan post-election violence of 2007 (Garwood-Gowers, 
2013: 599), Ivory Coast’s post-election violence of 2011, and Libyan uprising of 2011, while Syria is 
considered by some as the end of R2P (Small, 2014: 179). For the purposes of this research, only Ivory 
Coast, Libya and Syria will be dealt with specifically due to the nature of the crises and the armed 
intervention by external state/s, while the case of Syria is analyzed to answer whether the case is the 
end of R2P as argued by some scholars due to the competing geo-strategic interests of major regional 
and international powers. 
5.4.1.1    Ivory Coast 
Ivory Coast became an R2P subject in the aftermath of the refusal to step down by then incumbent, 
Laurent Gbagbo after a presidential run-off between him and his former Prime Minister, Alassane 
Quattara on 28 November 2010 (United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI); undated, 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml). There were contradictory results that 
were released with the Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI), Ivory Coast’s national electoral body 
announcing that Quattara had won by54.1% of the votes against 45.9% polled in favour of Gbagbo 
(Bekoe, 2011: 1), while on the other hand the Constitutional Council which controls the regularity of the 
operations of the elections counter announced that the CEI had lost the mandate to announce the 
elections results because they were already contested and the CEI had failed to announce the results in 
the stipulated period. The president of the Constitutional Council Paul Yao N’Dre announced his results 
51.45% to 48.55% in favour of Gbagbo on 3 December 2010 (Bekoe, 2011: 1). However, the international 
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community recognized Quattara as the dully elected leader of Ivory Coast (UNOCI, undated, 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml).  
War broke out between the supporters of the two contestants, leading to the intervention by the 
international community. Arguably, Ivory Coast presented a case in which most of the recommendations 
by the ICISS for R2P were utilized until the use of force became necessary. Firstly, diplomatic efforts 
with the threat and use of sanctions were used to move Gbagbo to relinquish power. The International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) (undated) states that “the African Union (AU) and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded with efforts to resolve the crisis 
through mediation and diplomatic pressure.” 
The AU sent former South African President and former Kenyan Prime Minister, Thabo Mbeki and Raila 
Odinga, respectively, to hold talks with Gbagbo and Quattara on 28 January 2011. ECOWAS appointed 
former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as its regional envoy to Ivory Coast. The continental 
body’s Peace and Security Council established a High Level Panel which on 4 March issued a 
communique that recommended a unity government and a respectable exit for Gbagbo. However, 
Gbagbo refused the offer (ICR2P, undated).  
Gbagbo’s refusal to step down led to the escalation of the conflict and the UNSC went on to pass 
resolutions 1962 (2010) and 1975 (2011), which recognized Quattara as the legitimate president of Ivory 
Coast and extended the mandate of UNOCI, which had been stationed in Ivory Coast since 2004 for 
peacekeeping, and the French forces in Ivory Coast to use all necessary means to protect civilians and 
stop the use of heavy weaponry in civilian populated areas. The intervention by UNOCI and French 
forces strengthened the power of the forces that supported Quattara. In April 2011 the forces loyal to 
Quattara defeated Gbagbo’s forces, stormed the presidential palace and arrested Gbagbo (on 11 April 
2011) who was later handed over to the ICC for trial (Fischer et .al, 2013: 20). 
However, the international intervention into Ivory Coast did not go without criticism. Former South African 
President, Thabo Mbeki, argued that the UN and the international community failed to understand the 
roots of the Ivorian crisis and pushed for the elections at the wrong time under wrong conditions (Mbeki, 
2011). Ivory Coast plunged into a civil war in 2002 which divided the country into two parts, the North 
which was under the rebel Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) which supported Alassane Quattara, and the 
South that was under the control of the army that backed Laurent Gbagbo (De Waal, 2012). 
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Mbeki (2011) stated that, “The objective reality is that the Ivorian presidential elections should not have 
been held when they were held. It was perfectly foreseeable that they would further entrench the very 
conflict it was suggested they would end.” The composition of the electoral constitutional bodies could 
not solve the problem. The head of the CEI which declared Quattara the winner was Quattara’s supporter 
while the head of the Constitutional Council, which declared Gbagbo the winner was a supporter of 
Gbagbo (De Waal, 2012). The problem was complicated by giving the UN mission in Ivory Coast the 
authority to certify election results (De Waal, 2012). By giving the mission such an important internal 
mandate, the international community had already usurped the power of the Ivorian constitutional bodies 
to deal with their internal issues. It is therefore not surprising that the final results of the CEI, Constitutional 
Council and the UN mission were different, though the CEI and the UN declared Quattara the winner. 
The use of force by a mission that was initially mandated to be a peacekeeping mission was also seen 
as damaging the neutral stand of the UN (Small, 2014: 187). Authorizing a peacekeeping mission to take 
a side in an internal crisis could be seen as a mission for regime change which has no legitimate stand 
under R2P (Bellamy and Williams; 2011, 835-836). Small (2014: 187) quotes John Murphy who argued 
that: 
The use of force by UN peacekeepers and French troops blurred the lines between 
human protection and regime change and raised questions about the role of the 
UN in overriding Cote d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council … and about the place of 
neutrality and impartiality in UN peacekeeping. 
The intervention by France, the erstwhile colonial master also helped to strengthen the voice of dissent. 
The intervention could be seen as a hegemonic intervention that sought to remove a leader who had 
fallen out of favour with Paris and instill on the thrown Quattara, who could be viewed as new darling of 
France (Bovcon, 2009: 8). It can also be argued that having been faced by a declining support at home 
at the eve of an election, the French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, took the mission in order to boost his 
support if the public could view him as reaffirming the international influence of France in world issues 
(Willsher, 2011)www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/sarkozy-ivory-coast-vote-winner. From this 
argument, the French intervention in Ivory Coast is not seen as a morally driven intervention to support 
the will of the Ivorian nation but a calculated move to boost political support at home, hence personal 
interest of Sarkozy and his political party.   
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5.4.1.2     Libya 
While having considered the Ivorian intervention as a moral intervention that could be used as a model 
for intervention, this research argues that Libya was a lost opportunity for the development of R2P into a 
practical intervention driven by international morality and devoid of national interest. International military 
intervention in Libya came after the Libyan uprising in 2011 escalated into a civil war driven by the 
Benghazi based rebels (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 838). In an effort to squash the uprising, the then 
Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, used the might of his military and stated that, “You all go out and 
cleanse the city of Benghazi. … We will track them down, and search for them, alley by alley, road by 
road...” (Al-Jazeera, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/2011317645549498.html) and 
declared that they will “cleanse Libya house by house” (Bloanfield, 2011) 
(www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8342543/libya-more-than-1000-
dead.html) until the rebellion had been crushed.  
The international community responded differently with the AU choosing diplomatic solutions while the 
League of Arab States and powerful NATO states quickly moved into the extreme response of R2P which 
can only be used after all peaceful solutions have been exhausted (ICISS, 2001: 31-32). The AU was 
taken by surprise by the Libyan crisis and as it tried to balance between the need to acknowledge the 
new political realities in Libya and adjust its rule on unconstitutional governments, it failed to attract the 
trust of the rebels led by the National Transitional Council (NTC) (Adams, 2012: 9). The AU condemned 
the use of indiscriminate weapons by Gadhafi in rebel strongholds (AU Peace and Security Council; 261st 
Meeting Communique; Article 2, du Plessis and Louw, 2011: 1) and came up with a peaceful roadmap 
to solve the crisis which was reluctantly accepted by Gadhafi, but rejected by the NTC which had already 
gained recognition and from Western countries (Adams, 2012: 9). 
The African solution failed due to number of reasons namely, (1) failure of a united stand and specific 
Libyan policy among African countries and between the AU and its member states, for instance, while 
AU was against a military intervention, African countries in the UNSC (South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon) 
voted in favour of the intervening resolution 1973. (2) The bullying approach by the Western countries 
that failed to give the AU a chance to push for a peaceful solution (De Waal, 2012). (3) A quick recognition 
of the NTC (by the West and the League of Arab States) which became emboldened and declined to 
accept the AU roadmap (Adams, 2012: 9). 
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Western and the Arab League countries had different plans on Libya. The UNSC passed Resolution 
1970 on 26 February 2011 which called on the Libyan government to respect human rights and 
international humanitarian law, protect all civilians in Libya and imposed an arms embargo on Libya. It 
also referred the Libyan case to the ICC. In less than a month, on 17 March 2011, the UNSC went on to 
pass resolution 1973 which authorized: 
Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the 
Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, … to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
NATO member states quickly moved in to implement the no fly zone as dictated by Resolution 1973. 
Britain, France and USA bombed targets in Libya in order to paralyze the military machinery of Gadhafi 
(Adams, 2012: 8). NATO moved further in its enforcing of resolution 1973 from simply stopping the 
military mighty of Gadhafi to be used on civilians into assisting the NTC to defeat Gadhafi, hence 
becoming a de-facto air force for the NTC (Zifcak, 2012: 8). 
While the intervening forces faced little challenge on the legality of the intervention in Libya, the morality 
of the intervention was challenged. In a move that resembled Ivory Coast, NATO states supported a 
single part in the conflict against the incumbent, namely the NTC. The intervention was a regime change 
mission which was against the ethical principles of R2P as stated in the R2P report that: 
Overthrow of regimes is not, as such, a legitimate objective, although disabling 
that regime’s capacity to harm its own people may be essential to discharging 
the mandate of protection – and what is necessary to achieve that disabling will 
vary from case to case” (ICISS, 2001: 35). 
Politicians and scholars criticized NATO actions arguing that they were either driven by geo-strategic, 
political or economic interests. Gadhafi was the first to criticize the intervention arguing that those who 
targeted his government “were trying to plunge Libya into a civil war and to turn it into an Islamic state, 
or an Afghanistan or a Somalia” (Spencer, 2011) 
(www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8341567/libya-Col-Gaddafi-damns-
the-rats-as-he-clings-to-power.html). It was difficult for anyone to take Gadhafi seriously given that he 
was the primary target of the R2P intervention. However, Gadhafi’s claims were supported by the 
Chadian President, Idriss Deby, who warned in March 2011 that NATO R2P military bombardments in 
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Libya “could have grave consequences for the stability of the region and the spread of terrorism in 
Europe, the Mediterranean and the rest of Africa” (De Waal, 2012). 
After the fall of Gadhafi, Libya plunged into a political and military crisis with different militia groups 
claiming territories and establishing distinct governments (Lulie, 2015: 8). NATO failed to undertake its 
responsibility to rebuild (ICISS, 2001: 39) and lead Libya into establishing an effective government. The 
failure by NATO member states that intervened in Libya to direct the political processes to stability under 
the responsibility to build led to the realization of the warning given by Gadhafi and Deby. 
In support of Deby’s criticism of the Libyan intervention, De Waal (2012) pointed out that the Malian crisis 
that erupted in 2012 was directly related to the fall of Gadhafi and the failure of governance in Libya. De 
Waal states that “about 3000 Malian Tuareg served in Gaddafi’s army and during the war they helped 
themselves to enormous supplies of weapons and as soon as the dictator fell, returned home in force”. 
Another direct result of the failure in managing Libya after the fall of Gadhafi, according to De Waal (2012) 
was the growth of the Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb which has been active in Algeria. 
Countries that had supported or abstained in voting for resolution 1973 criticized the manner in which the 
resolution was implemented. The Russian President, then Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin said that 
“Security Council resolution (1973) is deficient and flawed; it allows everything and is reminiscent of a 
medieval call for a crusade” (Russian Information Agency Novosti, 2011).  
Putin’s rebuke was based on the fact that the resolution was too open ended that, inspite of the good 
intentions that those who supported it had, it was open to abuse. For instance, the statement, “to take all 
necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” in the 
resolution is too open ended that it can even be interpreted to mean a regime change or assassination if 
that is the necessary measure to ensure the safety of civilians. South African president, Jacob Zuma 
criticized the manner in which NATO interpreted the resolution.  He said “We have spoken out against 
the misuse of the good intentions in Resolution 1973. We strongly believe that the resolution is being 
abused for regime change, political assassination and foreign military occupation” (Meo, 
2011)http,//www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8575984/Libya-
Jacob_Zum-accuses-Nato-of-not-sticking-to-UN-resolutiuon.html. 
The intervention failed to meet the benchmarks of R2P intervention. While legally the intervention was 
authorized by the UNSC, the resolution was hastened without having exhausted all peaceful channels 
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that the AU was pursuing. The intervention targeted a regime change and assassination of Gadhafi, 
which is not provided for in the R2P doctrine and lastly countries that undertook the intervention became 
more concerned with financial gains specifically oil and gas while neglecting the security of the ordinary 
Libyan (see Borger and Macalister, 2011). The issue of oil and exploration deals remained shrouded in 
secrecy. However, due to competition between the powers that intervened in Libya, some of the issues 
have been exposed to the public. For instance, Borger and Macalister (2011) point out that while the dust 
of the war was still up, France declared that it was “fair and logical” for its companies to benefit from oil 
resources which triggered a concession rush. As early as April 2011, the USA government had approved 
trade in oil that came from the rebels (Quinn, 2011) (http,//www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-libya-
usa-opposition-idUSTRE73Q6SI20110427). The Libyan R2P intervention could have therefore been 
influenced by the desire to get rid of Gadhafi given that he was a longtime foe who was still trying to re-
engage the West (Roberts, 2011) and also to acquire oil and reconstruction deals. Gadhafi fell out with 
the West after he nationalized western oil investments after his 1969 coup, and his alleged sponsoring 
of terrorism mainly the Lockerbie (Scotland) bombing of American passenger jet in 1988. 
5.4.1.3     Syria 
The Syrian crisis which degenerated into a civil war gave a first real test to the R2P doctrine. If one can 
argue that Libya signified the shortfalls and failure of R2P, then the Syrian crisis signified the fall of R2P 
(Nuruzzaman, 2013: 57). In the Syrian crisis, the international community through the UNSC was brought 
to a near total paralysis that was reminiscent of the Cold War era (Simura, 2014: viii and 99). 
The Syrian civil war started as demonstrations against the torture of children who had painted anti-
government graffiti and dictatorial rule of Bashar al Assad and his Baath Party (Zifcak, 2012: 15). On one 
hand, human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights, and leaders of the Western world like USA, Britain and France opine that the 
demonstrations degenerated into a civil war when the military attempted to disperse the demonstrators 
through the use of heavy weapons (Zifcak, 2012: 15-16). This argument has not been explicitly denied 
by the Syria government and its supporters like Iran and the Lebanese Shia militia group, Hezbollah, 
who, on the other hand, argue that the demonstrations were hijacked by Sunni extremists and terrorists 
from across North Africa and the Middle East sponsored by countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar and 
turned into a crisis (Hof and Simon, 2013, ii & 2 cited in Simura, 2014: 73). According to this argument, 
the Syrian civil war is a proxy war for the control of the Middle East by the West and a tussle for regional 
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dominance between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf sister states of Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and 
Jordan against Iran.   
In an effort that was argued as in the moral spirit to protect the civilians through the tenets of R2P, the 
international community initially tried to use diplomatic and international sanctions against the 
government of Bashar al Assad. The UN and League of Arab States (Arab League – for short) jointly 
appointed former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as an envoy to bring the warring side to talks and 
come up with a peaceful solution to the crisis (UN News Centre, 2012). However, Kofi Annan failed to 
bring the warring factions in Syrian to the table and the crisis escalated leading to his resignation on 2 
August 2012 (UN News Centre, 2012). Annan was succeeded by former Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister 
and international diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, who also failed to bring a peaceful solution and on 
resignation lamented that “how much more death, how much more destruction will occur” (UN News 
Centre, 2014) before the international community consider its moral duty to protect Syrian civilians ahead 
of different countries’ interests. 
While the international community was pursuing peaceful diplomatic solutions to the crisis, which also 
included talks in Geneva between representatives of the internationally recognized rebel groups13 and 
the Syrian government, there were also efforts to use coercive means to protect the civilians. Some EU 
and Arab countries sponsored three draft Security Council resolutions between 2011 and 2013 that 
implicated the Syrian government for the crisis. 
The three resolutions were vetoed by Russia and China because of what they saw as unfair blaming of 
the Syrian government for the crisis without condemning the rebels, hence there was a UNSC paralysis 
on the way forward to put an end to the Syrian civil war. Russia and China argued that while they gave 
the international community a chance to implement R2P through abstentions in the voting for UNSC 
resolution 1973 which opened way for a UN authorized intervention in Libya, NATO states showed that 
they needed UNSC as triggers for regime change (Joya, 2012: 35). Ferdinand (2013: 6-7) states that 
China and Russia argued that western states led by the USA cannot be trusted with another resolution 
which they can quickly use for regime change ultimately in pursuit of self-interests. 
                                                            
13   There were a number of rebel groups in Syrians some of which who did not accepted the leadership 
of the Syrian National Council (SNC) which was the most recognised Syrian opposition groups. 
However, there were a number of other militia groups which operated autonomously or failed to get 
regional or international recognition as they were considered to be ‘terrorist’ groups. These groups 
included Al Nurse Front. 
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While the UNSC managed to pass resolutions which gave Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
passage to send humanitarian assistance to the civilians in some hard hit areas, it is the failure by the 
international community to come up with an R2P grounded solution to bring sustainable peace into Syria 
that has shown the primacy of national self-interest over international morality. Former UN/Arab League 
Envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan argued that, “his mission failed because of the Syrian government’s 
intransigence and continuing refusal to implement the six-point plan, and also because of the escalating 
military campaign of the opposition – all of which is compounded by the disunity of the international 
community… At a time when we need – when the Syrian people desperately need action - there 
continues to be finger-pointing and name-calling in the Security Council (Annan quoted in UN News 
Centre, 2012).”  
These failures can be seen as representative of the bigger picture of the pursuit of interests by different 
international and regional players in the Syrian civil war. 
The response of different players in the Syrian crisis showed signs of the negations of ethical principles 
of R2P and pursuit of geo-strategic interests. Middle East countries that intervened took the crisis as a 
proxy war for regional dominance predominantly between the Shia and Sunni blocs (Gresh, 2013) 
(http,//mondediplo.com/2013/07/05syria). Sunni dominated countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar backed 
the predominantly Sunni Syrian rebels, while Shia dominated Iran and a Lebanese based Shia militia 
group, Hezbollah, supported the government of Assad which is dominated by the minority Alawite sect 
which is an offshoot of the Twelver Shia sect (Encyclopedia Britannica; 
Undated,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/12399/Alawite).  
In a global context, the Syrian war became a tussle for domination of the Middle East between USA and 
Europe on one side and Russia and Iran on the other (Manyuan, 2014). The USA and its European allies 
partnered the Sunni bloc and sponsored the rebelling groups in Syria with lethal and non-lethal 
assistance to depose the Assad led Syrian government (Wezeman, 2013: 271). In countering USA and 
European actions to depose the Assad government, Russia and Iran assisted Syria with arms 
(Wezeman, 2013: 269) and military strategists while Hezbollah provided manpower to beef-up the Syrian 
army (Manyuan, 2014).  
Scholars have come up with different answers on the moral relationship between R2P and the 
international community’s role in Syria. Due to the Libyan backlash, there is now a breakdown in great 
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power consensus, hence R2P failed to be implemented in Syria (Nuruzzaman, 2013: 65). The Syrian 
crisis became a playground for geo-political and strategic interests of regional and Major Powers. Given 
that the crisis has resulted in a civil war and rise of terrorism which has led to the death of more than 190 
000 according to 2014 UN estimates, (Cumming-Bruce, 2014) and more than 210 000 according to the 
2015 report by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (Al-Khalidi, 2015) the failure by the international 
community to come up with an effective mitigation measure symbolizes how far the international 
community is still to go on being a moral community. 
The crisis divided the main parties in the conflict into mainly two distinct camps with competing blocs in 
the crisis sponsoring the fighting sides with weapons. The provision of weapons to warring factions with 
full knowledge that there was a greater possibility of the weapons being used to kill innocent civilians is 
in itself immoral and unethical. It is because of this unethical nature that in a number of civil wars in which 
the international community has intervened, like the Kosovo crisis, the international community through 
the UNSC authorised arms embargoes on belligerent sides (Allain, 2004: 252).  
However, some analysts like Evans (2014: 21-22) argue that Syria does not signify the death or end of 
R2P but a simple hitch which will serve as an experience to develop the doctrine and suit the practical 
problem in implementing the doctrine. Weiss (2014, 35) is of the notion that R2P is a concept and a policy 
and has not been killed by failure to intervene for civilians in Syria. The argument by the two scholars 
entails that while there was practically inaction for the protection of civilians the doctrine of R2P which is 
still in its formative stages given the dynamics of international politics cannot be judged by the Syrian 
event alone. Even the argument of international great power paralysis is countered by the fact that other 
resolutions have been agreed upon during and after Syria, with the one on the need to rid Syria of 
chemical weapons being a case in point (Evans, 2014: 21). Weiss (2014: 35) goes on to argue that if 
weighed against international silence on the 1982 massacre of 40 000 people in Hama by Hafiz al Assad 
(the father of Bashar al Assad), R2P succeeded in condemning the current crisis, notwithstanding the 
high death records and displacement of civilians in the current conflict. 
Evans (2014: 19-20) lays the blame on the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS) for their argument that Western powers exceeded the mandate given by them in Resolution 
1973 on Libya by pursuing a regime change, hence Russia and Chinese vetoes against any resolution 
that condemned Syrian authorities. The Syrian case was also complicated as it was a crisis that was 
created over a long time. Weiss (2014: 36) concurs with Juzdan ((2015) that the rebels in Syria have 
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complex identities and some of them have committed crimes against humanity such that an intervention 
will not be easy from anyone. The failure in Syria, therefore, cannot be attributed to a single reason, but 
a number of reasons including the purported abuse of Resolution 1973 which created mistrust among 
the veto power states in the UNSC, complex nature of the Syrian crisis and geo-political considerations 
by international and regional powers which transformed the crisis into a proxy war. 
5.5  Conclusion 
The R2P doctrine came up as a result of different experiences the world went through since the end of 
the Cold War.  The failure by the international community to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide of 
1994, the degeneration of the Somali conflict into a failed state and the intervention by NATO into Kosovo 
without UNSC authorization are some of the cases that impacted on the need to have a precise 
intervention doctrine. 
The success of the doctrine was made possible by the support and drive it got from influential world 
leaders. This chapter argued that the push and support for an international policy change by former USA 
president and British Prime Minister, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, respectively, weighed in support of the 
birth of R2P. The success of the doctrine was also spurred by the push exerted on the UN by the then 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Due to the support given to the need of having new rules on intervention 
by the liberal world, the government of Canada sponsored ICISS which produced the R2P report. From 
the report, R2P became a doctrine that was debated at the World Summit of 2005 and in the general 
assembly before world leaders accepted it as an intervention policy that would be implemented on a case 
by case basis. 
R2P is a concise doctrine that is built upon the just war doctrine. The crafters however, tried to make it 
more acceptable by stating that it is not a challenge on the international relations cardinal principle of 
state sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty was redefined as the sovereign right from interference and 
the duty of the sovereign to protect his or her subjects who are the true owners of sovereignty. The state 
had a responsibility to protect its citizens. In the case of failure by the state to protect its citizens from 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it had the duty to seek assistance from the 
international community in which failure or unwillingness would transfer the responsibility to protect to 
the international community. 
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R2P was applied in a number of cases but scholars have agreed that the doctrine was explicitly used in 
the crises in Ivory Coast and Libya. Attempts to apply the doctrine in the Syrian crisis failed due to mistrust 
among the UNSC veto powers emanating from the excesses by NATO in its implementation of Resolution 
1973. Russia and China argued that the USA, France and Britain were pursuing regime change under 
the cover of implementing UNSC resolutions. This chapter argued that the moral failure of the 
international community in implementing the R2P doctrine is a burden for all powers in the crisis. All the 
players that included but not limited to USA, Britain, France, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar considered their national interests ahead of the safety and lives of the Syrians. The battle for 
Middle East dominance by the powers saw them fighting the war by proxy, hence exacerbating the 
suffering of the Syrian people whom they purported to be protecting.  Having looked at R2P and pointed 
in passing that R2P attempts to redefine state sovereignty, the following chapter discusses state 




CHAPTER 6:  STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTEVENTIONS 
6.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the R2P doctrine as an emerging norm that sought to establish HMI as 
a legitimate, ethical and legal practice in the international system, through the revision of the concept of 
state sovereignty. This chapter analyses state sovereignty. State Sovereignty is the most contentious 
ethical and legal term in relation to HMI. On one hand, powerful countries that support HMI argue that 
State Sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct hence when the leadership of a country abuses its citizens 
grossly, it loses the claim and privileges of sovereignty. On the other hand, less powerful countries, most 
of which are former colonies of powerful countries, view state sovereignty as their last garrison against 
the encroachment of powerful countries in their affairs and recolonization. Hence this chapter seeks to 
unpack this ethical and legal concept in relation to HMI and locate its current place in international 
relations vis-a-vis HMI. 
There are two terms which are going to be analysed, namely; ‘the state’ and ‘sovereignty’. The subject 
of ‘State’ and ‘Sovereignty’ spans many years back into history and developed in different epochs. The 
subject of the ‘state’ can be traced back to the writings of philosophers like Aristotle and his compatriots 
while the subject of ‘sovereignty’ is traced back years before the rise of the nation-state system in Europe. 
This chapter concentrates on the subject of state sovereignty from the Peace of Westphalia. The Peace 
of Westphalia is deliberately selected as it signified the codification of sovereignty as we know it today 
based on the rigid boundaries of the state.  
The chapter is motivated by the fact that discussion and critique of R2P is incomplete without giving a 
counter analysis of state sovereignty. On one hand, HMI and the R2P concept are rejected by some 
leaders like Robert Mugabe and Thabo Mbeki and scholars like Hans Köchler and Mohammed Ayoob, 
just to mention a few, who see the intervention doctrine as a direct threat to state sovereignty which they 
regard as a cornerstone of the international system. On the other hand, scholars like Thomas Weiss and 
Gareth Evans and world leaders like Tony Blair, Bill Clinton and Kofi Annan who supported the doctrine 
of HMI have sought to legitimise the doctrine by redefining the concept of Westphalian state sovereignty. 
The debate on R2P, from those who view the concept as a great step towards the observance of human 
rights and those who view it as an imperialist intervention policy, is grounded in the concept of state 
sovereignty. Pro-intervention scholars and world leaders argue that state sovereignty is no longer 
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sacrosanct (Weiss, 2011:3, Chopra and Weiss, 1992), while those who are against the concept argue 
that it’s a trump on sovereignty which is the stabilizing principle of the international system (Ayoob, 2002: 
81) that causes international instability. This chapter completes the HMI debate by citing the place of 
state sovereignty in the conundrum. 
The chapter begins by discussing different definitions of state sovereignty. After defining state 
sovereignty, the chapter will trace the history of state sovereignty from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 
until its application under the UN Charter. The last section of the chapter will discuss and critique the 
rising concept of sovereignty as responsibility which is credited to Francis Deng and popularised by the 
ICISS at the turn of the new millennium. 
6.2  Definition of State Sovereignty 
Biersteker and Weber (1996: 2) argue that the meaning of state sovereignty can be easily discerned if 
the term is separated rather than collapsing the two terms into one. State sovereignty is the marriage of 
two nouns, namely state and sovereignty. Biersteker and Weber define a territorial state as “a 
geographically-contained structure whose agents claim ultimate political authority within their domain.” 
However, the definition is not very clear and says little about what really a state is. For instance, one can 
question which are the agents who claim ultimate political authority? What really is ‘a geographically-
contained structure and how big should it be? Shaw (2003: 178) breaks down the definition of a state 
and notes that it (state) refers to an entity that “possesses the following qualifications, '(a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
states”.  
However, this definition is not immutable. This definition has its controversies hence has not been 
universally accepted by other scholars. One is tempted to question the minimum number of inhabitants 
who can be recognised as a permanent population for a state to be constituted. Bluntschli (2000: 23) is 
of the opinion that there is no agreed definitive number of the total population to constitute a state.  
Current economic and security needs of states mean that the minimum population is now higher. This 
has also been natural due to population increase spurred by advancements in medicine and food 
production. Scholars like Donnelly (2004: 5) have argued that the issue of recognition should also be 
added on the noted qualifications. Donnelly states that, “Sovereignty arises not from a pre-existing 
internal power or authority that imposes itself on other states but from the mutual recognition of exclusive 
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jurisdictions. Sovereigns are those whose sovereignty is recognised by (the society of) sovereign states.” 
While there have been some disagreements, in terms of the definition of sovereignty, there is agreement 
that there is need to have a sedentary population on a defined piece of land, as put forward by Bluntschli 
(2000: 23) who postulate that, “A permanent relation of the people to the soil is necessary for the 
continuance of the state.” 
Given the above attributes of a state, one can easily understand that a state is not a natural phenomenon 
but a human construct. States are created/born, for instance South Sudan which is the youngest state in 
the world, while others die, like the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. The death of a state means the 
end of a system of government, population and territorial disintegration as well as natural loss of 
recognition from the society of states. 
The last question which comes from the discussion on the ‘state’, is who constitutes a state. Jeng (2012: 
1) quotes Max Weber (1996) that, “The state has ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a 
given territory’ and that “the state has also been characterised as the provider of public goods including 
security.” How can an abstract qualify as an internationally recognised distinctive territory, constituted by 
people and run by an effective government have a monopoly use of force and provide public goods? The 
answer to the question may be that the state is represented by its governors, who embody the title of the 
state. 
The term sovereign is derived from the old French word “Soverain”, which comes from the Latin word 
“Superanus”, meaning “above” (Donnelly, 2004: 2). The Oxford English Dictionary defines sovereign as, 
“…one who has supremacy or rank above, or authority over others; a superior; a ruler; a governor, lord, 
or master”; “the recognised supreme ruler of a people or country”, whilst Lake (2003: 304) define 
sovereignty as “a type of authority relationship.” This definition is supported by Ayoob (2002: 82) who 
states that: 
Sovereignty is often defined in terms of internal control and external autonomy. 
However, since both control and autonomy wax and wane in the real world of politics, 
it is better to define sovereignty as authority (the right to rule over a delimited territory 
and the population residing within it).” It is imperative to note that sovereignty denotes 
the “right” and not the “ability” to govern and regulate behaviour (Donnelly, 2004: 3).  
The combined terms bring the notion of ‘state sovereignty’. State sovereignty from the combination of 
the definitions of the two terms means the supremacy of a certain population in its defined territory, which 
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supremacy it (the population) confide into its governors. Internally, the governors are entrusted to 
maintaining peace and security, while externally, they recognise no supreme authority.  
However, the definition of state sovereignty is not in simplistic terms. Different scholars have forwarded 
different definitions of the term.  Snyman (2006:4) defines sovereign states as:  
States whose subjects or citizens are in the habit of obedience to them, and which 
are not in themselves subject to any other (or paramount) State in any respect ... 
In the intercourse of nations, certain States have a position of entire independence 
of other ... This power of independent action in external and internal relations 
constitutes complete sovereignty. 
 
Biersteker and Weber (1996: 2-3) argue that it is wrong to give a definition for a controversial and 
historical concept like sovereignty. The two scholars while they gave a working definition of a territorial 
state and sovereignty, the definition is only made to create a platform for discussion but not a factual one 
that can be taken as conclusive. These two scholars opine that defining a concept such as state 
sovereignty “freezes that concept’s meaning in the present, thus neglecting the rich history of the 
concept, which enabled its particular present meaning to emerge.” However, they agree that “territory, 
population, and authority - in addition to recognition - are important aspects of state sovereignty” 
(Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 3). State sovereignty therefore can be understood as the link between 
authority, population, and territory.  
State sovereignty has both internal and external qualities. Internally, sovereignty mean that a state has 
rights to regulate and preside over matters obtaining in its territory. Snyman (2006: 4) is of the notion 
that: 
Internal sovereignty may be described as the competence and authority to exercise 
the function of a state within national borders and to regulate internal affairs freely. 
Internal sovereignty thus comprises of the whole body of rights and attributes that a 
state possesses in its territory.  
This is in line with Benoist (1999: 99)’s assertion that national sovereignty refers to “supreme public law, 
which has the right and, in theory, the capacity to impose its authority”. 
The rights and duties of a state in exercising its internal mandate of sovereignty are many. The most 
important being the legitimacy to control and enforce public order. This is in line with what Jeng (2012: 
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1) calls the legitimate monopoly to use force. The right comes with duties. The primary sovereign duty of 
a state is to create an environment in which all citizens exercise their rights freely (Rabkin, 2009: 2) and 
without infringing on the rights of other citizens. The state in accepting the rights and duties of sovereignty 
becomes a referee in state affairs. In observing its mandate, the state is guided not by external norms 
and rules but the laws of nature and the Creator as well as the law of nations (that is, the law and practices 
common to all nations (Bodin, 1576: 27-28). 
In contemporary times, however, state sovereignty has been reinterpreted not to mean the supremacy 
of those in control of government institutions, but the supremacy of the people who mandate the leaders 
to take up posts in government institutions (Peters; 2009: 516), while Rabkin (2009: 2) espouse that the 
supremacy is not on any individual or persons but on the constitution of the land which distributes rights 
and duties to different constituencies of the state. This argument is derived from Bodin (1576: 28)’s notion 
that: 
…it is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject 
to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates 
law already made, and amends obsolete law. No one who is subject either to the 
law or to some other person can do this. 
Given the foregoing discussion, no one is viewed as above the law as even state presidents are sued in 
national (internal) courts. The democratic systems which are now on a near universal nature in the world 
(except for a few absolute monarchies) have principles of checks and balances on the governing arms 
of the state which together are bestowed the sovereign mandate by the people. These in a layman’s 
terms are the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. 
While in theory the separation of powers and the ultimate wielding of power to the people or constitution 
means that there are internal mechanisms to control power, in practice it can be different. Leaders who 
are bestowed with power and control of state military machinery can abuse their power especially in a 
bid to perpetuate their stay in power. This abuse of power has in history led to genocides, massacres 
and civil wars. Examples include the Nazi Genocide of the Jews, the Srebrenica massacre in the former 
Yugoslavia, the Rwandan Genocide, the Sudanese and Burundi crises. These crises lead one to seek 
for answers on who then should be bestowed with the power to control the ‘state’ when it abuses its 
powers, an issue which is the subject of discussion under the R2P section. 
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When one accepts the theory of popular sovereignty or constitutional sovereignty, the primary mandate 
of the sovereign is to protect the rights of the people who bestowed the rights of sovereignty in him or 
her. Whether one takes it from the perspective of classical Realists like Hobbes’ (1651:103) state of 
nature in which a sovereign is needed to restrain people from the ‘law of the jungle’ or classical Liberalists 
like Locke (1689: 110-111)’s state of nature in which a referee is needed for all to exercise their rights 
and duties without having equal power to punish transgressors of the law of nature, the duties of the 
sovereign is to allow the exercising of basic human rights. The meaning of absolute internal sovereignty 
therefore has never meant the right to transgress against basic human rights, specifically the right to life 
(Verellen, 2011-2012: 167). 
Externally, state sovereignty means that the state recognise no supreme authority. A sovereign state “is 
not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the governmental, executive, legislative, or judicial 
jurisdiction of a foreign law other than public international law” (Steinberger, 2000: 512). Benoist (1999: 
100) states that, “On an international level, sovereignty means independence, i.e., non-interference by 
external powers in the internal affairs of another state.” 
This argument creates what the realist paradigm view as anarchy in the sense that there is no supreme 
law to govern state behavior (Tamaki, 2015). The international system is seen as a self-help system in a 
billiard ball format (Waltz, 1959). However, the international system has gone through transformations 
which have rendered some of the classical notions of ‘sovereignty’ redundant. One is enticed to accept 
the paradigm of the International Society as postulated by the English School, specifically the ‘Solidarists’ 
half of the school. The International Society theory put forward that the international system has had 
consistent interaction for a time that it has set out norms and institutions to govern their interactions. 
External sovereignty, therefore may now be seen to mean that a state is recognized by its peers (other 
states) as an equal sovereign state. Perhaps the best explanation of the relationship between sovereign 
states is given by the UN Charter which states under Article 2 (1) that, “The Organization is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” One can therefore argue that the best way for a 
state to feel accepted in the community of states is admittance into the UN which is the most universal 
international body of states.  
In sum, sovereign equality can best be understood as “legal independence, jurisdiction over people and 
territory, self-determination, territorial integrity, non-intervention, diplomatic immunity, legal personality, 
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and capacity (notably the treaty-making power, the capacity to be held liable, and the capacity to become 
a member of an international organization)” (Peters, 2009: 516). One can also add that such rights bring 
the duty to reciprocate the same to other states in the international system. This gives the state the right 
to claim non-interference in its internal affairs as an inalienable right (Snyman, 2006: 5).  
6.3  State Sovereignty, From Westphalia to the United Nations 
The concept of state sovereignty as understood from its pre-R2P period was developed at the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. After the lengthy and devastating Thirty Years War in Europe, European leaders 
came up with the concept of sovereignty based on territory (Vaughan, 2011: 6). Prior to the Thirty Years 
War and Peace of Westphalia, European boundaries were not as they are today, or what they were 
before the other major wars and events that followed the Peace of Westphalia, like the Napoleonic Era, 
and the First World War (WW I).  
Germanic states were ruled by the Holy Roman Emperor in some form of a loose federation under the 
name the Holy Roman Empire (Sibai, 2001: 82, Asch, 2004). The dominant religion in Europe was the 
Roman Catholic and the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor had some power and influence that limited 
the power and influence of the Germanic Princes. This was to undergo changes due to the Thirty Years 
War that was caused by religious, imperial and economic interests (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). The 
Thirty Years War (1614-1648) was triggered by the rebellion by Protestant Bohemian nobles against the 
Catholic King and Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand II. The Protestant Nobles feared Ferdinand II, an 
ardent catholic, who had begun to establish Catholicism as the absolute religion in his territories 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). Europe got divided into two fronts with some European protestant states 
like Denmark and Sweden supporting the rebelling Nobles (Vaughan, 2011: 5). 
However, as the conflict ragged on in the years, the essence of the war shifted from being purely religious 
to include imperial and geo-political interest. This was proven by the fact that when France, a Catholic 
state, joined the war, it came in on the side of the Lutheran Swedes due to fears that the Habsburgs of 
the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs of Spain could form an anti-French alliance with other states 
in Europe (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). The war which finally ended in 1648 had indelible footprints 
on the European political map and ideological issues. Encyclopedia Britannica (2014) states that: 
When the contending powers finally met in the German province of Westphalia to 
end the bloodshed, the balance of power in Europe had been radically changed. 
100 
 
… The member states of the Holy Roman Empire were granted full sovereignty. 
The ancient notion of a Roman Catholic empire of Europe, headed spiritually by a 
pope and temporarily by an emperor, was permanently abandoned, and the 
essential structure of modern Europe as a community of sovereign states was 
established. 
This assertion is supported by Masahiro (undated) who says that: 
Before the Thirty Years’ War, which was partly a religious war, the European world 
of Christendom was largely a diarchic one of Pope and Emperor. But as a result of 
its defeat, the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved into hundreds of relatively 
independent authorities with more or less equal sovereignty over their populations 
and territories, which theoretically marked the birth of the modern nation-State 
system. 
In 1648, in Westphalia, former belligerents agreed to peace through the treaties of Osnabruck and 
Munster popularly termed the Peace of Westphalia. Apart from changing the geographical and legitimacy 
of sovereigns in Europe, the peace also ushered in a new era of quasi-religious tolerance (Straumann, 
2008: 179-180). The peace can therefore be seen as a precursor to the UN Charter on the issues of 
rights. Apart from the political separations of the role of the church and the state, the Westphalian 
agreements signified the victory of the European Princes to be in control of small territorial units under 
their diverse views than to be bundled in a universal ‘Catholic’ system which non-Catholics viewed as 
oppressive to their free thinking and religious choices. 
The above assertion is supported by Morgenthau (2006: 317) opines that the formulation of state 
sovereignty in the sixteenth Century meant the rise of a territorial state that centralised power for law 
making and law enforcing within its territory. This power continued to increase in the span of centuries to 
become supreme. He noted that: 
By the end of the Thirty Years’ war, sovereignty as supreme power over a certain 
territory was a political fact, signifying the victory of the territorial princes over the 
universal authority of emperor and pope, on the one hand, and over the particularistic 
aspirations of the feudal barons, on the other (Morgenthau, 2006: 317). 
The Peace of Westphalia carried on as the referral of state sovereignty until the signing of the UN Charter. 
The Charter reinforced and transformed some of the rules that had governed the so-called ‘civilized 
world’ to suit the post WW II situation from 1945. When leaders of victorious powers (led by Britain, 
France, Soviet Union and USA) met to discuss the creation of the UN, they did not think of any better 
way to keep trust between nations more than what the peace of Westphalia had brought. The UN Charter, 
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therefore endorsed the Westphalian state sovereignty concept. According to Article 2 (1) of the UN 
Charter, “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. 
It can be argued that the WW II was caused by the trampling of the Westphalian state sovereignty concept 
by leaders with unbridled ambitions like Adolf Hitler of Germany. Creators of the UN and drafters of the 
Charter were aware of this and might have found it necessary to reinstate state sovereignty as one of 
the main principles of the UN system.  
However, the new UN Sovereignty concept had some slight differences from the Westphalian concept. 
While in the Westphalian conceptualization of sovereignty, wars of conquest, especially against those 
leaders and lands considered barbarian and not part of the civilized world were countenanced 
(Orachelashvili, 2006: 319), the UN concept of sovereignty altered that practice to be out of sync with 
the new obtaining system (Donnelly, 2004: 15). For instance, in 1884/5 European colonial powers 
partitioned Africa without its consent and presence at the Berlin conference and moralized the use of 
force in the occupation process. The UN was influential in dismantling this European colonial order that 
was moralized under the Westphalian system. The UN Charter categorically stated in Article 2 (4) that, 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations”, while stating in Article 51 that, “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.” The UN therefore limited sovereignty to internal rights to regulate 
behaviour in a state and limited any state from interfering and seeking to aggressively control other states 
through the use or threat of force and aggression.  
The UN system has been a unique system. The international organisation came up with a raft of treaties, 
besides the Charter, that sought to buttress respect of state sovereignty. However, the UN system has 
not only been interested in enforcing absolute state sovereignty but also to “encourage” member states 
to respect human rights (UN Charter Article 1 (3)). Unlike the Peace of Westphalia which was concerned 
more with the Kings and Princes in Europe, the UN system has equal concern for the states and the 
peoples, with the states being seen as the representatives of the collective will of the peoples as seen 
by numerous reference to the word “peoples” from the opening statement “We the peoples of the United 
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Nations” and throughout the preamble, while states are categorically stated as the members of the 
organization. 
Hence, while it has been noted earlier on that there was the dominance of the Realists influence in the 
formulation of the concept of state sovereignty and its subsequent infusion into the UN Charter, the 
interpretation of the charter at the end of the 20th Century can be read as an attempt to dismantle the old 
order in line with the influence of the International Society paradigm. The development in information and 
communication technologies that managed to broadcast through various media pictures of atrocities and 
the failure to deal with some of the horrendous atrocities in Africa and Europe particularly Rwanda and 
Srebrenica massacres has influenced some world leaders to challenge the classical conceptualization 
of state sovereignty. As noted under the paradigm of the International Society that states should observe 
rules and as noted by the Solidarists school of thought that HMI is  now a moral imperative, leaders like 
Annan (1999) (2012) and Blair (1999) explicitly called for a conditional sovereignty based on observance 
of human rights and a duty to protect the citizens. The interpretation of the UN Charter, therefore is now 
being revised on a tremendous extent. 
6.4  Sovereignty as Responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
The notion of sovereignty as responsibility is credited to Deng. In 1996, Deng, F. M., Kimaro, S. Lyons, 
T., Rothchild, D. and Zartman, I. W. argued that, “It is also recognized that sovereignty carries with it 
certain responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are accountable not 
only to their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community”. This argument carried 
on a long time and incubated into the R2P. 
The argument that sees sovereignty as responsibility is within the confines of the debate of sovereignty 
being a right of the state or the people with the state being only a custodian. The notion of sovereignty 
as responsibility goes further from the debates by not only trying to locate the debate within the internal 
borders of a state. It takes the debate into the international realm, where its proponents argue that the 
government is not only held accountable by its people but by the international community as well (Deng 
et al, 1996: 1). 
This notion is not all new. Prior to the Peace of Westphalia, the Princes and other European sovereigns 
were partially sovereign in their actions as they ultimately answered to the Pope or the Holy Roman 
Emperor (Franca Filho, 2007: 958 & 960). In the conceptualization of sovereignty by philosophers like 
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Hobbes (1651), Grotius (1625) and Bodin (1576), the sovereign was answerable to no other equal 
sovereign on earth. These philosophers advocated for sovereignty as an answer to the troubles of their 
times. Brown (2002: 27) states that, “Bodin explicitly advocates political sovereignty as the only remedy 
for the wars of religion in France and Hobbes is equally obviously influenced by the troubles of his era, 
the civil war in England and the Thirty Years war in Germany.” 
However, this did not mean that the sovereign was not answerable to a divine power, as they all 
acknowledged that sovereigns were enthroned by God. Bodin (1576, 27 and 29) states that: 
Similarly, sovereign power given to a prince charged with conditions is neither 
properly sovereign, nor absolute, unless the conditions of appointment are only 
such as are inherent in the laws of God and of nature…. It is far otherwise with 
divine and natural laws. All the princes of the earth are subject to them, and cannot 
contravene them without treason and rebellion against God. His yoke is upon them, 
and they must bow their heads in fear and reverence before His divine majesty. 
The absolute power of princes and sovereign lords does not extend to the laws of 
God and of nature. 
As in Bodin’s argument, Hobbes (1651: 106) states that: 
This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth; in Latin, 
Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more 
reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace 
and defence. 
Hence, while the philosophical creation of sovereignty meant that no sovereign answered to another as 
they were all equal, and that the sovereign’s rule on his subjects was absolute, was driven by the need 
to curb anarchy (Kleingeld, 2006, xvii-xviii). There was always an implied higher power, that of the 
immortal God, as noted by Bodin (1576:27 and 29) and Hobbes (1651, 106) acknowledged by other 
philosophers who wrote on sovereignty. Sovereignty has, therefore, always meant ensuring peace and 
stability for those under the sovereign’s commonwealth. This classical sovereignty concept can be seen 
as realist in nature. 
The new sovereignty as responsibility is different from the realist, Westphalian conceptualization as it 
seeks to create a higher power that has no divine connotations. Ayoob (2002, 84) captures this difference 
when he noted that: 
…there has been a concerted attempt beginning in the 1990s to redefine 
sovereignty to include the notion of responsibility as well as authority. This has 
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meant adding ‘respect for a minimal standard of human rights’ as an essential 
attribute of sovereignty. Such responsibility, according to this line of reasoning, is 
owed by the state both to its people and to the international community and those 
of its institutions that have come to be seen as the guardians of international norms 
of civilised behaviour. In other words, the state has to act toward its citizens in ways 
that meet not only with the approval of the latter but also of other states and certain 
crucial international organisations. 
The new concept is based on the doctrine of the international community, an extension from the doctrine 
of the International Society as enunciated in the English School theory. While the concepts may seem to 
be worlds apart, the new theorization is in line with the classical realist conceptualization under which 
sovereigns had to submit to the law of nature to which none is above, except the immortal God. The laws 
advocated for by the International Society and International Community paradigms are rooted in the law 
of nature, albeit some western molestation which have been disputed by some African and Asian states 
as well as scholars. 
One can be pardoned for linking the new sovereignty as responsibility to the neo-liberal doctrine of the 
international community which is itself premised on the concept of ‘universal’ human rights as put forward 
by neo-liberal world leaders like Tony Blair (1999) and Bill Clinton (1999). Ayoob (2002: 84) likened the 
obtaining situation to the situation that obtained until the end of the nineteenth century. He states that:  
Without denying the considerable moral force of the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
approach, one cannot help but notice echoes of the ‘standard of civilization’ argument 
in this proposition. According to this latter thesis, which was the prevailing political 
wisdom in Europe until the end of nineteenth century, only those countries that had 
reached a certain standard of civilised behaviour had the right to attain sovereign 
status and interact with each other on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty. 
The others, being barbarians if not savages, were to remain subject to, or under the 
tutelage of, sovereign (European) powers. Where they could not be subjugated… 
rules of European international law that enjoined the reciprocity in interstate 
interactions did not apply to them. This denied them the protection of norms that had 
been developed in Europe to govern interstate relations, the chief among them being 
the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.  
Sovereignty as R2P was popularized by the Kofi Annan led UN Secretariat. While the concept of 
sovereignty as responsibility was first put forward by Deng in 1996, it was the Kofi Annan led UN 
Secretariat, to which Deng was part of as the first UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons (1992-2004) to the Secretary General, which popularized the concept on 
an international scale and within the corridors of the UN. Weschler (2004: 65) states that, “One of the 
key factors in making human rights acceptable to most governments as an inherent element of the 
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Council’s (UNSC) outlook was the gradual abandonment – over a decade or so – of the absolutist 
approach to state sovereignty.” According to Weschler the process of deconstructing the absolute nature 
of sovereignty under the UN has its roots in the East Timor crisis which led the UN Secretary General, 
then Kofi Annan, to give an address to the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1999 “in which he 
counterposed the concepts of state sovereignty and individual sovereignty, describing the latter in terms 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
Annan (2012: 84) disclosed his pivotal role in re defining and re-aligning state sovereignty when he 
pointed out that one of his main roles at the helm of the UN Secretariat was to “make a broader case for 
intervention and challenge conventional views on national sovereignty as immutable and inviolable no 
matter what outrages were committed within the borders of states”. In his onslaught against state 
sovereignty as a shield by states committing mass human rights violations, Annan (1999: 206) in his 
address to the UN General Assembly said that:  
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the 
forces of globalisation and international cooperation. States are now widely 
understood to be instruments at the service of their people, and not vice versa. At 
the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom 
of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent treaties has 
been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. 
Annan’s speech echoed the argument forwarded by Deng (1996) and the scholars at the Brookings 
Institute. The argument that states were now being viewed as instruments at the service of the people 
was a rewording of the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. Annan argued that there was now the 
new rise and growing consciousness of the concept of individual sovereignty as a challenge to state 
sovereignty. The argument confused the debate on sovereignty given that the philosophical rise of 
sovereignty was based on what was seen as the need to suspend some of the individual freedoms for 
the good of the society (Kleingeld, 2006: xvii-xviii). The theory of sovereignty is not about the state 
usurping the powers of the individuals by the sovereigns, but the trade in rights for the benefit of the 
society, without necessarily prejudicing the individual except when exercising such right results in greater 
injuries on the society (Kleingeld, 2006: xvii-xviii).  
This argument is not meant to deny the fact that in many cases, sovereignty was used by both the 
international community and states committing mass human rights atrocities and genocide to find 
defence against taking no action or being questioned, respectively. Cases in point include the Rwandan 
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genocide, Srebrenica massacre, which most western states led by Britain had requested the UNSC to 
recognise it as a genocide but was blocked by a Russian veto (Baker, 2015), and the Darfur crisis. 
Annan believed in sovereignty as he accepted it as the last defence for the weaker states against the 
powerful ones, as he pointed out that, “I recognize both the force and the importance of these arguments. 
I also accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to small and 
weak states” (2000: 48). However, after having witnessed genocide and war atrocities being committed 
while he was part of the UN, with some of them taking place when he was at its helm as the Secretary 
General, he led an onslaught against the use of state sovereignty as defence when the state or militias 
getting state support commit mass atrocities. Annan (2000: 48) posed a historic question during the 
millennium summit that, “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”  
Weschler (2004: 65) notes that Annan’s address to the UN General Assembly in 1999 and a number of 
his speeches on the relationship between sovereignty and mass atrocities committed by states or their 
agents, generated a strong debate on the relationship between sovereignty, human rights and HMI which 
in part led to the creation of the ICISS in 2000, which went on to produce the R2P document in 2001. 
The ICISS argued that it did not seek to change the meaning of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty 
but to re-characterise the concept in line with international norms (ICISS, 2001: 13). The ICISS in its 
conceptualization of sovereignty as responsibility stated that: 
The Charter of the UN is itself an example of an international obligation voluntarily 
accepted by member states. On the one hand, in granting membership of the UN, the 
international community welcomes the signatory state as a responsible member of the 
community of nations. On the other hand, the state itself, in signing the Charter, accepts 
the responsibilities of membership flowing from that signature. There is no transfer or 
dilution of state sovereignty. But there is necessary re-characterisation involved, from 
sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and 
external duties (ICISS; 2001: 13). 
Simply put, the theory of sovereignty as responsibility denotes that sovereignty, unlike in its classical 
conceptualization where it was considered absolute, is now conditional (Etzioni; 2006: 72). Sovereignty 
can now be seen as based on the manner in which a state internally conduct itself in order to claim the 
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external conditions of sovereignty. This conduct is based on the observance of ‘minimum’ human rights 
as laid down by the international community.  
It can argue that the primary set of standards which should be observed by states under the theory of 
sovereignty as responsibility is the UN Charter and a host of other international human rights and 
humanitarian law instruments developed by the international community since the creation of the UN and 
beyond. On its part, the R2P document clearly states that “internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure” are the major issues to be dealt with under the international responsibility to protect. The R2P 
report points out that states should be held accountable for “large scale loss of life” and “large scale 
ethnic cleansing” (ICISS, 2001: XII). The 2009 UN Secretary General’s report on the implementation of 
R2P, article 1, quotes the 2005 World Summit outcome document that stipulates the parameters of the 
human rights issues that; “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including incitement, through appropriate and necessary means”. 
While at face value the concept of sovereignty as responsibility carries valuable moral justifications, the 
concept has not gone unquestioned. Chinyanganya (2015) questioned the wisdom behind the trampling 
of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty that kept the international community intact for centuries. His 
argument is that change is needed when there is a problem which needs to be solved. While the 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty has not been a perfect solution to world problems, at least it had 
been able to keep the international community as a working entity (Chinyanganya, 2015). 
While a number of scholars argue that the imagined international community is in creation due to 
globalisation (Simma and Paulus, 1998: 276-277, Craig, 2008: 1), politically, the state remains the 
primary and most important actor in international relations. Even when the state is removed from its role 
as the primary actor in international relations, other unifying entities similar to the state would be formed. 
This is noted clearly by Brown (2002: 19) argued that, “Political life is impossible, it seems, without some 
kind of bordering, some distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. All political entities whether formal 
(cities, states, empires) or informal (tribes, guilds, universities) find it necessary to distinguish between 
members and non-members.” 
Since the creation of political entities, the international community has witnessed, since the creation of 
political entities, movements for and against the creation of a world government. There has been eras 
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when a number of empires dominated the world. However, bigger states have broken up while some 
smaller states have coalesced to create bigger states. In recent history major states like the former Soviet 
Union broke up to create smaller states, other states that have broken up include Pakistan, which lost 
the territory to give birth to Bangladesh in 1971, Ethiopia which lost Eritrea in 1993, and Sudan which 
lost South Sudan in 2011. Even states that are considered stable today have their equal share of 
secessionist agitations. The United Kingdom has its problems with Scotland, Spain has Catalonia region 
while Iraq, Turkey and Syria have the Kurds. 
One would also question the sincerity of the Major Powers to the theory of the international community. 
The international community that is being perceived is rules based with international institutions that 
ought to be respected. The fact that the USA denied to ratify the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) which is an important institution of the international community, fearing the 
prosecution of its service and former service personnel (Brown, 1999:855-856) and the R2P doctrine, 
puts to question the sincerity of the neo-liberal world that is at the forefront of the creation of the 
international community and the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. The irony of the refusal by the 
USA to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, while participating in international tribunals like the ICC for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), as well as participation in 
HMI missions like the Kosovo intervention and Libyan intervention signals the primacy of national interest 
in the doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility. It also shows the esteemed position the USA holds its 
sovereignty, which creates a competition to guard sovereignty by other state and the moral bankruptcy 
of sovereignty as responsibility. 
6.5  Conclusion 
State sovereignty has a long history which goes back to the days of the creation of states. As discussed 
in this chapter, there is no single definition that can be accepted as exclusive to state sovereignty. The 
embodiment of sovereignty itself has been a subject of debate. The term has been conceptualized in 
terms of state sovereignty, absolute sovereignty, constitutional sovereignty and individual sovereignty, 
among others.  
As noted in this chapter, the chapter was concerned more with state sovereignty given that it is states 
that are primary actors in international relations. Sovereignty has gone through a process of 
transformation especially in interpretation in different times. However, as established, the concept of 
109 
 
sovereignty has always accorded rights and duties to the sovereign in relation to the citizens in his or her 
state. The most important of the rights is to be able to enforce authority without hindrance and the 
capacity to use legitimate force in cases of non-compliance. However, this right is only exercised in 
enforcing the rights of the society and restraining those who might want to hinder the enjoyment of these 
rights. 
The Peace of Westphalia ushered in a new era in state system and the concept of state sovereignty. The 
Peace of Westphalia separated the state from the church. It also established the principle of territorial 
based state sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty was observed as a right which meant that in a 
number of instances, the right was breached which led to the two world wars and the establishment of 
the UN based international system. 
The UN system adopted the Westphalian system of sovereignty. However, it abolished the acceptance 
of wars of conquest, specifically on the so called uncivilized world. Hence for the first time, there was a 
coded international instrument which abolished all aggressive wars as unethical in the international 
system. It also established the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as part of norms to be 
followed by sovereign states in dealing with their peoples. The chapter noted that the UN system, unlike 
the Westphalian system, gave importance to both the states and peoples. Hence there is numerous 
reference of ‘peoples’ in the UN Charter as well as the term ‘human rights’. However, the importance 
given to peoples by the Charter did not demean the importance of state sovereignty. Far from it, the 
Charter strengths sovereignty as it looked back at the primary aims of granting sovereignty from its 
philosophical roots.  
While there was the strengthening of state sovereignty and human rights, there has always been 
breaches of these concepts by either powerful states like the USA, and Britain in the invasion of Iraq 
(2003) among other cases, or by rogue leaders like Idi Amin’s invasion of Tanzania in 1979. There has 
also been grave breaches of human rights, specifically the right to life such as the numerous cases of 
alleged genocide as was in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Darfur. These events and other cases of war crimes 
led some scholars like Deng and his compatriots at Brookings Institute to argue for the 
reconceptualization of state sovereignty. Deng et al propounded that sovereignty should be 
conceptualized as a responsibility to protect the citizens. The argument was headed by some neo-liberal 
western leaders like Bill Clinton of the USA and Tony Blair of Britain. Blair came up with what he termed 
the doctrine of the international community which argued that sovereignty was now limited by the 
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interconnectedness in the world. In 2000 the government of Canada led in sponsoring the ICISS which 
forwarded an official call to the UN to redefine sovereignty as the responsibility to protect, a term which 
also became the title of the report which the ICISS produced in 2001. 
The concept of the responsibility to protect as a redefinition, or re-interpretation of state sovereignty, 
denotes that every state has a responsibility to protect the right of its citizens through its internal 
mechanism. When the internal mechanisms are failing, the state has a responsibility to request 
international help, failure of which will result in the international community morally assuming the 
responsibility to protect the citizens in the distressed state without its consent. The international 
community can exercise this moral duty by any means which in extreme cases can be the use of force, 
after authorisation by the UNSC. 
The chapter noted that this redefinition of sovereignty, while morally appealing, has a number of problems 
in implementing it. The concept can be seen as diminishing the sovereign rights of the weak while 
empowering the strong to trample on the weaker states who for long had seen the concept of state 
sovereignty as a shield. There is no proven case that when the state fail to protect its weak, mostly 
minority citizens, there will be another state or coalition of states who can intervene. Hence, the concept 
is open to abuse by the strong in furthering their interest. Even the argument by the ICISS that the UNSC 
authorisation can limit the influence of abuse and self-interest, which is noted in chapter 5 in depth and 
in passing in this chapter, has been tested and proven to be wrong in Libya and Syria. Hence, the notion 
of sovereignty as responsibility is still to prove its practical moral and ethical clout.   The next chapter is 




CHAPTER 7:  AN INVESTIGATION ON THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS IN HUMANITARIAN 
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
7.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed state sovereignty and its influence in humanitarian military interventions. 
Chapter 7 seeks to provide an account and understanding of the meaning and role of national interest in 
the conduct of HMIs from both the realists and liberalists’ perspective. First, the chapter will define 
national interest, self-interest and how these two terms are intertwined.  Secondly, the chapter will 
discuss the relationships between national interest and selfishness as espoused by different theorists.  
Thirdly, this chapter will discuss the classification of national interest and the urgency at which these 
interests are pursued by the intervening states from the view of the realists and liberalist thoughts. 
From the onset it must be understood that national interest is a core concept in HMI which cannot be 
divorced from humanitarianism.  States are in all cases engaged in the process of fulfilling or securing 
their set objectives of individual State National interests and states justify their actions both internally and 
externally on the basis of their national interest.  Therefore, the behaviour of each state is thus, motivated, 
conditioned, governed and guided by its national interests.  According to Chiwenga (2014: 130); 
National interests prompted some Member States of the UNSC such as the UK and 
USA to attack Iraq in 2003 without the authorization of the UNSC.  When Iraq invaded 
Kuwait they were among those who strongly appealed for the need for a multilateral 
military action against Iraq.  However, when they failed to get another resolution that 
would allow them to disarm Iraq they decided to bypass the UNSC and went to war 
against Iraq as a coalition.  From the actions of UK and USA against Iraq we can deduce 
that these countries used the powers given to the UNSC for their own selfish national 
interests and when their national interests were not recognized, they violated 
international law which forbids the invasion of a sovereign state without the authorization 
of the UNSC.  The USA and UK are among the prominent members of the UNSC who 
should be part of the UNSC collective that is delegated by the UN Charter with the 
mandate to enforce the observation of international law among member states.  Their 
failure to observe international law was a further demonstration that national self-
interests are pursued by the UNSC Member States in a way that does not take into 
account any sense of obligation and duty to fostering the common good for the 
multinational community. 
For instance, given the above understanding, it is critical in this study to conceptualize the meaning and 
role of national interest in the conduct of HMIs.  Throughout this study, national interest and self-interest 
are interchangeably used.  
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7.2 Definition of National Interest 
 
National interest means acting in a way within one’s country or relating internationally in a way that 
promotes the national interest of one’s own country. National interest derives its political meaning from 
the presumption that relations among states are not based on ethical considerations, but self-help and 
deceit whenever it suits their purposes. When statesmen talk of national interest some scholars have 
argued that, such a talk is usually done so in a way that conflates their personal interest with that of the 
nation. Niccolle Machiavelli sometimes equated the Prince’s interest to that of the nation. In his book, 
The Prince, Niccole Machiavelli (1467-1524) advanced the argument that when ruling, a ruler was not 
supposed to be constrained by moral considerations.  Machiavelli’s theoretical outlook towards politics 
is popularly known as skeptical realism.  Within the Machiavellian theory of skeptical realism, politics can 
best be described as ‘the art of the possible’ whereby lies and murder are permissible if they can be 
employed to attain the desired political ends.  Machiavelli had an amoral outlook towards human nature 
in which he understood it to be originally evil, hence amoral.  With regards to promises, Machiavelli said 
that a good ruler should never ‘honour his word when it places him at a disadvantage and when the 
reasons for which he made his promises no longer exist’.  His skepticism towards human nature comes 
out more poignantly when he states that, “if all men where good, this precept would not be good; but 
because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you, you need not keep your 
word to them” Machiavelli 1961:100).  Within this Machiavelli skeptical realism, all abominable human 
character qualities such as cruelty, lying and deceitfulness, just to mention a few, should be the source 
of guidance to the ruler.  According to Machiavelli’s theory of skeptical realism the ruler and the people 
who are ruled were basically self-interested or egoists.  Underlying the theory of skeptical realism is the 
presumption that nature is evil; therefore, an effective ruler has to rule in accordance with the dictates of 
this evil human nature. Among scholars of international relations “[t]he rightness of pursuing the national 
interest is widely accepted today” (Maxell 1990: 12). 
 
Many statesmen and policy makers have always used the term in the ways that are suitable to them and 
to their objectives.  For instance, President George W Bush used USA’s intervention in Iraq as a national 
interest decision.  The French led intervention in Libya in 2010 was carried out in pursuit of national 
interests.  The former President of the United People’s Republic of Tanzania Julius Nyerere authorized 
the intervention of Uganda in 1979 for national interest reasons.  Therefore, for this reason and many 
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others no definition of national interest has been accepted among many leading scholars of international 
relations. 
Morgenthau, a leading realist notes that national interests are conceptualized in four main categories: 
based on their importance they are distinguished in vital and secondary interest; based on their duration, 
temporary and permanent interests; based on specificity they are distinguished in specific and general 
interest and lastly, based on compatibility national interest can be complementary and conflicting.  
According to Morgenthau, national self-interest became a mechanism for advancing the power of one’s 
nation.  Powerful nations enter into relations with poor nations based on whether such poor nations 
support the national self-interest of the powerful nation. Due to the fact that the concept of humanitarian 
intervention has evolved from the ethical debate about making resources available for helping others, 
national interests would appear to have no place as a motivation for humanitarian intervention.  In 
particular, moralists tend to have a very low opinion of national interests, as the concept is generally 
based on the assumption that national interests are equal to self-interest or selfishness.  Mistakenly, 
perhaps, self-interest and selfishness are conceived to be intertwined, causing self-interest to be often 
identified as self-absorption, egoism, and the disregard for the rights and interests of others (Maitland 
2002:4).  Therefore, the negative connotation arising from this definition of self-interest in economics is 
adopted by political science as a motivation based on money making, avarice and greed, materialism, 
hedonism, the profit motive or profit maximization. 
The Oxford Dictionary (2014) define the term ‘national interest’ as, “referring to something that is common 
to the whole nation. However, the understanding of the term is not as simple as it is used by politicians 
and political scholars.  Acharya (2003) defines national interests as varying widely, from increasing a 
state’s power to a survival of a state to upholding international legitimacy. “Based on the realist notion, 
national interests are narrowly defined as the sum of material and security interests of a nation” Acharya 
(2003:2). 
Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach (2008) made an elaborate discussion on the concept of national 
interest. They note that for any policy to be regarded as of national interest, it must have two attributes 
namely ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘exclusiveness’. Under the inclusiveness attribute, the policy should concern 
the whole country “or at least a sufficiently substantial subset of its membership to transcend the specific 
interest of particular groups”, while the attribute of exclusiveness mean that the policy should not 
necessarily include the interests of groups outside the state, although it may do so” (Griffiths, et al., 2008: 
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217).   Griffiths et al’s definition, while it simplifies the understanding of the concept is problematic. One 
is bound to question the authority which decides that this is a policy which concern the whole country or 
which concern a substantial population to transcend particular group interests? This question may be 
followed by questions on the criterion which is used to categorize groups that are seen as ‘particular’ and 
if a country cannot have conflictual interests. In some cases, influential politicians may develop a policy 
and justify it as a policy of national interest when the nation has not made any input and does not know 
of the benefits or negative impact of the policy to them as a nation.  
The definition of the term is confusing because the term has both internal and external dimensions 
(inclusiveness and exclusiveness). Externally, national interest can also mean the interests or aspirations 
of a state in international relations. As defined by Nuechterlein (1976: 246), “The term ‘national interest’ 
has been used by statesmen and scholars since the founding of nation-states to describe the aspirations 
and goals of sovereign entities in the international arena.”  
In practical use of the term and in national policymaking the internal aspects feed into the external. Hence 
external foreign policy making is driven by the internal needs and aspirations of a state which change 
due to changes in country needs and evolution in the history of a country.14  The concept of national 
interest is extensively used in justifying the foreign polic(y)/ies of a state (Hill, 2003: 118-119). 
Policymakers use the concept for basically two reasons. Firstly, attributing a foreign policy to national 
interest hides their policy behind a screen of presumed collective unity and responsibility rather than 
personal goals or partisan policies (Hill, 2003: 118-119). Secondly it creates a strong defence against 
critics because in politics of international relations, no politician would want to be seen as working against 
the ‘public good’ of the whole nation especially given the fact that national interest has power and security 
connotations for the state. 
National interest is at the centre of the realist conceptualization of the international system. Realism 
argues that the concept of national interest is synonymous with the struggle for power (Mearsheimer, 
1994-5: 573-574). The struggle by a state to outdo other states using all the means necessary is seen 
as the pursuance of national interest. 
The realist approach is elitist in nature. The definition of national interest in an anarchical society is seen 
as a preserve of foreign policy experts and high ranking politicians. Ordinary people have no appreciation 
                                                            
14  Interview with Simon Badza, Addis Ababa, 19 June 2015 
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of the struggle for power among states and may not be aware of foreign policy formulation. Hence, the 
notion of national interest, from a realist perspective, being an internally inclusive policy becomes 
vulnerable to questions of the extent of its inclusiveness. 
The liberalist school of thought differs with the realist paradigm. The liberalist theory views the arena of 
international relations, not as an ‘international system’ whose primary subject are states alone, but as an 
international society whose primary objective is to create shared norms, rules and institutions and put 
them at the centre of international relations, thereby creating shared interest among states in international 
relations (Murray, 2013: 9).  Finally, in contemporary studies national interests are oftentimes divided 
into subcategories along a scale indicating the urgency of the national interests at stake.  Very high 
urgency interests are those interests connected to the survival of the nation while vital interests indicate 
only a high urgency.  Moderate and low interests correspond to major and peripheral interests 
respectively.  Survival interests have a very high urgency and therefore may trigger states to mobilise all 
national resources to defend them.  Vital interests are critical and involve the defence of close allies or 
strategic resources.  Major national interests are less critical and only represent a moderate level of 
urgency since they are concerned with the protection of less important allies and non-critical resources.  
From a realist point of view, the degree of urgency of national interests at stake determines the extent of 
the effort a state is allowed to invest in defending these interests.  Consequently, the higher the urgency 
of the interests at stake, the more costs in terms of troops, time, money, equipment, resources, political 
prestige or economic aid the state is willing to devote to the defence of these interest (Keifer 2003:6). 
7.3 Defining National Self Interest 
 
The Collins English Dictionary (2013) defines self-interest as, “The act or an instance of pursuing one’s 
own interest”.  The Oxford Dictionary (2013) defines the concept as, “one’s personal interest or 
advantage, especially when pursued without regard for others.” The term self-interest is derived from the 
Latin word, ‘interesse’. The term in Latin means self-preservation or self-aggrandizement that motivates 
people into taking actions (Murove, 2005: 12). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013) defines self-
interest in the context of egoism. The encyclopedia notes that under egoism, each person has an ultimate 
aim to cater for his/her welfare and that maximizing self-interest is seen as rational and morally right. 
Self-interest can therefore be defined as the pursuance of one’s interest without necessarily taking into 
consideration the impact and effects on other people or the environment. 
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As noted by Murove (2005: 12), “self-interest and selfishness can be used interchangeably on the 
premise that they imply being concerned with one’s advantage to the exclusion of the others.” In short, 
self-interest is a moral packaging of greed. 
From the two dictionary definitions, encyclopedia definition and the Latin roots of the word ‘interest’, self-
interest means self-inclination and the desire for self-aggrandizement mostly pursued at the expense of 
others. It is because of the pursuant of aggrandizement mostly at the expense of others that saw the 
concept of self-interest being unpopular among religious leaders and those who believe in the concept 
of humanism. It was seen as a divisive concept that could only be interpreted as the fall of human beings 
from a moral standing (Murove, 2005: 23).  
In modern economics, self-interest is exulted as the driving force behind development and growth. Adam 
Smith is hailed as having popularized the concept of self-interest in modern economic thought (Force, 
2003: 7). He wrote that: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher the brewer, or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but 
of their advantages (Smith, 2005: 18).  
Adam Smith argued that human being in economic affairs were motivated and driven by self-gain. He 
gives a classical example of two hunting dogs in which he postulates that:  
Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance 
of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or 
endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, 
however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their 
passions in the same object at that particular time (Smith, 2005: 18).  
According to Adam Smith, human being like animals have a pretense of love when in actual fact they are 
only driven by the gains that they accrue from a certain action. Assistance or an act packaged as goodwill 
is meant to camouflage the doer’s ulterior motive. Therefore, one’s gains become the incentive that push 
or pull him/her to act. Viewed from the lenses of self-interest, major powers have packaged their motives 
as benefits for the people who are suffering from the excesses of their leaders. They are informed of the 
human rights and good governance that will be ushered after the HMI and not the benefits that would be 
accrued by the intervening powers, which in most cases is the reason for the intervention.  
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Self-interest is not only seen as the push factor in economics but in social life in general. Aristotle (300 
B. C.: 24-25) wrote that: 
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon 
it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest, and only 
when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, 
everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill.  
From his view, Aristotle saw human beings as naturally self-inclined. A human being is therefore 
expected to exert more effort on issues that have a direct bearing in his or her life. The effort would 
diminish with the remoteness of the benefits to the individual. Sears and Funk (1991) note that Hobbes 
popularized the concept in modern times especially with his philosophy of ‘All against all’. The struggle 
among the greed and self-interest human being led to the creation of states when the people bequeathed 
some of their rights to the leader and a government to make decisions for the benefit of the majority or 
all people in the society. From this development the concept of self-interest transformed into national 
interest. The aggregate of self-interest of individuals in a single state produce national interest which is 
discussed in the following section.  
However, the concept of self-interest is a complex one. While a number of theories have put forward 
human beings as being self-interested, it should be noted that the concept is not a simple straight jacket. 
There are cases in which individuals develop conflicting interests. In these cases, a person can have 
both the self-inclined feeling and also a conscience drive to altruism. Hence the human being will have 
to negotiate between the conflicting interests to come up with an action. From this notion, one then is 
driven to question if it is not possible for a person to act in altruism. 
7.4  The Relationship between National Interest and Selfishness 
National interest is related to selfishness in the sense that it presupposes a sense of concern for the 
wellbeing of others. National interest is related to belief in group selfishness whereby a sense of right 
and wrong is nurtured. National interest presupposes all citizens of a particular country are selfish or 
egoists, hence the relationships of nations is a relationship on egoism or selfishness. It is mainly on this 
salient presumption that national interest has been critiqued by ethicists such as Peter Singer as based 
on a fallacious understanding of human nature because as human beings we do sympathise with the 
sufferings of others. Within a nation-state not all citizens egoists because there are many instances where 
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some individuals have used their own personal individual economic resources to serve lives of people 
who are not their own fellow citizens (Singer, 1981: 5 - 18).  
 
In the history of Western modern philosophy, the idea that nations should always pursue their own 
national interests in their relations with other nations has militated against the idea that nations should 
be altruistic towards each other.  In fact, the argument that nations do behave in a way that is amoral 
towards each other cannot be refutable, especially in light of the behavior of the powerful states in the 
Middle East. 
 
7.4.1 National Interest and Social Contractarianism 
 
An argument for the prevalence of national interest as the prime motivation for state action including 
humanitarian intervention comes from realist social contractarianism.  Realist social contractarianism 
rejects the moralist argument that humanitarian intervention must be purely humanitarian in its intent that 
is the protection of the freedom, rights and interests of people in another state.  Allen Buchanan argues 
that the internal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has to take precedence over the external 
legitimacy.  That is to say governments do not only have to justify the intervention externally as 
humanitarian, but also internally to its own citizens as an efficient intervention in terms of cost benefit 
analysis.  Dobos (2009: 3) notes that, the state’s raison d’etre is to ensure the security and wellbeing of 
the people that bring the state into existence through the social contract.  That is to say, that the social 
contract is a construct by a certain group of people, named a discretionary association, with the primary 
purpose to protect these individuals from the perils and inconveniences of the state of nature.  Every 
individual in a state submits to the authority of the state in order to receive in return protection and 
security.   On this view, citizens empower their government to act as an agent for the sole purpose of 
promoting their interests.  They relinquish a portion of their earnings in tax in return for this service.  The 
state is to be understood as the benefactor for its own citizens acting exclusively in their interests due to 
the fact that no one else’s interests are represented, so legitimate political authority is naturally defined 
as authority exercised for the good of the parties to the contract, the citizens of this state. 
According to Buchanan (1999: 75), the state itself receives its legitimacy primarily from the service it 
renders to its citizens; hence, benefaction is what gives the state the right to rule.  Quite to the contrary, 
states or governments do not have the obligation to serve the world at large.  Further, according to realist 
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social contractarians, the government does not have any inherent legitimacy in itself but is a sole agent 
of the discretionary association it represents.  Therefore, for governments to engage both internally and 
externally to practices that do not serve the primary interest of its citizens would be morally wrong.  
Charles Krauthammer (1985: 11) also notes by stating that since statesmen or governments are no more 
than people’s trustees spending the blood and treasure of others, their freedom to wage or intervene 
militarily is limited to cases where it is strategically necessary or where it renders an increase in domestic 
benefits.  Therefore, if intervention occurs in order to secure natural resources or sea ways that are of 
particular national interests to the intervening state, intervention is acceptable.  If on the contrary 
intervention occurs for the sole purpose of pleasing international law, world public opinion or public 
sentiments of crucial allies, intervention is not internally justifiable.  In this view, it follows therefore that 
purely HMI as envisaged by moralists and altruists is commonly rejected by realists social 
contractarianism for the simple reason that intervening states invest both the lives and funds of their own 
people in order to serve strangers who are not part of the social contract. 
7.4.2 National Interests and Morality in Humanitarian Military Interventions 
 
According to skeptical realism, the Western political theory of liberalism evolved around the idea that 
human beings were solely self-interested creatures by virtue of the fact that they were not originally 
endowed with a sense of promoting the common good in their social relation.  In advancing the theory of 
skeptical realism, Thomas Hobbes noted that human social existence was basically a contract and that 
it was this contractarian nature of our human existence that helps us to kill each other.  Hobbes maintain 
that the main responsibility of the government or the sovereign was to enforce contracts and that these 
contracts were relevant within the nation state which is a sovereign.  He further maintains that the 
principles of law and order are only intelligible and plausible with the realm of a nation state because of 
the existence of a common power or ruler.  Hobbes notes that: 
For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and in sum doing to 
others, as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power, to 
cause to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, 
pride, revenge, and the like.  And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and 
no strength to secure a man at all.  Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature, if 
there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and 





Taking note from the above quotation, Hobbes was advocating a sceptical outlook towards human nature 
in the sense that he argued that abiding with morals presupposed the existence of a terrifying power. 
Hence, without the existence of this terrifying power, societies can easily descent into anarchy. 
Furthermore, he notes that for human beings to abide by their contract, Hobbes maintained the use of 
brutal force was indispensable. Hobbes also maintains that without the use of brutal force, society would 
disintegrate into chaos. It was part of human nature that there is always disagreement. Whilst other 
creatures are naturally predisposed to agreeing with each other, the agreement among human beings 
“is by covenant only, which is artificial; therefore, it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required, 
besides covenant, to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep 
them in awe, and to direct their actions to common ends” (Hobbes 1967: 131-132).In other words, he 
notes that our human existence is something that is artificial in the sense that it is based on covenants 
which are to be enforced by an all controlling power. Human beings were originally violent creatures who 
are only interested in pursuing their private self-interests. Hobbes went on to say that the issue of a 
common covenant among different nations was illusory because, “The notions of Right and Wrong, 
Justice and Injustice, have no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law, no injustice. 
Force and Fraud, are in War, the two Cardinal virtues” (Hobbes 1967: 139). In his book, Leviathan, 
Hobbes propounded a theory whereby international relations are only based on anarchy. In other words, 
there is no nation which is concerned with the wellbeing of another nation, but its own national self-
interest. Murove (2005:75) summed up the Hobbesian theory of international relations as follows,  
 
The salient presumption in this reasoning is that citizens of country A are concerned with 
the wellbeing of country B only in so far as the wellbeing of country B promotes the self-
interest of country A. If the perishing of country B would promote the self-interest of 
country A, then it follows that it would not be to the self-interest of country A to stop 
country B from perishing. 
 
Given the above quotation we can conclude that national self-interest eliminates the possibility of the 
existence of altruism in international relations. Therefore, whatever help countries give each other it has 
to be seen as a way of the other country pursuing its own self-interest. Thus, the element of anarchy 
inherent in national self-interest cancels the possibility of the existence of common morality among 
nations. In a similar vein, Mary Maxwell summarised Hobbes’ view of morality among nations as follows: 
For morality to exist between nations, certain features such as power and compliance must also exist 
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concurrently. These features do not exist in relations between nations, therefore we cannot have morality 
in international relations because there is no common power that can enforce the rules (Maxwell 1990: 
11-12; see Hobbes 1967: 65). 
 
7.4.3 National Interests and the fear of the Political Influence 
 
The importance of national interests in current foreign affairs has stoked the concerns in some circles 
that the concept of humanitarian intervention is no more than a means of powerful Western countries to 
broaden their influence and guarantee their access to vital resources.  The fear of what scholars name 
neo-colonialism has been intensified by the recent experience of the usage of humanitarian rhetoric to 
justify the interventions in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003.  Fear of a new imperialism is particularly 
acute in parts of the world that have known colonisation, where international interventions revive 
memories of the imperial past. 
Ottaway and Lacina (2003: 74) maintain that due to the fact that Western governments have promoted 
Western values of liberalism and democracy abroad and in the post-Cold War era have used their 
economic, political and military superiority to correct humanitarian grievances abroad, many in the non-
Western world have come to regard the concept of coercive intervention for humanitarian purposes quite 
sceptically.  Unlike pure peace-keeping missions that require the consent of the receiving country and 
lack any coercive nature, the emerging humanitarian intervention regime enables Western states to take 
all measures necessary to bring humanitarian crises to a halt with or without the consent of the receiving 
state.  For example, the USA and UK actions in Iraq (2003) were carried out without the consent of the 
receiving state, a sign that the actions were influenced by their national interests.  Despite the fact that 
outside interventions in the last two decades have become less exploitative and abusive in comparison 
to 19th Century imperialism, many international interventions in the post-Cold War era have nonetheless 
aimed at regime change and/or nation building along Western liberal lines.  Ottaway (2003:74) notes 
that, while some instances such as Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti 1994 were designed to re-
install a democratically elected regime, post-conflict resolutions such as in Afghanistan or Iraq have relied 
on the installation of local transitional governments usually closely affiliated to the intervening parties.  In 
the cases of Kosovo or East-Timor, the international community has even taken over the role of the 
administrator itself by setting up an in international administration.  Together with the creation of a political 
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elite, Western states further support the new regimes by training security as well as administrative 
personnel.  Thus, it seems plausible that the intervention of foreign governments into the internal affairs 
of another country has a tremendous impact on the sovereignty and autonomy of the receiving state. 
7.5  National Interest and Humanitarian Military Interventions 
Given that national interest relates to the inclusive benefits for the people in a country exclusively against 
those from outside, the benefits of HMI on the people of the intervening state is questionable. HMI is a 
foreign policy adventure that is justified in most cases on the basis that it is a moral obligation upon the 
intervening country. It is rare for leaders of the intervening country to justify HMI in terms of national 
internal benefits except in cases where they (leaders of the intervening state/s) cite that the leader of the 
country intervened was a dictator or sponsor of international terrorism as was the case in the invasion of 
Iraq.15 
However, while the morality obligation argument is justifiable, Brownlie (1963) cited by Guraziu (2008: 4) 
points out that the concept is prone to abuse by vigilantes and expansionist leaders. Brownlie’s argument 
stresses the point that while intervening countries argue on the basis of morality, in most cases 
intervention is influenced by the self-interest of the intervening country, which is national interest. 
Different scholars have submitted reasons why HMI is the pursuance of national interest by other means. 
Köchler (2001: 6) points out that Britain and France intervened in the Ottoman Empire on the basis that 
they were defending the rights the Maronite Christians when they were committing worse crimes against 
the rights of the people they colonized in Africa, Asia and Latin America and even in their own states. 
The idea is also shared by Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2004) which dismissed Blair’s claims that the 
intervention in Iraq was based on humanitarian needs to save the Iraqis from the brutality of Saddam 
Hussein. HRW argues that:  
The Iraq war and the effort to justify it even in part in humanitarian terms risk giving 
humanitarian intervention a bad name. If that breeds cynicism about the use of military 
force for humanitarian purposes, it could be devastating for people in need of future 
rescue. 
                                                            
15  In the cases which have been cited by scholars as examples of HMI which include India in Eastern 
Pakistan, now Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda and NATO in Kosovo leaders of the intervening states 
have argued basing on self-defence and rarely on humanitarian intervention. See Nicholas Wheeler’s 




From the reasons put forward, HMI is undertaken as a smokescreen to cover up for national interest by 
the intervening countries. As noted by Köchler, (2000) while Britain and France stood on the high moral 
ground when they intervened in the Ottoman Empire, they were guilty of the same crime in their own 
colonies. Furthermore, if one is to borrow from Grotius (1625), the authority who can call or allow an 
intervention to take place should be a correct authority, which may be deduced to mean a leader who is 
not guilty of the same crimes against humanity given that when Grotius propounded his theory there was 
no organization that claimed supreme power of nation-states. Hence, the HMIs that were undertaken by 
Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire cannot be seen as such given that these states failed to uphold 
human humanitarian rights and laws of the people in their colonies. At best, these interventions should 
be seen in the light of the pursuit of geo-strategic interests. 
In support of the notion that national interests have a bearing on the decision by countries to undertake 
HMI, Walzer (1977:101) argue that it is difficult to find a ‘HMI’ that is not influenced by national interest, 
when he states that:  
Clear examples of what is called "humanitarian intervention" are very rare. Indeed, I have 
not found any, but only mixed cases where the humanitarian motive is one among 
several. States don't send their soldiers into other states, it seems, only in order to save 
lives. The lives of foreigners don't weigh that heavily in the scales of domestic decision-
making. 
When a foreign policy is being made, politicians weigh its benefits against the possibility of losing support 
from the electorate back home. An intervention is therefore undertaken if it is justifiable to the home 
constituency. Salim Ahmad Salim put forward that national interests will always be a permanent feature 
of humanitarian military interventions…because western government (which are major interveners) ask 
if what is happen in a subject country like Syria is affecting their national interests at home or in the 
region. “If our troops are going to die it must be something profitable for our people at home. If it’s not 
then we can only give material support.”16The influence of the home constituency in matters of 
intervention as a foreign policy is captured well by Combs (1986: 360) when he used the example of the 
creation of the Jewish homeland by supporting the Zionist movement in the Middle East during the 
presidency of Truman when he notes that, “…since there was no domestic constituency of the Arabs, a 
pro-Jewish stand seemed pure political gain.”.  This was meant to gain votes from the strong Jewish 
                                                            
16  Interview with Salim Ahmad Salim, …….., 23 June 2015 
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constituency in the United States of America (USA) even when it meant taking a policy that would anger 
Saudi Arabia, which is a USA ally in the Middle East. 
The same case can be said for HMI. Major Powers tend to intervene in regions or states where their 
interests may be threatened if they do not intervene or can be enhanced by the intervention. A number 
of humanitarian catastrophes and brutality have taken place without intervention. Rwanda17 and Sudan 
being examples of neglected cases due to lack of important national interests. On the other hand, HMI 
was undertaken in Libya based, as argued by NATO intervening countries that Gaddafi had promised to 
conduct an indiscriminate war against innocent civilian and the use of heavy artillery in civilian populated 
areas (Payandeh, 2012: 376).  
However, even after the intervention, the intervening forces failed to contain the warring militias leading 
to more deaths and suffering in Libya. In contrast, the NATO states with the exception of France did not 
condemn Israel’s use of heavy weaponry in civilian populated areas in Gaza in its battle to destroy 
Hamas’ secret tunnels in 2014 (http,//www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4695/hamas-terror-tunnels).  It is these 
contradictions that taint the nature of HMI and give a justification to the conclusion that HMI is a 
camouflage for the pursuit of national interest by powerful countries mostly in weaker countries. 
The case is also similar with HMI as a foreign policy consideration. State leaders look at whether 
undertaking the mission can be justified to the electorate either in national gains or rallying the nation to 
support a moral high ground principle. Because of national interest there are cases that warranted 
intervention yet no country that had the capacity did, due to limited or no threat to interests or anticipated 
gains for the intervening state, while in some states, resources were committed to intervention based on 
flimsy grounds as was the case of Iraq. The cost of intervention in financial and military personnel should 
be justified to the taxpayers back home. For instance, the invasion of Iraq, which initially was justified on 
the need to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (Bush, 2003: 149-164), but later after the failure to 
locate such resources was justified in humanitarian terms (Blair, 2010: 382) cost the USA and Britain 
(the leading countries in the coalition) more than US$802 billion and more than US$14 billion 
respectively, while the two states lost 4 487 and 179 service personnel respectively (BBC News, 2011). 
                                                            
17  In an interview with Sydney Sekeramayi on 31 May 2015, he argued that while there was a crisis in 
Rwanda there was no much talk of intervention. “The idea was let them fight and kill each other until 
they get tired or until one group is defeated. And then you ask were the big powers not concerned with 
what was happening”. One can conclude that there was no motivation for intervention because the big 
powers had no interests in Rwanda. 
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Such a justification can be, for powerful nations, the pride of carrying a successful military mission that 
will enhance the prowess of the country. In cases of failure, the outcry can result in the abortion of the 
mission or affect the decisions to undertake similar HMIs. 
7.6 How States Secure their National Interests 
According to the Denish International Politics (http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/international-
politics/national-interest-meaning-components-and-methods/48487/) [Accessed on 10 June 2016], 
states have several ways of securing their national interests, ranging from Diplomacy, Propaganda, 
Economic, Alliances and Treaties and Coercive means. 
7.6.1 Diplomacy 
Nations use diplomacy as a tool to reach other nations for purposes of securing their national interests.  
This is done through the deployment of Ambassadors.  It is these Ambassadors who then establish 
contacts with the decision makers.  They usually use persuasion and sometimes threats, rewards as a 
means of exercising power and securing goals of national interest as maybe defined in their foreign 
policy.  Diplomatic negotiations constitute the most effective means of conflict resolutions and reconciling 
the divergent interests.  According to Morgenthau, diplomacy is the most primary means of resolving 
conflicts. (http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/international-politics/national-interest-meaning-components-
and-methods/48487/) [Accessed on 10 June 2016]. 
7.6.2 Propaganda 
The Dinesh International Politics notes that, “propaganda is the art of convincing others about the 
justness of the goals and objectives or ends which are desired to be secured.  It consists the attempts to 
impress nations the necessity of securing the goals which a nation wishes to achieve.  It is a systematic 
way to affect minds, emotions and actions of a given group for a specific public purpose” “franked?”  
Propaganda is directly directed to the people of other states and its main aim is always to secure self-
interests.  For instance, before the USA led a coalition force in Iraq there was much publication about 
Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which were never found after the invasion (Blix: 2004).   
7.6.3 Economic 
Dinesh International Politics notes that the rich and developed nations use economic aid and loans as 
the means for securing their interests in international relations. The dependence of the poor and lowly 
developed nations upon the rich and developed nations for the import of industrial goods, technological 
126 
 
know-how, foreign aid, armaments and for selling raw materials has been responsible for strengthening 
the role of economic instruments of foreign policy (http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/international-
politics/national-interest-meaning-components-and-methods/48487/) 
7.6.4 Alliances and Treaties 
These are concluded by two or more states for securing their common interests.  This means is mostly 
used to secure identical and complementary interests. Alliances and treaties make it a legal obligation 
for the members of the alliances or signatories of the treaties to work for the promotion of agreed common 
interests. The nature of the alliance depends upon the nature of interest which is sought to be secured.  
For instances, the coalition of the willing’s intervention in Iraq is one such example of an alliance that 
was used to pursue national interests of the intervening countries. 
7.6.5 Coercive Means 
International Law also recognizes coercive means short of war as the methods that can be used by states 
for fulfilling their desired goals and objectives.  It is an unwritten law of international intercourse that 
nations can use force for securing their national interests.  Intervention, Non-intercourse, embargoes, 
boycotts, reprisals, retortion, retaliation, severance of relations and pacific biocides are the popular 
coercive means which can be used by a nation to force others to accept a particular course of behavior 
or to refrain from a course which is considered harmful by the nation using coercive means.  The use of 
military power against international terrorism now stands universally accepted as a natural and just 
means for fighting the menace. 
Nations may use all the means possible to secure their national interests.  However, in doing so nations 
must make honest attempt to make these compatible with international common interests of the 
humankind. 
7.7 Types and Classification of Interests 
 
According to Morgenthau, cited in Marleku (2013: 416), national interests were categorized between vital 
and secondary national interests, with vital interests, being concerned essentially with the survival of the 
state and can be seen as those which can be easily defined as being concerned with the state as a free 
and independent nation as well as the protection of institutions, people and fundamental rights, while 
secondary national interests are those removed from the state’s borders and not threatening the security 
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or integrity of the nation.  In addition to this, one should distinguish between temporary and permanent 
interests, specific and general interests, and complementary and conflicting interests.  “Permanent 
interest are relatively constant over a long period of time.  Variable or temporary interests are what a 
national chooses to regard as its national interest at any particular time.  General interests are those that 
a country applies in a positive manner to a large geographic area, to a large number of nations, or in 
several specific fields.  Specific interests are closely defined in time or space and often are the logical 
outgrowth of general interest” (Marleku, 2013, 416). 
In the modern times, national interests are divided into subcategories along a scale indicating the urgency 
of the national at stake.  Keifer (2003:3) notes that “Very high urgency interests are those interests 
connected to the survival of the nation while vital national interests are those interests that indicate only 
an urgency.  Moderate and low urgency interests correspond to major and peripheral interests 
respectively.  Survival interests have a very high urgency and therefore may trigger states to mobilise all 
national resources to defend them.  Vital interests are critical and involve the defence of close allies or 
strategic resources.  Major national interests are less critical and only represent a moderate level of 
urgency since they are concerned with the protection of less important allies and non-critical resources.   
From a realist point of view, the degree of urgency of national interests at stake determines the extent of 
the effort a state is allowed to invest in defending these interests.  Consequently, the higher the urgency 
of the interests at stake, the more costs in terms of troops, time, money, equipment, resources, political 
prestige or economic aid the state is willing to devote to the defence of these interests.  Whereas survival 
and vital interests necessitate the use of force, realists do not deem the use of force compulsory when 
defending major national interests.  As low urgency peripheral national interests do not involve the 
protection of the nation’s heartland and do not pose an immediate physical security threat to the nation, 
the defence of such peripheral interests may only involve humanitarian or reconstruction efforts, not 
however, the deployment of large numbers of combat troops (Slenska; 2007:4). 
Therefore, as noted by Wellzer (1995:54) on the claim that it is in the self-interest of every state to 
preserve global stability and care for global humanity, states may define their national interests in terms 
of liberal Western values such as democracy, liberalism or human rights.  In this respect, even if this 
serves an ethical purpose, promoting these values beyond national borders, this might also serve 
national self-interest of the intervening countries.  For instance, the USA’s national interests are often 
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defined as a hybrid of security related interests in the realist sense and of value related interests 
comprising the intrinsic ethics and morale values that are contained in its constitution. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter focused on the understanding of the role of national self-interest in the 
conduct of humanitarian intervention from the perspective of both realists and liberalists.  The chapter 
further clarified why and to what extent realism (realists) assigns considerable importance to 
national/self-interest.  In this chapter, national interests were narrowly defined as “the self-interests of a 
state or nation”, and this has been precisely done so to be able to distinguish national interests and self-
interest.  The chapter notes that national/self-interests are a composition of narrow national interests, 
that is, economic and strategic interests and the personal political interests of the political decision 
makers.  This is to say, acting to national interests include actions based on economic interests and 
strategic interests, as well as the interests of personal political or material gains of policy makers. 
The chapter further notes that a prevalence of national interests as the prime motivation for state action 
in intervention comes from the realist social contractarianism.  The realists social contractarianism rejects 
the moralists argument that HMI must be purely humanitarian in its intent, that is, the protection of 
freedom, rights and interests of people in another state. As noted by Buchanan, the internal legitimacy 
of humanitarian interventions has to take precedency over the external legitimacy.  That is to say, 
government do not only have to justify interventions externally as humanitarian but also internally to its 
citizens.  It is noted from Hobbes and Locke, that state’s raison d’etre is to ensure the security and 
wellbeing of the people that bring the state into existence through social contract.  It has also been 
observed that interventions to preserve the interests of others, that is not national interests, but still 
jeopardise the lives of the soldiers will be morally wrong.  Therefore, to prevent or avert the loss of lives 
of individuals abroad by jeopardizing one’s own citizens would not be ethically defendable, since 
according to the social contract every state should first of all care for the wellbeing of its own citizens. It 
is also observed that for morality to exist between nations, certain futures as power and compliance must 
exist concurrently.  Therefore, these feature do not exist between nations hence they cannot be morality 
in international relations because there is no common power that enforce the rules. 
From a realist point of view, it has been observed that the urgency of national interest at stake determines 
the extent of the effort a state is allowed to invest in defending these interests.  Consequently, the higher 
129 
 
the urgency of the interest, the more cost in terms of troops, time, money, equipment, resources, political 
prestige or economic aid the state is willing to devote to the defence of these interests.  It is further 
observed from this chapter that the international system of the world is based on five assumptions on 
how the world should be organized;  
1) States are the key actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system, 2) great 
powers invariably have some offensive military capability, 3) states can never be certain whether 
other states have hostile intentions towards them, 4) great powers place a high premium on 
survival, and 5) states are rational actors who are reasonably effective at designing strategies 
that maximise their chances of survival.  The world still comprises states that operate in an 
anarchic setting.  Neither the UN nor any other international institution has much coercive 
leverage over the great powers (Maersheimer 2010:349). 
In relation to the concept of HMI, the chapter noted that national interest is the major influencer of HMI. 
Ethical scholars like Walzer have noted that national interests greatly influence HMIs, specifically for the 
benefit of the intervening powers.  Given the observations made in this chapter, one is tempted to argue 
that it is a misnomer to say HMIs are intended to serve humanity but a tool by the powerful to pursue 
their national self-interest. Furthermore, the pursuit of national interest has also been observed as related 
to the struggle for power and dominance.  National self-interest has thus become a mechanism for 
promoting the power of one’s own nation.  Therefore, it is noted that the presumption beyond the skeptical 
theory of realism is that the international scene is imbued in a state of anarchy where there are no 
common rules that regulate international conduct. The following chapter will make an analysis and 




CHAPTER 8: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY HUMANITARIAN 
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 
8.1     Introduction 
Chapter 7 discussion was an investigation on the role of national interest in humanitarian military 
interventions by intervening states. Chapter 8 is a critical analysis that collapses all the concepts in a 
single argument. It critically analyses the ethical challenges and role of self-interests in HMIs. It attempts 
to answer whether it is possible for powerful countries to undertake HMIs in the affairs of weak countries 
without anticipating any benefit from the intervention. This critique is done from the perspective of ethical 
challenges in HMIs. 
The chapter begins by interrogating ethical issues in the pursuit of national interests in military 
interventions; the prevalence of anarchy in international relations; national sovereignty and R2P; 
nationalism and the problem of shared moral values; and altruism and HMIs, which is followed by a 
conclusion. The chapter and its plan are motivated by the need to come up with a concise argument on 
all the concepts that were subject to interrogation in the previous chapters. The setting allows for a deeper 
interrogation of the important ethical issues that impact on HMI which allowed the researcher to come up 
with informed conclusions on the impact of national interests in HMIs by powerful states in the affairs of 
the weaker states. 
The chapter discusses the ethical challenges in the pursuit of national interests in HMI, the prevalence 
of anarchic international relations, national sovereignty and R2P, nationalism and the problem of shared 
moral values.  It will also look at altruism and HMIs. 
8.2     The Ethical Challenges in the Pursuit of National Interests in Humanitarian Military 
Interventions 
 
The ethical relationship between HMI and the pursuit of national interests is a subject that cannot be 
given easy conclusions. The subject goes into debates between the Realist school of thought and the 
Liberalist school of thought in international relations on whether ethics can be a subject of international 
relations.  Scholars are not in agreement on whether international relations can be regulated by ethics. 
Coady (2002, 15) notes that a number of realist scholars support the argument that the international 
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system is ruled by the rules of the jungle as expressed in the concept of the Hobbesian state of nature 
hence ethics have no place in such a world.  
The foundation principle of Realism is that power is the currency of international relations (Mearsheimer, 
2006: 72) and it is sought by all actors, primarily countries, at all cost (Mearsheimer, 2005: 139). 
Morgenthau (2006: 5) notes that, “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through 
the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power before 
separating between politics and ethics as different fields”. Mearsheimer (2006: 74) states that: 
“…countries can pursue other goals like ... human rights, but those aims must always take a back seat 
to survival, because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue other goals”. This can be traced back to 
antiquity historian, Thucydides’ notion that the powerful do what they need to while the weak suffer what 
they must through the exchanges at the Melian dialogue between Athenians and Melians. Given the 
above discussion, it is therefore argued that, in realism, therefore, ethics have a place which is however, 
subservient to national interests which is defined as power to guarantee survival (Thucydides, 431 B.C.). 
The Realist argument is based on international relations being struggles for power and domination. It 
goes therefore that there is no way political decisions can be made on moral terms. This Realist notion 
has moral implications on state behaviour in international relations. As a theory, the Realist doctrine finds 
readers who are influenced by it to act primarily for the fulfilment of their national self-interest and in some 
cases the interests of a few in the nation under the guise of pursuing national interest (Maxwell, 1990: 
13 & 15). A number of politicians in the USA, which was the post-Cold War Major Power have been 
influenced by the doctrine with the effect of relegating morality to the backyard in the conduct of 
international relations. The net effect of such actions is that other states that may have ethically driven 
foreign policies might be forced to revise their policies upon the realization that acting on moral terms 
without reciprocity becomes a weakness in the international arena (Maxwell, 1990: 12). 
In the conduct of HMI, the concept has had a double impact. The first impact was to drive ambitious 
powers to undertake military interventions in pursuit of selfish interests of their states without 
considerations for either the effect of the wars on the international system or the victims in the target 
state. A number of examples in history bear some testimony to this. For example, the case of Emperor 
Constantine’s war against Maxentius which Grotius (1625: 247) cites as a historical example of initial 
cases of HMIs could not be taken as a pure HMI case because the two (Constantine and Maxentius) had 
been embroiled in a succession crisis (Gearey, 1999) hence Constantine’s war and his courting of 
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Christians could have been political manoeuvers to win support and control and hence pursuit of self-
interest. The then Soviet Union undertook HMIs in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century to increase 
its influence in the Mediterranean region (Jane, 2013: 58-60) which was dominated by Britain while the 
USA led a military invasion against Saddam Hussein in 2003 to dominate oil resources in the Middle 
East (Ahmad, 2014) under the pretext of humanitarian war.  
The double effect is witnessed in the reaction of other powers either regionally or globally to self-interest 
manoeuvers disguised as humanitarian. In the case of Russia’s military intervention in the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19th Century purportedly to save Greeks and Christians, other European powers, namely, 
Britain, France, Austria and Prussia joined in the military intervention not as part to a humanitarian 
mission but to control Russian ambitions and take part in peace settlements and be able to guard their 
interests in the Mediterranean regions (Jane 2013, 58-60). Thus it can be observed that the practice of 
HMI is riddled with ethical conflicts. 
In contradiction to the Realists’ argument, Liberalism subscribe to the notion that the relationship of 
countries in international relations should and in most cases is guided by moral rules, primarily the liberal 
democratic countries. Liberalists argue that liberal democratic countries do not make wars, at least 
among themselves as they are guided by rules of peace and accountability to their citizens who bear the 
brunt of war (Newbrander, 2012: 40-41). It could be because of this reason that Teson (2003: 94) is of 
the notion that only democratic liberal states should undertake HMI because they are regarded as moral 
countries. Teson’s argument lays burden of HMIs on liberal democratic states. However, this burden is 
not strictly meant to pursue HMIs but export democracy which is contrary to the ethical principles of HMIs.  
The former USA President, Ronald Reagan, in his address to the British parliament in June 1982, stated 
that governments that are “founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise restraint and peaceful 
intentions in their foreign policy” (Doyle, 1986: 1151). According to this liberalists’ argument that can be 
traced to philosophers like Emmanuel Kant, liberal democratic countries are ethical countries because 
they are either guided by democratic principles or restrained by the same democratic principles. 
While liberalists argue that liberal democratic countries rarely make war against each other (Russett and 
Oneal, 2001: 49), the theory does accept that liberal democratic countries do not make war against non-
democratic, autocratic and authoritarian countries (Fischer, 2000: 12-13). It is because of this liberal 
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‘ethic’ that Reagan announced to the British parliament “a crusade for freedom and a campaign for 
democratic development” (Doyle, 1986: 1151). 
In extension to the call to go on military and non-military crusades for the establishment of freedoms and 
democratic development, cosmopolitanism, a branch of liberalism, propound that human rights are 
universal and that individuals, and not governments of countries are the subjects of international ethics 
and rules (Archibugi, 1995). Leaders are guided by a social contract that recognizes no boundaries but 
individual freedoms. From this opinion, not only governments have a right and duty for HMI, but 
individuals, in whose collective capacity, their respective governments will undertake HMI. 
In the sense of cosmopolitanism, humanity cannot be separated hence in the case of a leader brutalizing 
his/her citizens, the international community should intervene to save humanity as noted by Fine (2007: 
79) that, “The practice of HMI goes to the heart of cosmopolitan aims to defend human rights.” This neo-
liberal thinking advances the concept of HMI not only as a right, but a duty to be undertaken by the 
international community to save others (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002: 101). This is captured by Sangha 
(2012, 2) who states that, “Ultimately, as premised upon the main tenets of the cosmopolitan ethical 
perspective, in instances of widespread human suffering caused by the neglect, breakdown, or abuse of 
sovereign power, it is the moral responsibility of foreign states to respond accordingly.” The ethical 
problem that arises from this line of thinking in practical terms is that humanity is seen as one, hence 
there should be a response to every humanitarian catastrophe without selection.  
Practically, selectivity, inconsistency and double standards have been the major definers of HMIs. While 
there were speedy responses by NATO in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), by France in Ivory Coast in 
2011, and effective USA intervention in Haiti in 1994, there was a neglect in the 1994 Rwandan case 
and the 2003-5 Darfur crisis. There were massacres in Cambodia, that were noted by Kiernan (2004) as 
genocide and brutality in Uganda under Idi Amin (Sempangi, 1975, Nayenga, 1979, Carson, 2005: 2-4) 
and the only responses from the regional neighbours of these two countries, Vietnam and Tanzania, 
respectively, came after their territorial sovereignty had been threatened or attacked. Even when Vietnam 
and Tanzania intervened for their national security interests and achieved humanitarian by-products, the 
Security Council condemned the military intervention by Vietnam as being an invasion and was silent on 
Tanzania’s intervention (Hathaway, et al, 2013: 512). Kuperman (2001: 23) pointed out that Rwanda was 
part of a region that was regarded as “a low priority” to the USA interest. This lack of direct self-interest 
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can be seen as the reason why the USA never took the Rwandan genocide as a subject of HMI, a case 
that disapproves the cosmopolitan moralist argument for HMI. 
The second question on the justification of HMIs based on the cosmopolitan intervention theory is that 
how does a leader come up to conclude that the actions which he/she is undertaking are the aggregate 
desires of the majority of the citizens. The moral problem here is that leaders of powerful states abuse 
their sovereign representative role for their people to advance narrow self-interests of a few powerful 
individuals in their states. Maxwell (1990, 15) that, “American foreign policy is often made for the benefit 
of narrow economic interests rather than for, and sometimes contrary to, the interests of the nation as a 
whole... the phrase ‘national interest’ is merely a device to rally loyalty”. It is therefore unethical to claim 
that a HMI has been undertaken because the majority have asked for it while in actual fact there would 
not have been a referendum to ascertain the response of the nation to atrocities being committed on 
citizens in faraway places. 
The thesis questions the liberalists’ arguments on HMI from an ethical development perspective.  
Questions begging for attention are: If HMIs were purely humanitarian, why has it been that in some 
cases intervening forces have left the subject states in more appalling conditions than they were under 
the alleged brutal or rogue leader?  Why has there been allegations of humanitarian abuse by the 
intervening forces that have not been prosecuted. In illustration, Metz (1995: 68) argues that, “An action 
is good if it preserves the totality, fullness, and the harmonious life of a human person; an action is bad 
if it has a more or less decided tendency to break into and narrow the totality and fullness of humanism 
and its contents.” From this quotation it can be observed that after the USA/British led military intervention 
in Iraq in 2003, Iraq has become one of the most unsafe nations in the world and arguably a breeding 
ground for terrorism (Blair, 2009: 6, Blair, 2015). One of the leading architects of the intervention, former 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair accepted that Iraq was better off with Saddam Hussein than it is now 
and that they acted on false intelligence.18 The situation was also replicated in Libya where after having 
                                                            
18  In an interview with Cable News Network (CNN)’s Fareed Zakaria, Tony Blair accepted that the role 
of the Coalition of the willing had played a part in creating a space for the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant to breed and grow. He apologised for his role in the intervention and noted that Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein was a safer place than it is now. He however argued that the birth of ISIL could have 
also been partly aided by the Arab Spring and argued that its major bases were in Syria (Fareed Zakaria 
GPS; 25 October 2015; 1300hrs – 14oohrs Central African Time), which argument raises moral 
questions for the Western powers who declared Bashar al Assad, the Syrian President an illegitimate 
President and supported the opposition forces, some of whose, like Al Nusra Front pledged allegiance 
to ISIL. Some of the weapons the Americans air dropped for the Syrian rebels and Kurdish fighters 
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supported the NTC with air cover in its fight against Gadhafi, NATO pulled out of Libya after the 
assassination of Gadhafi leaving Libya as a failing state with different militia groups fighting for power 
and two major governments claiming legitimacy, one based in Tobruk and the other in Tripoli (Laessing, 
2015). Because of these practical historical cases, one can safely argue that HMI is a tool for the powerful 
states to pursue their selfish interests in the affairs of weaker states with a moral face. It has been 
established that in both Iraq and Libya, Western powers’ HMIs were a cover for the pursuit of oil resources 
and to forcefully remove state leaders who were seen as unpredictable in relation to western interests. 
Hence, the military interventions were not humanitarian but abuse of the concept to pursue selfish 
interests without regard for the wellbeing of Iraqis and Libyans who now suffer under semi-stateless 
states. The social humanitarian situation of the Iraqis and Libyans is now generally worse than they were 
under their deposed leaders. It can be argued that western intervention did not solve humanitarian cases 
but created humanitarian catastrophes. Hence, Sekeramayi noted that it is now that Libya needs a HMI.19 
8.3      The Prevalence of Anarchy in International Relations? 
The international system is defined by scholars like Bull (1977) as an anarchical society. Anarchy in 
international relations is seen as “a political relationship in which the units possess no authority over one 
another and are not bound by any common authority” (Lake, 2004/5: 8). Where there is anarchy there 
are no or only loose rules to govern interaction of the parties (Suissa, 2010: 7). Indeed, in an anarchical 
situation, there is no talk of formal interaction but mere collision of actors while pursuing separate but 
sometimes converging goals. 
Scholars who argue that the international system is anarchical base their argument on the prevalence of 
the concept of absolute sovereignty of states as propounded in the Peace of Westphalia which denies 
the existence of strongly established hierarchy in the international system (Donnelly, 1986: 601-602). 
Lake (2004/5: 4) notes that the concept of sovereignty, in its absolute form as propagated by the Peace 
of Westphalia, “implies an internal hierarchy of authority (in a country) that culminates in a single apex”. 
An anarchical society creates a double moral problem in relation to HMI. Firstly, in an anarchical society, 
no country is bound by any form of rules. The argument that in the practice of sovereignty a country sees 
                                                            
ended up in ISIL hands (MacAskill and Chulov, 2014) which has created a lot of unanswered ethical 
questions to the USA’s involvement in the Syrian crisis. 
19 Interview with Dr. Sydney Sekeramayi, Harare, 2015. 
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no other authority above it means that there are no checks and balances in the international system. Any 
government can do what it deems necessary on its citizens without any positive or negative reaction from 
other countries in the international system. If there is any reaction it may only end outside the borders of 
the concerned state because any attempt to take the disgruntlement outside the reacting part’s national 
boundaries will be resisted as an assault on national sovereignty.  
Given the foregoing analysis that there are no moral rules guiding state relations, HMI cannot be justified. 
This could have been the case prior to the creation of an international society proper and in the aftermath 
of the fall of the League of Nations. European states brutalized societies in their colonies in Africa and 
Latin America without anyone questioning them. An anarchical society, as it was prior to the creation of 
the League of Nations and UN, is characterized by the bullying of weaker states by the powerful states. 
In a state of anarchy there is no talk of humanitarianism, ethics and moral behaviour, hence there can 
be no discussion on HMI. 
Secondly, powerful countries can do what they wish and invade weaker countries using any pretext 
including HMI without being restrained by anyone or anything. At a time when the European powers were 
brutalizing their subjects, the same powers namely, Britain, France, Austria and Russia, undertook HMIs 
in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire on the pretexts of protecting Greeks or the Christian minorities who 
were allegedly brutalized by the Turks, crimes either similar or less than those committed by the same 
European powers in their territories or in their colonies (Köchler, 1999). These actions proved that there 
is an inherent existence of double standards in the application and conduct of moral practice in HMIs. 
In the era of the demise of the League of Nations, Hitler undertook a well-planned strategy to annihilate 
the Jews and the communists in Germany. Hitler’s internal policies were not challenged by other 
European powers to the extent that when he began exporting his Nazi doctrine outside of Germany, 
European powers attempted to placate him, a policy that was popularly termed as ‘appeasement’ and 
advanced by the then British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain (Trubowitz and Harris, 2015). The 
failure to undertake an HMI in Hitler’s Germany could be argued by Realists that the international system 




An anarchical society is, therefore, one in which powerful countries can pursue their self-interest without 
any fear of reprisal or questioning from weaker countries which they can punish by force. This leads to 
the question:  Is the international community really an anarchical society or it is not? 
This thesis’s argument goes against the assertion by Lake (2004/5: 2) that “international relationists 
almost universally assume that the international system is a realm of anarchy”, by arguing that the 
international community is not an anarchical society but a community of self-interested individuals who 
all submit to the realization of the ultimate wellbeing of everyone because a community that excludes 
any individual from wellbeing can hardly be called a community from the perspective of ethical 
development theory. Nonetheless in an attempt to come up with a definition of anarchy, Bull (1977: 4) 
defines the opposite of anarchy which is order and established that order is a relative term which in most 
instances in social life when it is discussed refers to actions or conditions that establish three goals 
namely that:  
All societies seek to ensure that life will be in some measure secure against 
violence resulting in death or bodily harm. Second, all societies seek to ensure that 
promises, once made, will be kept, or that agreements, once undertaken, will be 
carried out. Third, all societies pursue the goal of ensuring that the possession of 
things will remain stable to some degree, and will not be subject to challenges that 
are constant and without limit.  
The implication of the above quotation is that, despite the compelling arguments on international relations 
characterized by anarchy, Realists such as Bull concur with the ethical development theory that all 
societies strives for the ultimate wellbeing of the community, a situation that runs contrary to the anarchy 
arguments. Hence, the theory and practice of HMI cannot escape ethical interrogation on the basis of 
the arguments by the proponents of international anarchy. In the example given by Bull (1977), the 
absence of the three conditions create anarchy. A situation in which there is no guarantee for peace and 
life, where agreements are never honoured and security of property is not guaranteed is an unsafe 
situation which leads to the Hobbesian state of nature. The situation of individuals in a society as given 
in the example can also be used to clarify the subject of anarchy in the international system. The 
international system is a rules based system in which the member countries are driven by the primary 




The creation of a universal international organization of the magnitude of the UN ushered in a different 
phase in international relations that could not be defined as anarchic. When countries accented to the 
UN treaty and agreed to conduct their interactions based on the Charter rules, they in practice accepted 
the new norm of limited sovereignty which began the process of redefining the absolute concept of the 
Westphalian creed (Wheeler, 2001: 2-3). The concept of anarchy is based on the notion that countries 
are independent of other countries externally, which is no longer the practical norm in international 
relations. The new UN system means that the UN is a supra-state body that is mandated and recognized 
by countries as a legitimate body to question any countries’ actions, including internally (Sohn, 1982: 13). 
It is because of this reason that the moral and ethical justification of any HMI has been sought by those 
conducting it primarily at the UN, through either the General Assembly or the UNSC. It is also because 
of the same reasons that even when powerful countries choose to undertake missions without an express 
UN mandate they have referred to previous UNSC resolutions to acquire an implied mandate such as in 
Kosovo (1999) and in Iraq (2003).20 The justification of HMIs on humanitarian grounds and under certain 
Security Council resolutions can be used to justify the existence of an international community that seeks 
to base its actions under accepted legitimate moral rules.  
Lake’s (2004/5) argument that international community is not anarchic is refuted universally by 
international relations scholars who use either or both of the terms ‘international society’ or ‘international 
community’. These terms denote relations based on a certain order and rules based society (Bull, 1977, 
Buzan, 1993). Bull (1977, 9) puts it that an international system is formed when “two or more states have 
sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them 
to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a whole.” Simply having contact does not translate 
into the nonexistence of anarchy. When Hobbes (1651) formulated the theory of the state of nature which 
was anarchical it emanated from an unregulated contact among the members of a system.  
                                                            
20  There has not been explicit Security Council authorisation for the military interventions in Kosovo 
and Iraq. In Kosovo, NATO was vindicated by that the defeat of a Russian sponsored Security Council 
draft resolution to declare the NATO intervention in Kosovo illegal by twelve votes against and three in 
support, as a sign that the international community accepted the moral legitimacy of the HMI 
(Greenwood, 2002). In the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the coalition of the willing, specifically Britain based 
their intervention on Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), which recognised “the threat Iraq’s non-
compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range 
missiles posed to international peace and security” stated that, Iraq was in ‘material breach’ of its 
disarmament obligations and that failure to do so would attract serious consequences, on one hand. 
On the other, leaders of the intervention argued for the moral legitimacy of the military intervention on 
the basis that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant who brutalised the Iraqis (Blair, 2009, 6). 
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However, as noted previously, the international system is referred with either of the two terms, namely 
‘international society’ or ‘international community’. An international society “exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share 
in the working of common institutions” (Bull, 1977: 13). Bull and Watson quoted in Buzan (1993: 330) 
further define an international society as:  
A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) 
which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a 
necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by 
dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, 
and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements. 
An international society is therefore not only defined by the interaction of different countries that make 
up the system but established rules that are created for the common good of the society. A rules based 
system is created in order to deal with disorder, which is sometimes referred to as anarchy. Having rules 
does not necessarily mean that there will not be some elements within the system that may break or 
attempt to break the rules for personal advantage. It is therefore possible for countries to use unethical 
means to attain goals that can be defined as self-interests. One of the concepts that are susceptible to 
abuse in the international society is the ‘HMI concept’.  
In a number of instances, states have used the concept of HMI to seek a justification for the pursuit of 
national self-interest. From the case examined in the thesis, the Indian intervention can be seen as a 
fitting example. After having failed to convince the UNSC with the theories of refugee aggression 
(Wheeler, 2000: 59) and Pakistan military aggression inside Indian territories (UNSC 1606th Meeting; 
1971, Articles 153, 154, 161, 163 and 175), the Indian ambassador to the UN argued that Indian actions 
in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) could be ethically justified given that Pakistani army’s brutality in the then 
East Pakistan “was on a sufficient scale to ‘shock the conscience of mankind” (Wheeler, 2000: 63). The 
deliberate use of the term ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ was meant to invoke a sense of moral right 
if not duty from the international community that someone had to act under humanitarian motives to save 
the people in the then East Pakistan. The same could be said about the 2003 military intervention in Iraq 
by the USA and British led coalition of the willing. After the failure to establish weapons of mass 
destruction, which was the intended and declared motive for the invasion, Britain and the USA went on 
to argue that the mission was a moral venture that sought to liberate Iraqis from the brutality of Saddam 
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Hussein. Such a justification was an attempt to borrow legitimacy for the military intervention from an 
ethical point and deny the apparent pursuit of self-interests. The two given examples clearly show how 
the concept of HMI is susceptible to abuse by regional and international powers for the achievement of 
self-interest driven goals, even under an international society or community. 
An international community is a society that would have developed from being a loose rules governed 
system to one that has developed “some elements of a centralised enforcement mechanism” (Bull; 1977, 
126). Kritsiotis (2002: 962) put forward that a community is “defined as a social system of continuing 
interaction and transaction and ongoing structured relationship between a set of actors” with 
consciousness of reciprocity among the actors based on shared moral imperatives and values. 
When scholars refer to the international system as an international community they cannot be charged 
with being too ambitious. The international system today as we know it has developed some enforcement 
mechanism of laws and ethical regulations that it can be classified as an international community. The 
League of Nations was the first major attempt to create an international community from the international 
society, while the UN represented the success of the project (Kritsiotis, 2002: 968). The UN system has 
passed the stage of only dealing with matters of power politics among different countries in the 
international system to dealing with social issues of internal and international affairs like health, gender, 
education and business in its member countries. Different specialised organs of the UN like the World 
Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) are 
some of the specialised agencies whose roles in the international system impact and affect internal policy 
formulation and implementation. The UN has managed to achieve its universality through its links and 
cooperation with regional bodies like the African Union (AU) European Union (EU), and the Arab League 
(Kritsiotis, 2002: 968). The UN system is also accepted by all member in the international system as the 
sole depository of international treaties (Abbott, et al; 2000: 26). 
The existence of either an international society or an international community translate to the argument 
that the international system is not an anarchical society. The system is based on rules that are enforced 
either by self-help projects like sanctions or by UN enforcement mechanism (Abbott, et al, 2000: 25-26). 
There are numerous cases in which the UN enforced its resolutions or restrained the actions of ‘rogue’ 
elements in the international system. These cases include the economic sanctions on Smith’s Rhodesia 
after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) that sought to create an independent white 
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supremacist state in Zimbabwe in 1965, military restraint on Saddam Hussein after he invaded Kuwait in 
1991 and authorisation of NATO to enforce a no fly zone in Libya in 2011 after Gadhafi had failed to 
withdraw his troops that were marching to fight unrest in Benghazi. The UN system is a developed 
international regulatory system that has managed to hold the international community and achieved on 
its main goal of preventing another catastrophic global war of the magnitude of the first and second world 
wars (WW I and II) as stated in the preamble and article 1 of the charter.  
The argument that the international community is not an anarchical society does not mean that there is 
no anarchy in the international community. Even in sovereign countries where the laws are enforced by 
a defined central authority criminals always break the law and some ‘powerful’ individuals are never 
prosecuted and it can be argued that in matters of humanitarian law, it is because of this reality that the 
international community created international criminal tribunals like the ICTR and ICTY. Such a scenario 
does not translate that the country is in a state of anarchy except only when it becomes so widespread 
that it is ungovernable as was the case with Somalia at the end of the Cold War and recently in the Hoothi 
take over in Yemen. Mostly internal anarchy leads to civil wars. The situation is the same in the 
international community. Ethical rules that have long been established by tradition are followed. For 
instance, the long established tradition that an envoy cannot be killed has been a practice of countries 
even in war times (Denza, 2009: 1).  
However, there are always instances in which some ambitious leaders and powers may attempt to defy 
rules and regulations for self-interest. In cases where an ambitious leader succeeds in defying the rules 
of the system and break the rules to the extent that the rules based system breaks down, then the society 
becomes an anarchical society. the case of Hitler’s, Mussolini’s and Tojo’s actions in the aftermath of 
WW I can be cited as examples of rogue actors in the international system whose action led to the 
breakdown of a nascent international community that the League of Nations was attempting to create.21 
                                                            
21  After the defeat of Germany, the European powers with the assistance of the then USA President, 
Woodrow Wilson, took a major step in creating an international community by establishing the league 
of nations which had clear rules for international engagement. However, with the rise of Hitler to power 
in Germany with his Nazi doctrine, the nascent international system came under stress. Hitler 
challenged the whole order which the League was attempting to create using the concept of Aryan 
nationalism and supremacism. As he sought to establish a Nazi empire, with cooperation from Benito 
Mussolini of Italy and General Tojo of Japan, the international community which was in its embryonic 
stages broke down and the world plunged into a second major international war (WW II). 
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Walzer (1977, x) classified Hitler’s regime as a criminal regime for defying all ethical issues in their 
conduct of internal and external relations. 
In the post WW II and post-Cold War eras the establishment of the UN as an attempt to create a global 
rules based system has not managed to totally eradicate acts of anarchy as powerful and ambitious 
countries and leaders continue to test the system by pursuing national self-interests. This assertion is 
proven by the undertaking of wars by Major Powers in the affairs of less powerful states against the 
established rules under the UN Charter or respective regional rules. Wars have become a common 
feature in most less developed continents with the major actors in such wars, either directly or by proxies, 
being the powerful states in the world. The DRC is one example that is rocked by perennial wars which 
Carpenter (2012, 10) noted that there were invisible hands which could be western. The Middle East is 
also popular for different military conflicts in different countries examples being the Afghanistan war, the 
Yemen civil war and the Iraq civil war in which Western hands had some elements of visibility, while 
Russia had been fingered as the hand behind the rebellions in Ukraine that were triggered by the unrest 
against former President, Viktor Yanukovych in 2013 (BBC News, 2014) and the Georgian conflict of 
2008 in which the interests of regional or international powers like USA, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran 
were threatened.   
The other challenge is that while countries which undertake HMI argue that they will be doing it on behalf 
of the moral international community, it is not always a truism. as in the situation were national leaders 
argue that their policies are undertaken to pursue national interest of their citizens even when the majority 
of the citizens will be against such policies (Maxwell, 1990: 15), major powers have given themselves 
the role of international police personnel (Mugabe, 2015) and always refers to their actions as being done 
on behalf of the international community. Even after it was revealed that Saddam Hussein had no 
weapons of mass destruction, one of the coalition leaders, former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair 
(2009), reiterated that the world is safe without Saddam Hussein. The inference from the argument is 
that the mission of the coalition of the willing that invaded Iraq undertook its mission not only for the 
betterment of Iraqis, but the world as a whole by removing a tyrant who threatened the global community 
from the face of the earth. However, it has already been proven that the Iraq war had narrow interests 
for the western powers who undertook the war (Hinnebusch, 2006: 453). 
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8.4      National Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect, Nationalism and the Problem of Shared 
Moral Values 
HMI and the subsequent R2P concept have been justified as moral imperatives that countries undertake 
to protect civilians in distress and besieged by their leaders. The concept has however faced counter 
moral challenges. These challenges pertain to the relationship between the concept and national 
sovereignty, nationalism and the debate on shared moral values. 
National sovereignty is a moral concept that denotes a country’s supremacy in its national affairs. Bull 
(1977: 8) states that:  
On the one hand, states assert, in relation to ... territory and population, what may be 
called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within 
that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert what may be called 
external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but independence of outside 
authorities. 
The legitimate or de-facto government of a country has the legitimate right to create laws and enforce 
them in its borders and effect order while recognizing no superior authority above it outside its borders 
(Ayoob, 2002: 82). National sovereignty is also buttressed by international recognition. Having power to 
control internal politics alone is not enough to claim sovereignty. As a moral tool in international relations, 
sovereignty denotes the moral duty to be recognized as a legitimate authority of a certain territory by 
other leaders and governments and in turn, a duty to recognize others as such (Goldsmith, 2000: 959).  
As noted in chapter 8, sovereignty since its inception, at least in theory, meant that leaders who claimed 
it had a reciprocal duty to protect their citizens from both internal and external threats to life. This is the 
essence of the social contract theory. The concept of limited sovereignty as espoused in the R2P 
document can arguably be seen as having been at the core of the concept of national sovereignty since 
its inception. It is because of this relationship between sovereignty and rights that social contract theorists 
like Grotius (1625) and Locke (1689) all agreed that if a government fails to uphold its side of the contract, 
the people will also have a moral right to topple that government and replace it with responsible 
leadership. In theory therefore, there is a moral right for states to undertake HMI given the fact that when 
people in a state disowns their leader, such a leader can no longer make legitimate claims to sovereignty. 
This argument was put forward by the European Union member states and the USA after the Syrian 
uprising (Middle East Bulletin, 2013: 14). 
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Given that the leadership has always had a monopoly control of efficient apparatus of violence in the 
army and police forces, it has always been difficult for civilian citizens to rise against the tyranny of their 
leaders. It is because of this reason that Grotius (1625) saw no problem in other countries assisting 
militarily those who would have risen against their government. However, this notion raises some moral 
issues. Firstly, when another government renders support to an uprising in another country in the era of 
globalization, some ambitious cessationists would find it easy to provoke their governments by violence 
and attract a violent retaliation so as to gain international sympathy and intervention. Simura (2014) 
argues that the reason for the failure of the AU in solving the Libyan crisis peacefully was partly because 
of the support that the rising groups, which he termed “rebels”, got from western powers. 
Simura’s (2014) argument could be true. On one hand, in areas where there was explicit western support 
to the uprisings, the uprisings were successful in toppling their governments or being prolonged. For 
instance, with the exception of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya successfully toppled their long time leaders, 
Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gadhafi, respectively, with Libya doing so with the military support from 
NATO. In Syria, while the uprising failed to topple Bashar al Assad, the Syrian President, the Western 
powers successfully sustained the civil war because of the support they got from the western powers 
and other anti-Assad countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and 
Turkey (Cordesman, Shelala II and Mohamed, 2013: v).  
On the other hand, those uprisings that did not get support from the western powers crumbled. The 
uprising in Saudi Arabia went unnoticed while the Bahrain uprising was crushed by a coalition of Gulf 
Cooperation Countries (GCC) under the leadership of Saudi Arabia (Haykel, 2013: 3-4). These examples 
shows that the support of Western powers did not only help to encourage uprisings from groups expecting 
sympathy from the Western powers, but also the fact that most of those who got the explicit western 
support in the uprisings had different levels of success while those who did not get the support crumbled 
with some going unnoticed. 
The second moral issue that rises pertains to powerful countries acting as above other countries, a 
concept that is commonly referred to as hegemony. While it can be accepted that leaders who brutalize 
their citizens will be acting against the moral tenets of national sovereignty (ICISS, 2001: 13), the practice 
of another country entering a foreign land without the consent of the subject country cannot be morally 
reconciled in relation to national sovereignty. National sovereignty is the last line of defence for weaker 
countries against the encroachment of powerful countries (Ayoob, 2002: 83). Allowing for HMI, while it is 
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morally noble in theoretical terms, it practically gives a leeway for powerful countries to encroach into the 
affairs of weaker countries, hence shaking the foundation upon which the international system rest. The 
only instance in which the cardinal principle of national sovereignty can be broken in international 
relations is after the authority has been given by the Security Council for the protection of international 
peace and security as stated in chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
HMI is an ‘aggressive’ act that can only be undertaken by a relatively powerful state against a relatively 
weaker state. Moralizing HMI can be equated to giving powerful countries a leeway to invade weaker 
countries under the pretext of humanitarianism. In extreme cases, as was the case in Syria, powerful 
countries can fan uprisings in order to create pretext for HMI (Clark, 2013: 47).  
Related to the subject of HMI not being an adventure that can be conducted in the affairs of powerful 
states, is the lack of it in the affairs of weaker countries that are allies of powerful countries. The 
Palestinian case has been accepted by many countries in as a humanitarian case. The case has been 
discussed using such words as occupation and massacre, which both point to humanitarian cases. 
However, the Israeli/Palestinian crisis has been relegated by the international community to be a de facto 
American internal matter because of the deep rooted USA interests in the matter.22 The ongoing Syrian 
crisis is also another case in point. Russian support for Bashar al Assad has seen the international 
community failing to make any meaningful HMI to save the thousands of lives that are lost. As of August 
2014, the UN put the death toll from the crisis at an estimated 191 000 (UN, 2014), and 4.2 million 
displaced (UN, 2015). While Russia (and China) abstained from voting on UNSC resolution 1973 for the 
HMI in Libya on the basis that the AU and Arab League had supported the Resolution, it has, with Chinese 
cooperation, denied the international community a legitimate case of HMI in Syria (Idike and Nnenna, 
2014: 304-305). Russian actions in the Syrian crisis, including its military actives in support of the Syrian 
government can be best explained as the pursuit of geopolitical interests that seeks to limit western, 
particularly USA, influence in the Middle East. The moral dilemma here is that HMI which must be 
conducted to save people in distress has become a hegemonic tool which is used as a HMI pretext in 
                                                            
22   After the creation of the state of Israel and the subsequent wars that the Arab states mounted 
against the creation of the Israeli state, the region has been a conflict zone. Peace agreements have 
been dominated by USA presidents and government to the exclusion of the international community. 
This has created a scenario where the Middle East crisis is seen as primarily an American issue 
because Israel is seen as a USA outpost in the Middle East with the USA leading and being central in 
all peace talks. 
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states where powerful states have vested interests and denied by the same powerful states in areas they 
also desire to protect the status quo. 
The issue of HMI is based on what are seen as universal human rights and standards in governance. 
This argument is problematic in the sense that shared universal moral values cannot be easily identified 
(Köchler, 1999: 4). The debate of universal moral values has been at the centre of debate between the 
international human rights advocates and the cultural relativists on the other side. The debate is also 
found on the sidelines of the international relations debate between the realists and the liberalists and it 
profoundly impact on the concept of HMI. The impact is based on the notion that external states can use 
the gross abuse of human rights to levels that shock the conscience of mankind to ethically justify a HMI 
(Davidson, 2012: 129). 
Liberalists and advocates of universal human rights argue that human beings everywhere are equal and 
should therefore enjoy equal human rights (Donnelley, 1984: 400). The argument is further strengthened 
by the notion that all countries that are member states to the UN signed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948. Liberalist further draw strength from the fact that Article 1 (3) of the UN 
Charter states that no one should be discriminated based on gender, race, religion or sexual orientation 
while the preamble to the UN Charter states that the UN seeks to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights and equal rights between men and women. The neo-liberal Universalist argument on human rights 
is based on the individual and seeks to atomise the concept of individual rights to an extent of attempting 
to place an individual as an isolation to the community and being functional in exclusion (Calder, 2002: 
18). Calder (2002: 18) notes that: 
Atomism amounts to the claim that it is possible for human beings to go it alone, that 
we can be fully fledged agents quite apart from any relation to society, or to the world. 
On these terms ... location of rationality in a severed realm of introspective thought, 
the world and others are only a secondary intrusion on an already self-sufficient 
subjectivity. 
The individualistic argument, though seen as the driving force behind HMI, in actual fact create some 
moral questions for itself. Concentrating on the individual to pursue self-interests is problematic from the 
perspective of ethical development. Kenyatta (1953, 199) explaining the case of individualism from the 
perspective of interrelatedness writes that: 
The selfish or self-regarding man has no name or reputation in the Gikuyu 
community. An individualist is looked upon in suspicion and is given a nickname 
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‘mwebongia’ (one who only works for himself and is likely to end up as a wizard). 
He cannot expect that everything he does will prosper for the weight of public 
opinion makes him feel his crime against society. 
Within this thinking, the individualistic argument, therefore, as the driving force behind HMI should be 
seen as detrimental to both the intervening state and the subject state. The use of humanitarian excuses 
to pursue national interests will bring condemnation upon the intervening state and disapproval of its 
future intervening plans in critical humanitarian cases as was the case with NATO in relation to Syria 
after international criticism against its abuse of Resolution 1973 in Libya to pursue the interest of the 
intervening states.  
Morality is a relational concept where one is expected to forego his/her needs for the benefit of the 
society/community as noted by Kurasha (2015) that, “Morality and ethics is about the concern of the 
other person”.23 When we assume that one lives in a vacuum detached from other human beings and 
living animals, there will not be a talk of morality given that such an individual is not answerable to anyone. 
He/she does as he/she pleases without thinking of questions of right and wrong coming from any quarter. 
It is only because we live in societies and communities that ethical codes and moral rules are developed 
in both written and unwritten codes (Copp, 1997: 189) 
When one is seen as important than the society and acting independently it follows that individuals are 
not driven by any motive to sacrifice their rights, primarily the right to life, only to save ‘strangers’. In this 
individualistic nature, neo-liberal concepts of human rights forward an argument for the pursuit of self-
interest as propounded by Smith (1776). In relation to the conduct of HMIs by powerful countries in the 
affairs of the weaker ones, it follows from this concept that their adventures will be motivated by self-gain 
and not humanitarianism. Most interview respondents gave out the preceding argument and worthy 
noting is the notion by Kurasha (2015) that, “Ethics have very little to do with it (HMI). That is why they 
(powerful countries) use international law and not ethics when they intervene. Only in cases when a 
situation has gone out of hand like in Iraq that ethics may then be used to justify the intervention. They 
build a moral consideration after a disastrous intervention.”24Smith (1776), cited by Wight (2002: 61) put 
it, any good that derives therefrom is a by-product, not the motive or intended product. In such a scenario, 
when there is a failure in the intervention or the intended goals have been achieved, the intervening 
                                                            
23  Interview with Kurasha, Harare, 28 August 2015. 
24  Interview with Kurasha. This notion was also supported by Sandra ... who in an interview on 26 June 
2015 in Addis Ababa stated that, “When it comes to intervening there are a lot of interests involved.” 
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forces can withdraw without considering the humanitarian situation of those in the subject state. This 
case could be argued to be the driving force behind the HMIs in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003) and Libya 
(2011). The interventions carried selfish motives of the intervening states. Badza (2015) noted that:  
Powerful countries with capabilities to pursue their interest, are always driven to stop 
violence when it breaks out. However, they don’t intervene in every area of crisis but 
only do so when their interests are at risk and where there are not they don’t intervene. 
In Rwanda people were massacred in the face of the same humanitarian masters. 
Ethical considerations are always there as was the case with UNOSOM I but up to now 
Somalia is not stable. Some countries are trying to reconfigure Somalia so that they can 
benefit from the discovered oil deposits. Gaddafi made a mistake by saying he will attack 
Benghazi. The humanitarian crisis in Libya is worse than it ever would be.25 
The argument that was put forward by some scholars and practitioners in politics and international 
relations is that while there are genuine humanitarian reasons in less powerful countries that warrant 
intervention, most of the interventions that are undertaken are not only influenced by these compelling 
humanitarian reasons but also the national self-interests of the intervening country or countries. It is 
because of this reason that Badza gave some contrast between Rwanda and Libya. Badza therefore 
concluded that, “As long as humanitarianism is applied in a selective fashion it remains hypocritical and 
illegitimate. Hence there is no humanitarianism.”26 
The issue of the pursuit of selfish interests if weighed against the conduct of NATO and the Coalitions of 
the willing military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, respectively, raises further 
questions of the pursuit of immoral group interests at the expense of those viewed as others. These 
questions relate to the argument that may be put forward by one group (in international relations, these 
can be a state or a regional group like AU, EU or NATO) that its security and survival is more important 
than the security and survival of innocent civilians in states led by alleged rogue leaders. The military 
interventions in these two countries were partly justified, as was Iraq, or wholly justified, as in the case 
of Afghanistan, on the need to launch pre-emptive wars against impending attacks from the alleged 
tyrants who were leading these states (Schwartz, 2004). In short, the military interventions sought to 
safeguard the lives of Europeans and Americans which was however achieved at a price of the blood of 
Iraqis and Afghanis. The moral question therefore that comes is that were the lives and rights of 
Europeans and Americans more valuable than the lives and right to life of the Iraqis and Afghanis who 
                                                            
25Interview in Addis Ababa on 19 June 2015 
26  Interview in Addis Ababa 
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were killed in the military interventions. In short, the application of universal human rights is relative to 
the importance of the powerful countries. This is questioned by Kurasha who noted that even the killing 
of a single innocent person is enough to de legitimize intervention and noted that the USA’s action is not 
guided by morality as noted in the use of drone to kill certain targets which comes at the expense of 
killing many innocent souls all in the name of eliminating a single person.27 
The liberalist argument is countered by cultural relativists. Cultural relativism argues that while there are 
human rights, these rights are the creation of people in line with their cultural values and practices 
(Donnelly, 1984: 400). The school of thought also notes that religion plays a major role in assigning rights 
and duties to society’s individuals. Because of these reasons, cultural relativists argue that there cannot 
be universal human rights but human rights based on the cultural and religious practices of human beings 
in different places (Donnelly, 1984: 400). 
Cultural relativism has its inadequacies in relationship to HMI. In arguing that human rights are cultural 
and religious specific (Donnelly, 1984: 400-401), the concept of cultural relativism dismisses the concept 
HMI. Substantial maltreatment of human beings has been justified on cultural or religious practices. In 
the pre-colonial and colonial times in South America, Native American tribes practiced human sacrifices 
that were religious practices (Sorabji, 2007: 20). It was because of this reason and allegations of 
cannibalism that theological scholars like Sepulveda justified Spanish conquest of the Indians’ lands as 
humanitarian as it was a mission to Christianize the Indians and save them from being sacrificed by their 
kings (Reynolds, 2010: 17-22). If one follows a fundamental cultural relativist argument, it is unethical for 
another state to intervene in another state on the basis that leaders in such a state are violating human 
rights. From a cultural relativist’s argument, intervening in another state on the pretext of human rights is 
an imperialistic adventure, which is unethical in international affairs (Calder, 2002: 17). 
8.5     Altruism and Humanitarian Military Intervention 
HMI is a moral concept. Its roots are found in the concept of philanthropy which basically means acts of 
helping people in distress. Merriam-Webster (online) dictionary defines philanthropy as, “(1) goodwill to 
                                                            
27  Interview in Harare on 20 August 2015. The USA has been using drones to targets what it terms 
terrorist leaders, like the leadership of the Taliban and leaders of ISIL, in countries like Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. However, in a documentary titled “Living underneath the Drones” by Aljazeera, civilians have 
complained of living under fear of unknown instant death. The documentary noted that drones have 
killed a number of innocent people and disturbed the lives of a number of communities. 
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fellow members of the human race; especially, active effort to promote human welfare, (2) a, an act or 
gift done or made for humanitarian purposes, b, an organization distributing or supported by funds set 
aside for humanitarian purposes”. Philanthropy can be understood as assisting others out of good will 
and without expecting returns from the actions. This means philanthropy can be seen as similar to 
altruism. Krieg (2013: 48) notes that “altruism refers to an action that is not only not self-enriching but 
actually self-harming while benefiting someone else.” Bar Tal (1986, 5) propounded that for an act to be 
classified as altruistic, it must have features “(a) must benefit another person, (b) must be performed 
voluntarily, (c) must be performed intentionally, (d) the benefit must be the goal by itself, and (e) must be 
performed without expecting any external reward.” 
From this definition, any act of good will should not be driven by declared or undeclared motives of 
personal gain. It is this notion of pure acts of good will in human relations that this thesis argued to be at 
best theoretical. The definition and classification of altruistic behaviour from which the concept of HMI is 
derived has telling pointers for scholars like Teson (2005) who have argued that HMI can have both 
altruistic intentions and self-interest motives. The conduct of HMI should not be guided by the twin 
questions of; what do I gain? And what do I lose?  
In practical cases, when the USA pulled out of Somalia after the death of its eighteen rangers in 1993, 
the pulling out meant that the intervention was not humanitarian from the ethical principles of altruism. In 
this case, the USA put ahead the importance of the lives of its rangers and failed to take note of the 
multitudes its mission was intended to save. Since then, Somalia has fallen to the level of embodying the 
definition of a failed state while the humanitarian catastrophe has been exported regionally as Somalia 
has become the hub of terrorism from which notorious terrorist attacks like the September 2013 Westgate 
Mall attacks in Nairobi (Howden, 2013) and Garissa University College attacks in Kenya were launched 
from Dearden in 2015. Similar comparisons can be made with respect to other interventions which were 
undertaken by the USA in Haiti (1994) and NATO in Kosovo (1999). In Haiti, the USA intervention was 
driven by the desire by President Clinton to gain the support of the black community and his credibility 
as an effective president and the need to stop the flow of refugees into America (Girard, 2004: 1 - 26). In 
such a case the motive for the intervention was not to save the lives but to save the American territory 
from being flooded by refugees. In other words, the intervention was driven by national preservation 
which is self-interest. In Kosovo, while NATO argued on a moral imperative to save the lives of Albanians 
who were under attack from the Serbian army, the methods that NATO used raised ethical questions. 
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The aerial bombardments resulted in the death of civilians estimated at between 500 and 1 500 (Cronin, 
2014: 2) who were not part of the criminal state with others being the victims. The aerial bombardment 
strategy was meant to limit the NATO casualties while being effective in destroying their targets and 
achieve quick victory (Cronin, 2014: 3). This, as argued in the previous cases proves that the 
interventions did not conform to the definition of altruism that one must be driven by the desire to save 
those in distress regardless of the harm that might meet him/her in the process (Singer, 1981: 5).  
This strict approach to HMI is, however, not in agreement with the ethical principles for HMI with respect 
to the possibility of harm befalling the intervening forces and states. Grotius (1625: 247) opined that:  
It is certain that no one is bound to give assistance or protection, when it will be 
attended with evident danger. For a man’s own life and property, and a state’s own 
existence and preservation are either to the individual, or the state, objects of 
greater value and prior consideration than the welfare and security of other 
individuals or states. 
Borrowing from Grotius, there is therefore, no morality in undertaking an HMI when the probability of 
defeat is more than that of success. It translates that the ‘tyrant’ may met his/her subjects with worse 
tyranny attacks and can even follow on to the subjects of the defeated intervener on the pretext of 
repelling aggression. It would also mean that the leader of the intervening state would have invited 
tyranny upon his/her subjects by attempting a HMI which he/she lacked the capacity to undertake. 
Grotius’ argument was noted by the ICISS (2001, XII) which stipulated in the R2P document as one of 
its principles for intervention, that, “There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting 
the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse 
than the consequences of inaction.” What it therefore means, from this practical argument is that while 
HMI is a moral imperative, it must not be undertaken at the expense of one’s life, which is however ironic 
given that any military adventure would cost lives, specifically in Grotius’ era. 
Grotius’ argument that altruistic actions should be undertaken with caution is supported by Krieg (2013: 
49-50) who argued that while human beings have a natural inclination to help others and engage in 
altruistic behaviour the willingness to do so is situational. According to Krieg, acts that are driven by mere 
assistance are normally undertaken in low risk situations. In contrast, Krieg (2013: 48 - 50) notes that 
actions that are motivated by self-interest can be undertaken even in high risk areas because of the 
anticipated personal benefits. The forgoing argument creates a middle line between the extremist 
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conceptualization of altruism and the extreme other which argues against the existence of altruism. It is 
only normal that any leader, whose primary duty is to protect those who bequeathed their sovereignty to 
him/her, does not undertake any external military action that has the capacity to bring untold harm to 
his/her citizens. However, in HMI, this principle has little application given that in contemporary history, 
only powerful states with strong military capabilities have undertaken the interventions. These 
interventions are also undertaken in less powerful states which means that there is no risk of inviting 
military aggression on the citizens except in the form of terrorism as has been the case with Kenya after 
being part of the AU intervention in Somalia. 
Even societies that have been defined as communitarian whose individuals are seen to be ardent 
followers of the concept of sacrificing one’s self for others, such acts of pure altruism as put forward by 
Bar Tal (1986: 5) have been hard to come by. These communities mostly in precolonial Africa which 
have been based on the concept of ‘Ubuntu’ which stated that ‘umuntu ngomuntu ngabantu’ (which 
literally means that, you are a human being because of other human being) (Murove, 2005: 132) have 
not been purely altruistic societies. The theory of Ubuntu, which can be understood as African humanism 
perceives human beings as part of a single human community that is subject to the spirits and ultimately, 
the Creator. According to the Ubuntu concept, one is fully human when his/her actions contribute to the 
societal wellbeing (Murove, 2005: 131). However, this wellbeing is undertaken by one to have a good co-
existence with other societal members, hence the goodwill is premised on anticipation of a goodwill in 
return. The famous Shona saying that, “kandindiro kanoenda kunobva kamwe” (literally meaning; a 
favour deserve a favour in return) proves that there has never been pure altruism in societal relations, 
both internally and externally. Outside Africa, in the traditional Scandinavian states, Mauss (1967: 1) 
states that “In Scandinavian and many other civilizations contracts are fulfilled and exchanges of goods 
are made by means of gifts. In theory such gifts are voluntary but in fact they are given and repaid under 
obligation.” From this assertion, while there were practices that appeared on the surface as acts of 
altruism in the exchange of gifts, in actual fact those gifts always deserved other gifts in return, which 
was an unwritten rule of the practice. This practice is in line with the practical concepts of Ubuntu. 
Singer (1981:16-18), however, does not accept that the practice of expecting a return after a good 
gesture or assisting others in anticipation of reciprocal assistance is self-interest. Singer (1981: 16-18) 
forwards that such kind of behaviour should be termed “reciprocal altruism”. Hence, from Singer’s 
argument offering a good gesture for a return as exemplified in the Ubuntu concept or in the pre-historic 
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Scandinavian society resembles help that assisted in nurturing group growth. While these arguments 
can be traced in individuals and even in animals from a sociobiological perspective, in larger groups like 
states it has not been easy to establish these kinds of behaviour. Maxwell (1990: 23) established what 
she termed “the immorality of groups” in international relations. She notes that the concept of the 
immorality of groups holds that, “a group of persons does not act ethically, as a body in a way that reflects 
the typical behaviour of its individual members. Rather, there are certain characteristics of group 
behaviour which lead to a lower moral standard for the group.”  
HMI is developed from the concept of humanitarianism, which is a philanthropically derivation. As 
previously defined in the thesis, HMI refers to the use of force to protect the lives “of persons situated 
within a particular state and not necessarily nationals of the intervening state” (Shaw, 2003, 1045). The 
definitions of HMI denote that it is military assistance rendered to citizens who are facing brutality at the 
hands of their leaders who would have digressed from their sworn mandate to protect the citizens. In 
such a case, the intervention is driven by the moral imperative to save lives and humanity. When an 
intervention loses its altruistic traits, it falls of the conceptualization of being an HMI. While there could 
be traits of altruism in individual state leaders, it does not translate that the aggregate decision of the 
leaders is driven by the morality of the individuals but rather by the immorality of the group. In the conduct 
of military activities outside national borders, major powers like the USA have not shown an ethical 
empathy to civilians’ deaths which it constantly refers to as collateral damage (Kiernan, 2003). In 
reference to this assertion, more than 65 000 civilians are estimated to have been killed in the Iraq war 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, online), while currently Russia has been accused of killing civilians in a war it 
claims to be targeting terrorists in Syria (Mullen, 2015) 
(http,//edition.cnn.com/2015/10/25/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-hrw/). NATO forces were also 
accused of killing innocent civilians in the intervention in Kosovo (Cronin, 2014: 2). 
While HMI is a moral concept, the practice has always been marred by allegations of the pursuit of 
national self-interest. The concept of HMI is prone to abuse by ambitious powers that may use the 
concept to justify missions that are meant to pursue national interests. The fact that HMI is susceptible 
to abuse is proven on the ground by the actions of ambitious powerful state. The concept which was 
initially promulgated to protect civilians facing brutality amounting to mass organized torture and killing 
was used to justify the wars in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 which did not comply with the ethical 
principles of HMI. This desire to stretch the doctrine from being an exercise of last resort in extreme 
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cases to embrace general human rights as defined by the powerful states is one reason in the 21st 
Century that has seen the doctrine being denounced by weaker developing countries as an imperialist 
tool by the former colonial masters to install puppet leaders in weaker states. This was witnessed in the 
case of Zimbabwe in 2008 when Britain planned a military intervention as revealed by former South 
African President, Thabo Mbeki, whom Blair wanted to rope in the military intervention (Smith, 2013) as 
well as the joint sponsoring of a draft UNSC resolution (S/2008/447) that was double vetoed by Russia 
and China, which sought to have the case of Zimbabwe to be categorized as a Chapter VII issue that 
threatened international peace and security. While there were humanitarian issues in Zimbabwe which 
included political violence that was perpetrated by both the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the main opposition, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) supporters 
(Asuelime and Simura, 2014) and specifically the crumbling economy that led to economic emigration 
into other regional countries, the situation was not catastrophic to be compared with cases of genocide 
or mass killing that are classified as extreme cases that warrant HMI. The desires for an HMI was a pure 
exhibit of the pursuit of self-interest given the fallout between New Labour government led by Blair and 
ZANU PF led by Robert Mugabe, specifically on the land issue. 
8.6    Conclusion 
The chapter critically discussed and analyzed the pertinent concepts that impact on the morality of HMI 
by powerful states in the affairs of weaker states. It interrogated how the pursuit of national interest by 
powerful states impact on the conduct of HMI. It also critically analyzed how the concepts of national 
sovereignty, nationalism, perceived shared moral values and the prevalence of anarchy in the 
international community of states impact on the ethical conduct of HMI. 
The major question that the chapter attempted to answer was whether it is possible for states to prioritize 
morality ahead of their national interests. From a Realist position, as was argued in the chapter, power 
expressed as the pursuit of national interests is the currency of international relations. Every state 
pursues it at any cost. The adverse effect of not prioritizing the pursuit of national interests, at least from 
a Realist perspective, is that one’s state would be doomed for death as other states are always seeking 
to destroy it. Prioritizing ethics and moral rules in the conduct of international relations is seen as a 
dangerous path towards the extinction of that state. This argument translates into that there cannot be 
any HMI that is purely guided by humanitarian intentions and motives. In any HMI, the powerful capable 
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states that conduct the HMIs in the developing countries will be seeking to extent their influence and 
hegemony in international affairs. 
The chapter argued that the conduct of HMI in contemporary history has taken place in two distinct eras, 
namely the pre UN anarchical era and the post anarchical era. It was argued that anarchy put simply 
refers to a system that has no governing and regulating rules. In the international system anarchy 
prevailed until European powers with the help of the former USA President, Woodrow Wilson, established 
the League of Nations.This attempt at creating an international society and community was short lived 
as it failed to put an end to imperialist manoeuvres by Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Hideki Tojo in 
Europe, Africa and the Far East. The battle to establish a community of nations was finally established 
in 1945 with the creation of the United Nations.  
These transformations in the international system had tremendous impacts on the concept of HMI. Prior 
to the establishment of the UN, the conduct of HMI was undertaken by powerful states in the affairs of 
weaker states without taking regard to what the other states would say. In the case of the Western 
powers’ intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the best the rival powers could do was to join 
in the intervention and be able to influence the peace process to safeguard their strategic interests 
(Hammond, 2006: 9-10). That it was an anarchic situation is further proven by the fact that the reasons 
that the Western power gave for their HMIs in the Ottoman Empire were either similar or less heinous as 
compared to the crimes the European leaders committed against those who challenged their power in 
their internal states or in the colonies. 
Under the international community created by the UN based system, the international system can no 
longer be classified as anarchic. However, such a transformation did not tremendously change the nature 
and conduct of HMI. Powerful states have remained the major players in HMI, with less powerful 
developing states being the subjects of intervention. However, the conduct of HMIs is no longer explicitly 
anarchic. Powerful states have now developed a new strategy of exploiting genuine humanitarian 
concerns in subject states for them to camouflage their pursuit of national interests. The use of genuine 
humanitarian concerns as was the case in Haiti, East Pakistan, and Sierra Leone when the USA, India 
and Nigeria undertook their respective military interventions, should not be seen as a turn in international 
relations from the realist route to an ethical one. These interventions came up with humanitarian 
outcomes, but only as by-products of the pursuit of national interests. 
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The chapter established that the concept of national sovereignty has been subject to abuse by state 
leaders. As highlighted in the chapter, sovereignty as established in the social contract does not translate 
to the right of the state leaders to inhumanely dominate their citizens. Rather, leaders hold it in custody 
for the whole nation to the world outside the nation’s physical state boundaries. The Westphalian concept 
could have been an abuse of the social contract. National sovereignty as noted has faced double abuse, 
firstly by tyrant leaders seeking to insulate themselves from accountability to their peers on the 
international arena and from their citizens. Secondly, it is used by Major Powers when they seek to 
disregard brutality by leaders in states they do not hold strategic interests or to insulate leaders in states 
they are protecting from international attention and formal scrutiny. This has been the case with the 
Russian defence of the Syrian government on different international fora. 
The last sections of the chapter were dedicated to the relationship between HMI on one hand and human 
rights and altruism on the other. It was noted that principles that constitute altruism are contested. In its 
extreme sense altruism has been understood as assisting others in ways that disadvantages the helper 
or even bring harm on the helper without expecting any benefits or rewards from the altruistic action. 
However, in its lighter form, altruism is seen as a rationale form of assisting others in distress but without 
necessarily undertaking the altruistic action when the helper is threatened by harm.  
In relation the ethics of HMI, the chapter argued that HMI is derived from the concept of altruism given 
that it is a concept that seek to give relief to people suffering from the tyranny of their leaders or military 
groups with the consent or abetting from the leadership. The concept of HMI as a use of military force to 
stop a tyrant from killing his or her own people is arguably derived from the instincts in human beings to 
assist fellow human beings in distress. However, as noted in the chapter, while individual human beings 
may have the moral instincts to help other human beings and animal species for no gain, the concept of 
the immorality of groups makes it difficult for states to undertake purely HMIs. 
The sum of this chapter is that there are a number of ethical principles which gives a military intervention 
a humanitarian tag. These principles include altruism, protecting the lives of civilians, acting with 
consistency and being driven by humanitarian intentions and motives. In judging the military interventions 
that have been declared as humanitarian by the powerful states in the affairs of weaker developing states, 
the argument is that most of the interventions that were declared as humanitarian fall short ethically. In 
almost all the interventions, the influence of self-interest was highly visible. This visibility was noted 
through firstly the comparative response of powerful states to humanitarian cases that deserved HMIs, 
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the internal conduct of the foreign troops and the use of heavy weaponry in civilian populated areas as 
was the case in Libya, and the lack of a will to restore the socio-political situation to normalcy and peace 
after the intervention, with Libya and Iraq having been reduced to failing states. The chapter therefore 
accepts that there are humanitarian cases that deserve an HMI. However, such cases have become 
subjects of abuse by Major Powers that view these cases as opportunities to extend or protect their 
hegemony and economic interests on the international arena.  The next chapter will give a general 




CHAPTER 9:   RESEARCH FINDINGS  
9.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 to 7 covered the aspects that relate to the concept of HMIs.  Chapter 8 ethically critiqued the 
practice of HMI.  Chapter 9 gives the research findings and recommendations in line with the research 
objectives. The chapter aims at answering the questions that influenced the research and in so doing 
meeting the objective that the research set to accomplish.  
After discussing the research findings the chapters goes on to give recommendations.  The chapter will 
provide a summary of the thesis from chapter 1 to 8.  In this chapter, it is noted that the role of self-
interest in military humanitarian intervention has been a subject of debate amongst the whole spectrum 
of scholars, politicians and state leaders in the world.  Some scholars have challenged military 
humanitarian intervention as a complete camouflage of national self-interest while others see it as a 
trump on sovereignty.  This study questioned the morality of HMI in developing countries by the powerful 
states.  The study also interrogated the ethical role of HMI and the doctrine of the international society 
as an interventionist doctrine seeking to apportion more power to powerful countries to subvert the ethical 
rule of sovereignty. Having discussed these issues throughout the thesis, this chapter will give concise 
conclusions on the issues.  
The chapter is structured as follows; research findings, Theories and practices of ethics in international 
relations, Conceptual definitions of humanitarianism, An investigation on the role of self-interest in HMIs, 
Historical analysis of HMIs, The pursuit of strategic resources through the cover of HMI, The creation of 
the Responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P), State sovereignty and HMIs, An ethical analysis and critique 
of contemporary HMIs. 
9.2   Research Findings 
 
It has been noted through chapters 1 to 8 that in many areas where military interventions have taken 
place, its application has not been consistent and in certain cases it has been abused and critically 
motivated by national self-interest rather than moral and ethical principles/obligations.  Double standards 
in the application, use and practice of HMIs have been noted.  This section succinctly provide a 
conclusion of findings in line with each objective.   
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9.2.1  Objective 1: To Discuss the Different Contentious Reasons for the Undertaking of 
Humanitarian Military Interventions 
 
The thesis noted that the reasons for undertaking HMIs are basically argued to be ethical. The concept 
of HMI is supported by the liberal school of thought in international relations. Liberal scholars like Teson 
(2003) and Grotius (1625) argue that HMI is an ethical practice that was accepted and undertaken by 
different kingdoms and countries since the creation of the state system and beyond. The major reasons 
for undertaking the HMI adventures as given by the liberal school of thought is the gross violation of 
human rights of the citizens by their leaders and government. 
However, the realist school of international relations object to the dominance of ethics in international 
relations. The school put forward that international relations is governed by objective law of nature where 
different countries seek to survive hence morality has no place. From this argument, HMI is seen as a 
utopia if ever it can be thought of. The school argues that while there exists the violation of human rights, 
countries who intervene do protect their interests and not the interests of those suffering from gross 
human rights violations. This notion of interest will be dealt with under objective 2. 
What has been contentious on the reasons for undertaking an HMI mission is the failure to establish legal 
and moral thresholds which when surpassed would warrant an intervention. The thesis observed that 
intervention undertaken in Kosovo was based on a clear reason that there was a genocide28 that was 
being undertaken. While there have been legal contentions on the Kosovo HMI given that it was not 
authorized by the UNSC, there were clear justifying reasons on the ground. However, in other cases as 
in the intervention in Iraq (2003), the reason was that Saddam Hussein, then the Iraq President, had 
brutalized his citizens before. It is important to note that the justification was given in the post intervention 
phase given that initially the military intervention had been undertaken on the pretext of disarming 
Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This reason is not in line with the ethics of 
HMI which notes that an HMI should be undertaken when a leader is in the process of committing gross 
                                                            
28 The definition of genocide in relation to Kosovo is drawn from the December 1948 UN General 
Assembly Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Article II of the 
convention defines Genocide as, “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such : (a) Killing members 
of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group. 
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human rights violations or has threatened such violations with high chances that he/she will act on the 
threat with the citizens having no means to protect themselves. This was exemplified in Libya when 
Gaddafi threatened genocide to the people of Benghazi. In Saddam Hussein’s case, the violations had 
been committed in a long time and international corrective measures had been undertaken to deal with 
the leader’s brutality. These corrective measures included the passage of UNSC Resolution 688 which 
authorized a no fly zone in Iraq and international sanctions against Saddam Hussein. 
In the case of an intervention in Libya and non-intervention in countries like Rwanda, Sudan and Syria, 
a lot of contentions were brought to the front on HMI debates. In Rwanda and Sudan genocide and war 
crimes were committed with the international community acknowledging the atrocities as noted in this 
thesis. However, the international community took no meaningful action to save the civilians or take to 
task the perpetrators during the time the crimes were being committed.29 Contrary to this approach, in 
Libya, there was a swift response from NATO with countries like the USA and France mobilizing their 
military machinery before the passing of the UNSC Resolution 1973 (Issaka; 2011: 10-11). Gaddafi was 
accused of having threatened a genocide or mass murder to the people of Libya specifically those living 
in Benghazi.  
UNSC Resolution 1973 was passed in line with the principles of the new R2P doctrine. However, after 
the military intervention and the assassination of Gaddafi, the intervening forces took no further steps to 
fulfill the principles of the Responsibility to Re-build as enshrined in the R2P document. As argued in the 
thesis, more people died in the aftermath of the fall of Gaddafi than those he was accused of having 
killed. In place of building institutions to bring Libya back to a peaceful era, the intervening countries were 
alleged to have concentrated on winning oil concessions, as argued in the thesis. This brings us again 
to the question of self-interests in HMI which is subject of the next section. 
 
9.2.2  Objective 2: To Analyze the Role of National Interest in the Context of Humanitarian Military 
Interventions 
 
                                                            
29 In an interview on 19 June 2015 in Addis Ababa, Simon Badza noted that, “In Rwanda people were 
massacred in the face of the same humanitarian masters.” 
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The question of the role of national interest in HMI has been the central ethical question in this research. 
This is proven by the fact that the hypothesis of this thesis was; national self-interests are the main 
motivating factor in the undertaking of HMIs. The research showed that national self-interests dominate 
in the decision by powerful countries when they decide to undertake HMIs. The majority of the 
interviewees agreed that national self-interests although publicly concealed are always taken into 
consideration by decision makers of powerful countries before deciding on undertaking any HMI. 
However, it is important that there was no consensus among respondents on what an HMI is in relation 
to HMI as well as the real meaning of HMI. 
Firstly, it is important to note that Mandaza (2015)30 and Nyuykonge (2015)31 (interviewees) argued that 
there is nothing like an HMI. The two argued that there are military interventions and humanitarian 
interventions. Furthermore, they urged that once there is more of military combat in HMI, then the 
intervention ceases to be humanitarian. In their conceptualization, the two put forward that a humanitarian 
intervention should not be dominated by combat military personnel. The two interviews are in support of 
a humanitarian intervention that is dominated by civilian personnel. It is because of this that the two put 
forward that what has dominantly become known as HMI is to them simply military interventions which 
are always defined by national self-interests under-currencies.  
Kurasha (2015)32 on a different note argued that the notion of HMI is by itself unethical. He noted that, 
every single life from an ethical perspective is sacred and cannot be unjustly sacrificed for anything. 
Kurasha went on to postulate that when the powerful western countries led by the USA argue that they 
are intervening on humanitarian grounds, they will be driven by the pursuit of their interest mostly 
resources, drawing parallels between Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) on one hand and Rwanda (1994) on 
the other. He went on to point out that after the intervention in Iraq and Libya, the intervening forces left 
the people exposed to more appalling humanitarian catastrophes. Kurasha stated that, “What is 
humanitarian is contrasted with what an animal does. If an action is going to live me in a street, then you 
have reduced my life to live like an animal. Humanitarian action should lead to humanitarian life. These 
interventions are leading people to live and run away like animals”. On the notion of “running away 
                                                            
30 Mandaza is a Political Analyst, Academic and Director of SAPES Think Tank and Publisher. 
31 Nyuykonge is a Senior Researcher at ACCORD. 




animals”, Kurasha meant the mass dangerous migrations undertaken by many people from war zone 
including Syria and Libya were the hand of the powerful countries has been visible.  
On another note, Kurasha questioned the whole notion of what is termed national self-interests. He stated 
that, “They cannot be called (national) self-interest. They are class interests. It is a few economic barons 
who determine the policy of the United States. It is not the national interests of the United State but the 
interests of a few. The interests of big banks and economic tycoons determine the foreign policy of the 
USA. It is not about the USA nation but of a few.” This is in line with the theoretical arguments presented 
in chapter 1 which argued that the question of national interests should be understood from the concept 
of the ‘self’. From this notion, one will be able to understand the argument by Kurasha that what are 
called national interests can in most cases be alien to the majority of the citizens, hence the question of 
how such can be seen as the aggregate of the interests of all. 
The dominance of national self-interests was argued to be the driving force behind the undertaking of 
HMIs. This, as argued by respondents, is proven by the differences in responses to humanitarian 
disasters, specifically those which are politically and militarily perpetrated by state leaders. In some 
cases, there has been swift responses as was the case in Libya as noted earlier on as well as in Kosovo, 
in others there were half-hearted responses as was the case in Somalia and calls for political solutions 
as is the current case in Syria, while in other cases there is total neglect as was the case in Rwanda. 
Badza (2015) stated that, “The reasons for the existence of a state is national interest both at home and 
abroad. Even if it means undertaking a war disguised as a humanitarian war, it will still be done. For me 
I will always say that national interest is the core guiding line. In real politics, altruism is wishful thinking. 
National interest is at the core of all military interventions under humanitarian umbrella.” 
On a related note, Salim Ahmad Salim (2015) forwarded a different view in regards to HMIs. Ahmad 
Salim postulated that there are national interests and racial connotation to the undertaking of HMIs. In 
his postulation, when there is a humanitarian catastrophe that calls for HMI in Europe, powerful countries 
from the Western hemisphere come with a swift reaction because such catastrophes are seen as a dent 
on white supremacy. However, when there are similar catastrophes in Africa and other less developing 
countries the powerful countries neglect such issues and when they take action it is mostly done in giving 
financial and military support while those indigenous peoples are left to sacrifice their lives. Ahmad Salim 
cited the interventions in Kosovo, Somalia and Rwanda as illustrations. 
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The arguments put forward by interviewees was also dominant in most debates by scholars on the 
subject. Köchler saw the practice of HMI as a façade for the pursuit of national self-interests. He argued 
that all major HMIs that are used by liberalists scholars to argue that HMI was established by customary 
international law was simple the moralisation of the pursuit of geo-strategic interests in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Mediterranean Sea. While other theorists and scholars like Grotius (1625), Teson (2003) 
and Walzer (1977) saw HMI as an ethical practice that was undertaken to deal with gross human rights 
abuses by national leaders or those whom they support, the thesis proved that examples given are 
contested and at best proved that HMI is the pursuit of national self-interests in a moralised manner to 
counter internal and international condemnation. For instance, the thesis argued that the example noted 
by Grotius that the wars of Constantine against Maxentius and Licinius were simple battles for the control 
of the Roman Empire.  
Teson acknowledged, so does Walzer, the influence of national self-interests. Teson, however, argues 
that national self-interests and humanitarianism can be compatible of the intervening country do so based 
on clear humanitarian reasons and that both the intervening country and the subject country benefit. 
However, this, as argued in the thesis is against the tenets of humanitarianism and HMI. Badza (2015)33 
stated that, “As long as humanitarianism is applied in a selective fashion it remains hypocritical and 
illegitimate. Hence there is no humanitarianism.” The selective application of HMI is driven by national 
self-interests were in cases where powerful countries see no benefit, they ignore the catastrophes or 
simply pay lip-service in the form of what may sometimes be called a political solution. The question of 
the compatibility between self-interests and humanitarianism is the subject of the section that follows. 
9.2.3   Objective 3: To Assess Whether Self-Interest is Compatible with Humanitarianism 
 
Having observed that national self-interests of the powerful intervening countries are central in 
influencing powerful countries on whether or not to undertake HMIs and in which cases, this section 
answers the question on whether national self-interests is compatible with humanitarianism. As noted 
above, Teson saw the two being compatible as in theory they brought mutual benefits both to the 
intervening country and the subjects of the intervened country. While in theory this seems like so, it 
practice, history shows that it is not the same.  
                                                            
33 Badza is a Senior Political Officer AU, Department of Peace and Security. 
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Among the many examples cited in the thesis, Somalia (1991), Iraq (2003), Rwanda (1994), Darfur 
(2003), Libya (2011) and Syria (the crisis which is still ongoing), national self-interests have not been 
compatible with humanitarianism. In Somalia, the death of 18 USA rangers resulted in the USA pulling 
out of the HMI and leaving hundreds of thousands of Somalis to brutality from warlords. In such a case, 
the argument by Salim Ahmad Salim that HMI is driven by both interests and race and colour becomes 
more clear and answered. In this case, one is driven to question if the lives of 18 rangers was more 
important than the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis who were killed or displaced by the 
humanitarian crisis. If this is contrasted with Iraq, where thousands of USA service personnel were killed 
without pulling out, one again would question whether humanitarianism and humanitarian life of the Iraqis 
is more important than that of the Somalis. 
Following on the Iraq example as well as the example of Libya, USA and other intervening countries 
pulled out without creating the necessary institutions for sustainable peace and humane living. On the 
two example the interests in oil was seen as the dominant factor and after removing stumbling blocks to 
accessing the resources, the intervening countries pulled out and left the people more exposed to loss 
of life than before. 
On the other hand, Rwanda and Darfur, clearly defined as cases of genocide, were ignored due to, as 
argued in the thesis, lack of strategic interests for the powerful countries that have the capacity to 
intervene. In Rwanda, more than 800 000 people lost their lives while in Darfur powerful countries paid 
lip-service while innocent people were subjected to government sponsored brutalist and mass murder. 
The Somali, Rwandan and Darfur crises among others in the developing world can be seen to be in line 
with the argument forwarded by Salim Ahmad Salim on the interplay between interest and race. 
Lastly, in Syria the contrast/divergence of the interests of powerful countries resulted in the utopian talk 
of what has been defined as a ‘political solution’ to a crisis. In all the talk both the USA and Russia, who 
are the leading powers in the crisis have played active roles that have seen the death, internal 
displacement, maiming and emigration of hundreds of thousands of civilians. There has been a failure to 
take an active intervention, which Simura (2014) argues that it was as a result of the pursuit of national 
interests driven intervention in Libya. Hence the battle for the domination of the Middle East which is 
regarded as a strategic region by both major powers has seen the neglect of innocent civilians who are 
the primary subject of HMI. Due to the influence of geo-strategic interests, this thesis argues that Syria 
will be another Srebrenica and another Rwanda, only in different circumstances. 
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9.3.   Theories and Practices of Ethics in International Relations 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, it was observed that the practice of HMI by major powers in the affairs of less 
powerful countries was informed by a number of theories, namely Realism, Liberalism (Idealism), 
Altruism, International society and Just War which were basically constructed to explain state behaviour 
in international relations.  These theories are grounded in ethical relations between states in the 
international system.  Realism and Idealism are arguably the most contending theories in relation to the 
morality of HMI. Korab-Karpowicz (2011), quoted in Hall (2013, 12) states that realists contend that 
international relations and interactions between different countries are defined by power struggles 
between countries. State survival is seen as the primary reasons for interaction in the international 
system.  
On one hand, such characterisation creates a picture of a continued and sustained cold war among 
countries, including those that claim to be allies. This is exemplified by media leaks by former USA 
National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, Edward Snowden that the USA had spy programmes on its 
European ‘allies’ (Clackson, 2014). In accepting that international interaction resembles a sustained cold 
war means that morality has no place in deciding the behaviour of different countries. Morality, in realist 
thinking is a weakness which others can take advantage of and work to destroy you or eliminate you 
through the use of even unethical ways like spying on an ally. 
On the other hand, liberalists have sought to justify that the world is equally run on moral values as it is 
also affected by principles of survival and national self-interests (Blair, 2006: 7-8). Liberalists argue that 
human rights are an essential element of human societies. Faced by the argument that the UN was more 
premised on realist dispensations of the world, Kofi Annan and likeminded thinkers have put forward the 
argument that the UN charter also takes great regard of the human individual as it does to countries 
(Annan, 2000: 6). Annan cites the use the term, “We the people” in the UN Charter as representing the 
unity of individuals as equal to the unity of countries in a UN system when he states that, “it reaffirms the 
dignity and worth of the human person, respect for human rights and the equal rights of men and women”. 
The argument is further sustained by the fact that the UN Charter encourages member countries to 
adhere to human rights, which are put down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One can then 




Practically, it is not easy to contextualise a historical case or an ongoing case into a single theory. The 
behaviour of different countries in the international system vacillates between explanations given by 
different theories. For instance, while the USA led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which costs it more than three 
thousand lives of service personnel by end of December 2007 (Curtis and Payne, 2010: 45) and 
approximately more than two hundred and fifty billion dollars by the end of 2005 (Bilmes and Stiglitz; 
2006, 1) can be best explained under the realist theory of asserting hegemony and entrenching its 
influence in the Middle East, its entry and subsequent exit from Somalia in 1992-1993 after the death of 
its rangers cannot be easily explained by this theory given that the USA had dumped Somalia as a 
hegemonic territory after the fall of the Cold War and its return on humanitarian basis had been explained 
as being a reaction to the Cable News Network (CNN) (Livingston, 1997: 2, Luttwak, 1999/2000: 59). 
Countries tend to abide by moral rules in international relations when such actions do not pose any 
threats to their interests. It has been noted that when a country’s interests are under threat, abiding by 
moral rules may translate the threat into a real damage or attack on the subject country, morals become 
subservient to the principle of survival which translate to pursuing national interests.  It has been 
discussed that in international relations, it is a moral rule that in the case of a power intending to undertake 
military strikes in another country to deal with a threat there is need to inform the government of the target 
state. However, in a number of instances this moral rule has been by-passed as exemplified by the extra-
judicial killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan by American Navy Seals without the knowledge of the 
Pakistani government (Deeks, 2011). 
9.4    Conceptual Definitions of Humanitarianism 
 
As was noted in chapter 2, the concepts of humanitarianism and national self-interest have been the core 
of this chapter. Humanitarianism as a concept developed from philanthropy mostly from the major 
religions as well as the Chinese, Indian, African and Greek philosophy. The chapter noted that under the 
Greek philosophy, the subject was contested between the Stoics and the Epicurean Schools of Thought. 
The Epicurean School of Thought argued that human beings by nature were driven by self-interests, 
while the Stoic School of Thought propounded that altruism was the natural endowment of human beings 
and those who acted under the motivation of self-interest were driven by avarice.  
It was concluded that, in the traditional African societies as well as the traditional Scandinavian societies, 
there were rules that put the society above individuals. However, as noted in the chapter, the observance 
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of societal norms was driven by the compelling need for the society to take care of the individual. Hence 
those who did not put the society first were shunned by the same society. The working together, was 
therefore seen as acting in self-interest given that any deviation would result in some form of 
excommunication from the society. 
The chapter further noted that the concept of humanitarianism was influenced by different religions, 
specifically the Judaic-Christian doctrine as expounded in the Bible. The Christian doctrine notes that 
humanity is a single family of a single parentage by Adam and Eve. The chapter observed that the Bible 
gave some confusing remarks on the equality and sameness of human beings given that while the Old 
Testament which puts forward that humanity is a single family divides them later into a chosen race of 
Jews and non-chosen race who are gentiles, the Pauline doctrine in the new testament argues that 
humanity is one and only differs in righteousness. Hence, in its practice, the Europeans used the 
Christian doctrine to look down upon the colonized world as semi human beings were treated 
inhumanely, a practice that was also popular in the Greco Roman Tradition which separated between 
homo humanus and the homo barbarous. The ‘civilized’ Europeans were the homo humanus who held 
rights and had to be treated in a civilized manner, while other races were viewed as homo barbarous, 
some form of semi human beings who needed to be educated and transformed if they were to be allowed 
to enjoy human rights. It was because of this line of thinking as espoused in the chapter that the 
Europeans saw no moral blameworthiness in practicing slave trade. 
The chapter concluded by discussing the intercourse of humanitarianism and military intervention. It 
highlighted that the use of the term ‘humanitarian’ in military intervention was derived from the fact that 
such a military intervention would not be driven by the needs of self defence, self-gain or assistance to 
another sovereign state that would have called for assistance, but driven by ethical desires to save 
civilians in distress. In contemporary times, the chapter traced the application of humanitarianism in 
warfare to Dunant who advocated for humanitarianism in war after witnessing the scourge of war in the 
aftermath of the battle of Solferino in 1859.   
While Dunant’s humanitarianism specifically targeted creating moral rules for the treatment of 
combatants and non-combatants in war, HMI specifically target to relieve civilians who are subjected to 




9.5    An Investigation on the Role of National Self-Interest in Humanitarian Military Interventions 
 
Chapter 7 was an investigation on the role of national interest in HMIs. The concept of national interest 
was traced from individual self-interest to national self-interest. The chapter began by defining self-
interest from dictionary, encyclopedia and scholarly perspectives. It observed that the general definition 
of self-interests from the three dimensions explained above is that self-interest refers to self-inclination 
and the desire for self-aggrandizement mostly pursued at the expense of others.   
The chapter followed by locating the development of self-interest in the liberal economics doctrine. In 
liberal economics, was popularized by Adam Smith who argued that people pursue developmental issues 
not for the benefit of the society but for personal benefit. The benefits that accrue to the society are only 
meant to promote the interests of the business persons. This line of thinking had already been supported 
by the Greek Philosopher, Aristotle, who argued that human beings were naturally self-inclined. 
From the development of self-interests in liberal economics, the chapter linked the notion to the concept 
of national interest. It argued that national interest refers to the total aggregate interest of the whole 
nation. National interest, therefore, can be seen as the total national interests that cut across different 
group interests. 
As discussed in the chapter, national interest has both internal and external dimensions. Internally, 
national interest is defined by the needs and aspirations of the people. These desires and aspirations 
influence the external dimensions of national interest, hence influencing foreign policy. The external 
dimensions refers to the aspirations of a nation state and its goals in the international arena.  However, 
the notion of national interest is prone to abuse. As shown in the chapter, it can be used to cover elite 
interest. These can be the interests of the political elites or the interests of dominant business persons. 
The notion is also used to create strong defence against critics of a policy that would be seen by others 
as a wrong or bad policy. 
In relation to the concept of HMI, the chapter mentioned that national interest is the major influencer of 
HMI. Ethical scholars like Walzer (1977) have noted that national interest greatly influence HMIs, 




9.6    Historical Analysis of Humanitarian Military Interventions 
 
The development of the concept of HMI is grounded in the Christian doctrine. Its development was also, 
like the development of the concept of human rights and humanity, exclusive. Intervention was mostly 
justified in cases where Christians were being persecuted by non-Christian sovereigns and being denied 
the right to practice their religion freely. It has also been argued in the chapter that there has been a 
considerable influence of self-interest even in the initial stages and development stages of the concept. 
The argument that the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia 
and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda are classical cases of HMI during the Cold War should be 
questioned. The intervening countries did not structure their intervention on humanitarian plans and did 
not justify their military interventions as such.  
In the Vietnamese case, Vietnam acted out of self defence against military incursions from the Pol Pot 
government, and in the Indian intervention, India acted to protect itself from the influx of refugees into its 
territories, while to a lesser extend it was driven by religious relations given the argument that it was the 
minority Hindus who bore the greatest brunt of Pakistani misrule. In the case of the Tanzanian invasion 
of Uganda, the case was purely of defence against an invasion that had been launched by Uganda. 
Pursuing Idi Amin after crossing the Ugandan/Tanzanian borders was justified to dispel the threat he 
posed to Tanzania. 
The chapter concluded that, while it has been noted that the only country that had a quasi-humanitarian 
justification was India in its intervention in East Pakistan, it is important to note that in all the three 
countries that military intervention took place, there were humanitarian concerns that would have 
warranted an HMI according to the Grotian tradition. The interventions, though as argued, not undertaken 
for humanitarian reasons, achieved humanitarian outcomes. 
However, achieving humanitarian outcomes did not warrant the categorization of a military intervention 
as humanitarian. A military intervention can only be classified as humanitarian if it is driven by a 
humanitarian intention and should also be conducted by guiding HMI rules like proportionality, limiting 
civilian casualties and a considerable chance of success. 
In the post-Cold War period, it was concluded that, a number of interventions were undertaken on the 
pretext of HMI. While some were justified, as was the case with the Kosovo intervention, intervening 
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states always hesitated to justify the military interventions under the concept of HMI. Most of the cases 
were justified under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, thereby describing them as threats to international 
peace and security.  
The chapter also noted that the concept was also tainted by the justification of the Iraq invasion as a 
HMI. In Africa, the concept was tainted by neglect of the neediest cases of Rwanda and Darfur, while the 
Libyan intervention and the uprisings in the Arab states only brought back the memories of the pursuit of 
self-interest even in humanitarian cases. While HMI as a concept is meant to protect civilians against 
tyrant leaders, powerful states have tended to abuse the concept for self-interests, rendering the 
interventions unethical and immoral. It is finally concluded that the application of the concept of military 
intervention is fraught with abuses and inconsistences and that double standards are at play when 
decisions are taken by the UNSC. 
9.7   The Pursuit of Strategic Resources through the Guise of Humanitarian Military 
Interventions 
 
Chapter 4 dwelt on the actual tangible interests of Major Powers that define their military interventions in 
weaker developing states. These interests were grouped into categories namely economic interests, 
protection of geo-strategic zones and regions, and protection of the balance of power and diffusion of 
the rise of antagonistic regional and international powers that will challenge the hegemony of the 
dominant powers internationally or regionally. These groups of interests have a greater influence on the 
decision by Major Powers in undertaking HMIs. 
Under economic interests, it was noted that Major Powers undertook HMI to protect strategic resources 
that were important for their industries. These resources included but not limited to petroleum and 
minerals. Regions that have these vast resources and have been subject to great power competition for 
control include the Middle East, North Africa and Central Africa, while West Africa was also rising as an 
influential producer of oil.  
9.7.1 Economic Interests 
 
Other economic interests were based on the preservation of traditional areas of influence for marketing 
and extraction of raw material. This explained the asserted gentleman’s agreement among former 
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colonial powers and dominant western major powers that have seen former colonial power undertaking 
HMIs in their former colonies, while the USA leads in the HMIs in South America and the Middle East. In 
this regard, as noted in the chapter, France leads in HMIs in the former francophone African region which 
includes Ivory Coast and Central African Republic (CAR) while Britain leads in former Anglophone Africa 
which includes countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. In some cases, where stakes were high, Major 
Powers have stumbled on each other to undertake HMI specifically to secure economic concessions, as 
was the case in the 2011 Libyan intervention by NATO (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2011: 6-12). 
9.7.2 Geo Strategic Interests 
 
Under geo-strategic interests, it has been argued that different powers have different regions that they 
consider to be of vital interests to their nations. The accordance of such importance is determined by 
economic and defence needs of the Major Powers. The major geo-strategic regions in the world have 
been the Panama Canal for the USA and the Middle East for USA, Russia and Britain, while the 
Caucasus Region is considered a geo-strategic region for Russia. The importance of geo-strategic 
regions is noted in the actions of Major Powers where they either ignore all moral rules, or use HMI as a 
façade to intervene to either maintain stranglehold on the region, to get control of it or deny another Major 
Power or regional power exclusive dominance of the region. 
Russian purported interventions in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century were influenced by the need 
to gain accesses to the Mediterranean Sea and have total control of the Black Sea. However, in a geo-
strategic countermove, Britain, France and Austria joined the humanitarian military adventure not 
because of the need to protect civilians but to counter Russian advances into the Mediterranean Sea. 
The chapter noted that, in the Cold War era, USA declared the Middle East a region of vital interests. 
This saw the USA curving its own sphere of influence that it has jealously guarded against any 
encroachment, either from external powers or from internal regional powers like Iraq and Iran. This 
dominance has been challenged by Russia in Syria. The Syrian crisis can be seen as a geo political war 
by proxy between USA and Russia in general but also including regional powers like Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Qatar and Iran. In this regard, contending powers have disregarded the need to protect Syrian 
humanitarian concerns as they have continued to militarily sponsor their sides, (the government beings 
supported by Russia and Iran, and the armed insurgence being supported by the West, Qatar, Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia) with arms that are used to attack civilians. The crisis has led to the creation of the 
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greatest humanitarian catastrophe and migration crisis which the international community has only 
condemned in public but stalked covertly. 
9.7.3 Balance of Power and Threat Diffusion 
 
The other cluster which the chapter noted is that of the need to preserve the balance of power and deter 
ambitious weaker states from becoming major regional or international powers. It has been noted that 
while it takes relatively a longer period of time for a state to rise from being a weaker state to become a 
hegemonic global power, it is relatively easier for states to rise and be regional powers. Regional powers 
have the potential to scuttle the interest of major powers in their areas of influence. Hence international 
Major Powers continue to monitor the rise of less powerful states especially those known to be 
nonaligned to such a Major Power. It could be because of this competition of national interest between 
a Major Power and a regional power that the USA has had a turbulent relationship with Iran in the Middle 
East. The rise of Iran, which is antagonistic to USA national interest and the interests of USA allies such 
Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Middle East which saw the creation of a conflict which has also manifested 
itself in the Syrian proxy war, while Saddam Hussein was toppled because he exhibited hegemonic 
tendencies against a USA ally and sought to influence the change of the global petro dollar to a petro 
euro.  Regime changes in Iraq and Libya were as a result of self-national interest rather than the 
humanitarian concerns by the USA and her Western allies. 
In summary, the chapter attempted to bring to light and illustrate how national interests are the end goal 
or the hidden objectives in HMIs. The discussion of interest of Major Powers in less powerful states was 
also meant to give an understanding on what the thesis means when it argues that HMI was not 
conducted in a certain country due to lack of the interests of major powers. These interests are simply 
the pursuit of economic benefits, protection of geo-strategic regions and fighting to bar the entry of other 
countries into the ranks of regional and international powers and it is these interests that are camouflaged 
under HMIs.  
9.7.4 Political Hegemonic Interests 
 
It was noted that the term hegemony originates from the ancient Greek ‘Hegemonia’ literally expressing 
the dominant and oppressive status of one element in the system of others.  According to Gramsci, 
hegemony represents the status of the most powerful country in the international system or the position 
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of a dominant state in a specific region (Barrett, 1997: 239).   He further notes that hegemony entails 
“cooperation ensured by force, combining social and political supervision, force and consent”.   Cox 
(1981: 16 – 155) postulates that hegemony enables the dominant state to spread its moral, political and 
cultural values around the society and sub-communities.  This has been done through civilian society 
institutions which consist of the net institutions and practices that are partly autonomous from the state.  
He further notes that hegemony produces social and political systems that are to be applied on the 
nations targeted. 
9.8    The creation of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
 
The R2P doctrine came up as a result of different experiences the world has gone through since the end 
of the Cold War.  The failure by the international community to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide of 
1994, the degeneration of the Somali conflict into a failed state and the intervention by NATO into Kosovo 
without UNSC authorization are some of the cases that have impacted on the need to have a precise 
intervention doctrine. 
The success of the doctrine was made possible by the support and drive it got from influential world 
leaders, among them the former USA President, Bill Clinton and the former British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair. The success of the doctrine was also spurred by the pressure exerted on the UN by the then 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Due to the support given to the need of having new rules on intervention 
by the liberal world, the government of Canada sponsored ICISS which produced the R2P report. From 
the report, R2P became a doctrine that was debated at the World Summit of 2005 and in the general 
assembly before world leaders accepted it as an intervention policy that would be implemented on a case 
by case basis. 
The R2P doctrine is a concise doctrine that is built upon the Just War doctrine. The crafters however, 
tried to make it more acceptable by stating that it is not a challenge on the international relations cardinal 
principle of state sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty was redefined as the sovereign right from 
interference and the duty of the sovereign to protect his or her subjects who are the true owners of 
sovereignty. The state had a responsibility to protect its citizens. In the case of failure by the state to 
protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it had the duty to seek 
assistance from the international community in which failure or unwillingness would transfer the 
responsibility to protect to the international community. 
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R2P was applied in a number of cases but scholars have agreed that the doctrine was explicitly used in 
the crises in Ivory Coast and Libya. Attempts to apply the doctrine in the Syrian crisis failed due to mistrust 
among the UN Security Council veto powers emanating from the excesses by NATO in its implementation 
of Resolution 1973. Russia and China argued that the USA, France and Britain were pursuing regime 
change under the cover of implementing UNSC resolutions. The chapter argued that the moral failure of 
the international community in implementing the R2P doctrine was a burden for all powers in the crisis. 
All the players that included but not limited to USA, Britain, France, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar considered their national interests ahead of the safety and lives of the Syrians. The 
battle for Middle East dominance by the Major Powers resulted in them fighting the war by proxy, hence 
exacerbating the suffering of the Syrian people whom they purported to be protecting. 
9.9    State sovereignty and Humanitarian Military Interventions 
 
State sovereignty has a long history which goes back to the days of the creation of states. As discussed 
in chapter 6, there is no single definition that can be accepted as exclusive to state sovereignty. The 
embodiment of sovereignty itself has been a subject of debate. The term has been conceptualized in 
terms of state sovereignty, absolute sovereignty, constitutional sovereignty and individual sovereignty, 
among others.  
As noted in this chapter, the chapter was concerned more with state sovereignty given that it is states 
that are primary actors in international relations. Sovereignty has gone through a process of 
transformation especially in interpretation in different times. However, as established, the concept of 
sovereignty has always accorded rights and duties to the sovereign in relation to the citizens in his or her 
state. The most important of the rights is to be able to enforce authority without hindrance and the 
capacity to use legitimate force in cases of non-compliance. However, this right is only exercised in 
enforcing the rights of the society and restraining those who might want to hinder the enjoyment of these 
rights. 
The Peace of Westphalia ushered in a new era in state systems and the concept of state sovereignty. 
The Peace of Westphalia separated the state from the church. It also established the principle of territorial 
based state sovereignty. The principle of sovereignty was observed as a right which meant that in a 
number of instances, the right was breached which led to the two world wars and the establishment of 
the UN based international system. 
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The UN system adopted the Westphalian system of sovereignty. However, it abolished the acceptance 
of wars of conquest, specifically on the so called uncivilized world. Hence for the first time, there was a 
coded international instrument which abolished all aggressive wars as unethical in the international 
system. It also established the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 as part of norms to be 
followed by sovereign states in dealing with their peoples. The chapter noted that the UN system, unlike 
the Westphalian system, gave importance to both the states and peoples. Hence there is numerous 
reference to ‘peoples’ in the UN Charter as well as the term ‘human rights’. However, the importance 
given to peoples by the Charter did not demean the importance of state sovereignty. Far from it, the 
Charter strengths sovereignty as it looked back at the primary aims of granting sovereignty from its 
philosophical roots.  
While there was strengthening of state sovereignty and human rights, there have always been breaches 
of these concepts by either powerful states like the USA, and Britain in the invasion of Iraq (2003) among 
other cases, or by rogue leaders like Idi Amin’s invasion of Tanzania in 1979. There have also been 
grave breaches of human rights, specifically the right to life, as was explained that numerous cases of 
alleged genocide as was in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Darfur. These events and other cases of war crimes 
led some scholars like Deng et al. (1996) at Brookings Institute to argue for the reconceptualization of 
state sovereignty. Deng et al. (1996) propounded that sovereignty should be conceptualized as a 
responsibility to protect the citizens. The argument was headed by some neo-liberal Western leaders like 
Bill Clinton of the USA and Tony Blair of Britain. Blair came up with what he termed the doctrine of the 
international community which argued that sovereignty was now limited by the interconnectedness in the 
world. In 2000 the government of Canada led in sponsoring the ICISS which forwarded an official call to 
the UN to redefine sovereignty as the responsibility to protect, a term which also became the title of the 
report which the ICISS produced in 2001. 
The concept of the responsibility to protect as a redefinition, or re-interpretation of state sovereignty, 
denotes that every state has a responsibility to protect the right of its citizens through its internal 
mechanism. When the internal mechanisms are failing, the state has a responsibility to request 
international help, failure of which will result in the international community morally assuming the 
responsibility to protect the citizens in the distressed state without its consent. The international 
community can exercise this moral duty by any means which in extreme cases can be the use of force, 
after authorisation by the UNSC. 
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The chapter noted that this redefinition of sovereignty, while morally appealing, has a number of problems 
in implementing it. The concept can be seen as diminishing the sovereign rights of the weak while 
empowering the strong to trample on the weaker states that for long had seen the concept of state 
sovereignty as a shield. There is no proven case that when the strong fail to protect the weak, mostly 
minority citizens, there will be another state or coalition of states who can intervene. Hence, the concept 
is open to abuse by the strong in furthering their interest. Even the argument by the ICISS that the UNSC 
authorisation can limit the influence of abuse and self-interest, has been tested and proven to be wrong 
in Libya and Syria. Hence, the notion of sovereignty as responsibility is still to prove its practical moral 
and ethical clout.  
9.10   An Ethical Analysis and Critique of Contemporary Humanitarian Military Interventions 
 
The chapter critically discussed and analyzed the pertinent concepts that impact on the morality of HMI 
by powerful states in the affairs of weaker states. It interrogated how the pursuit of national interest by 
powerful states impact on the conduct of HMI. It also critically analyzed how the concepts of national 
sovereignty, nationalism, perceived shared moral values and the prevalence of anarchy in the 
international community of states impact on the ethical conduct of HMI. 
The major question that the chapter attempted to answer was whether it is possible for states to prioritize 
morality ahead of their national interests. From a Realist position, as was argued in the chapter, power 
expressed as the pursuit of national interests is the currency of international relations. Every state 
pursues it at any cost. The adverse effect of not prioritizing the pursuit of national interests, at least from 
a Realist perspective, is that one’s state would be doomed to death as other states are always seeking 
to destroy it. Prioritizing ethics and moral rules in the conduct of international relations is seen as a 
dangerous path towards the extinction of that state. This argument translates into the idea that there 
cannot be any HMI that is purely guided by humanitarian intentions and motives. In any HMI, the powerful 
capable states that conduct the HMIs in the developing countries will be seeking to extend their influence 
and hegemony in international affairs. 
The chapter argued that the conduct of HMI in contemporary history has taken place in two distinct eras, 
namely the pre UN anarchical era and the post anarchical era. It was argued that anarchy put simply 
refers to a system that has no governing and regulating rules. In the international system anarchy 
prevailed until European powers with the help of the former USA President, Woodrow Wilson, established 
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the League of Nations. This attempt at creating an international society and community was short lived 
as it failed to deal with Germany’s Adolf Hitler, Italy’s Benito Mussolini and Japan’s Hideki Tojo. The 
battle to establish a community of nations was finally established in 1945 with the creation of the United 
Nations.  
These transformations in the international system had tremendous impacts on the concept of HMI. Prior 
to the establishment of the UN, the conduct of HMI was undertaken by powerful states in the affairs of 
weaker states without considering what the other states would say. In the case of the European powers’ 
intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the best the rival powers could do was to join in the 
intervention and be able to influence the peace terms to safeguard their strategic interests (Hammond, 
2006: 9-10). That it was an anarchic situation is further proven by the fact that the reasons that the 
European power gave for their HMIs in the Ottoman Empire were either similar or less heinous as 
compared to the crimes the European leaders committed against those who challenged their power in 
their internal states or in the colonies. 
Under the international community created by the UN based system, the international system can no 
longer be classified as anarchic. However, such a transformation did not tremendously change the nature 
and conduct of HMI. Powerful states have remained the major players in HMI, with less powerful 
developing states being the subjects of intervention. However, the conduct of HMIs is no longer explicitly 
anarchic. Powerful states have now developed a new strategy of exploiting genuine humanitarian 
concerns in subject states for them to camouflage their pursuit of national interests. The use of genuine 
humanitarian concerns as was the case in Haiti, East Pakistan, and Sierra Leone when the USA, India 
and Nigeria undertook their respective military interventions, should not be seen as a turn in international 
relations from the realist route to an ethical one. These interventions could come up with humanitarian 
outcomes, but only as by-products of the pursuit of national interests. 
The chapter observed that the concept of national sovereignty has been subject to abuse by state 
leaders. As established in the chapter, sovereignty as noted in the social contract does not translate to 
the right of the state leaders to inhumanely dominate their citizens. Rather, leaders hold it in custody for 
the whole nation to the world outside the nation’s physical state boundaries. The Westphalian concept 
could have been an abuse of the social contract. National sovereignty as noted has faced double abuse, 
firstly by tyrant leaders seeking to insulate themselves from accountability to their peers on the 
international arena and from their citizens. Secondly, it is used by major powers when they seek to 
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disregard brutality by leaders in states they do not hold strategic interests or to insulate leaders in states 
they are protecting from international attention and formal scrutiny. This has been the case with the 
Russian defence for the Syrian government on different international fora. 
The last sections of the chapter were dedicated to the relationship between HMI on one hand and human 
rights and altruism on the other. It was noted that principles that constitute altruism are contested. In its 
extreme sense altruism has been understood as assisting others in ways that disadvantages the helper 
or even bring harm on the helper without expecting any benefits or rewards from the altruistic action. 
However, in its lighter form, altruism is seen as a rationale form of assisting others in distress but without 
necessarily undertaking the altruistic action when the helper is threatened by harm.  
In relation the ethics of HMI, the chapter argued that HMI is derived from the concept of altruism given 
that it is a concept that seek to give relief to people suffering from the tyranny of their leaders or military 
groups with the consent or abetting from the leadership. The concept of HMI as a use of military force to 
stop a tyrant from killing his own people is arguably derived from the instincts in human beings to assist 
fellow human beings in distress. However, as noted in the chapter, while individual human beings may 
have the moral instincts to help other human beings and animal species for no gain, the concept of the 
immorality of groups makes it difficult for states to undertake purely HMIs. 
The sum of this chapter is that there are a number of ethical principles which gives a military intervention 
a humanitarian tag. These principles include altruism, protecting the lives of civilians, acting with 
consistency and being driven by humanitarian intentions and motives. In judging the military interventions 
that have been declared as humanitarian by the powerful states in the affairs of weaker developing states, 
the argument is that most of the interventions that were declared as humanitarian fall short ethically. In 
almost all the interventions, the influence of self-interest was highly visible. This visibility was noted 
through firstly the comparative response of powerful states to humanitarian cases that deserved HMIs, 
the internal conduct of the foreign troops and the use of heavy weaponry in civilian populated areas as 
was the case in Libya, and the lack of a will to restore the socio-political situation to normalcy and peace 
after the intervention, with Libya and Iraq having been reduced to failing states. The chapter therefore 
accepts that there are humanitarian cases that deserve an HMI. However, such cases have become 
subjects to abuse by Major Powers that view these cases as opportunities to extend or protect their 
hegemony and economic interests in the international arena. 
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CHAPTER 10: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
SECTION A: Conclusion 
 
It is noted in the thesis that HMI is an ‘evil’ that is necessary to avert a greater ‘evil’. I argue that it is an 
evil as it is a trump on state sovereignty, which is the international regulating norm since the Peace of 
Westphalia and as noted in the thesis, it has been in most cases abused by countries that have the 
means to intervene, to intervene for their national self-interest and not to save humanity. However, it is 
necessary in extraordinary times when a leader or leaders refuse to honour and respect the rights of 
those who entrust them with power by brutalising innocent and defenceless citizens. This thesis took 
serious note of the question by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (2000, 48), that, “If 
humanitarian (military) intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend 
every precept of our common humanity?” The appeal by Kofi Annan was against both those who would 
use sovereignty as a reason for not intervening in extreme cases and those who would use sovereignty 
as defence against HMI when they are in the process of brutalising their citizens. This thesis, therefore 
argues that there is need to regulate and create stringent rule for the undertaking of HMI. 
HMI can be insulated from abuse by creating regional reaction forces that should not only be trained in 
peacekeeping and dealing with invasions, but also in carrying out HMI missions.34 There is also need to 
ensure that the forces that intervene in a case are those with minimum interests in the country where 
intervention is undertaken. This can be achieved through the use of military forces from regional task 
forces like the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Standby Force. The duty to intervene 
should be given firstly to the regional organisation and hierarchically transferred to high regional and 
international organisations due to lack of capacity. Regional forces should be trained in tactics on how to 
undertake an HMI given that an HMI is different to a purely offensive or defensive war between two 
countries.  
In relation to financing the interventions, the international community, through its different regional blocs, 
should create an HMI fund from which resources can be withdrawn when needed to deal with the cases. 
                                                            
34 Interview with Hon. Dr. Sydney Sekeramayi, Zimbabwe Minister of Defence, at Defence House, 
Harare, 6 August 2015. 
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Such mechanism would give the intervening forces independence and autonomy from richer countries 
that can use the power of the wallet to direct any matter into their interests. 
An international court/tribunal should be empowered to try soldiers from any country who commit war 
crimes during HMI missions. Powerful countries manage to diplomatically arm twist international 
humanitarian law by signing agreements with some less powerful countries so that after a military 
intervention their servicemen are not arraigned before any local or international court of law to answer to 
crimes committed during service. The USA has signed treaties with countries like Afghanistan that make 
USA service personnel in those countries not to be subjected to the local laws when they commit crimes. 
These laws, including the failure to ratify the Rome Statute are a clear sign that the USA views its 
personnel as unaccountable to International Law. This approach is immoral especially when weighed 
against the fact that it is Major Powers which push for the respect of global human rights. 
There should be a well-defined End state to the mission of any HMI. For instance, when the international 
community agrees that there is a case that warrants intervention, prior to undertaking the intervention, 
intervening countries should state clearly what they aim to achieve. On the achievement of the targeted 
goals, the intervening forces should initiate the process of withdrawing troops. An intervention should 
never be an occupation.  Furthermore, HMIs should restore normalcy in the country that has been 
intervened. 
There should be an intervention template. An HMI template is a list of do’s and don’ts which service 
personnel should use. An HMI template will lay down rules on how the intervening forces would deal with 
both peaceful and hostile citizens of the subject country, how they would handle perpetrators of human 
rights violations and how they would deal with armed forces of the subject country and would also 
incorporate the End state.  HMIs should not be used as regime change tools. 
In summary, the concept of HMI is a noble ideal response to excesses by an abusive government on its 
citizens who cannot defend themselves. The concept can serve as the intervention of last resort given 
that HMI is not the only intervention mechanism that can be used by the international community to deal 
with excess cases of human rights violations (ICISS, 2001).  Where there are cases of genocide, 




However, as already noted, this concept of HMI has been used as a tool to camouflage national interest 
based invasions by powerful countries. From the consultations done by the researcher in books, articles 
and interactive as well as in-depth interviews, HMI is an ideal tool to control tyrant leaders, which is 
problematic in practice given that in most of the cases where the concept has been used as a pretext for 
intervention, the underlying motives have been national self-interests. The research established that self-
interest has been the major influencing factor on the decision by the powerful countries to intervene in 
the affairs of weaker developing countries.  Intervening countries have always turned a blind eye in most 
situations where human rights were trampled if they had no self-interests in those countries. The concept 
has been selectively applied in different countries.  In most deserving countries like Rwanda, the powerful 
nations pretended as if the case did not deserve intervention. 
Because of its inherent weakness to abuse, HMI is resisted by leaders of weaker developing countries. 
Weaker countries argue that HMI is an immoral adventure that trumps on the ethic of respecting the 
sovereignty of other countries in the international system. The argument is premised on the selective 
application of HMI by powerful countries that have the capacity to intervene. The assertion is further 
supported by the argument that the human rights that the western world claims to be protecting on 
intervention are not constant but creations of western values. The notion of HMI has therefore remained 
a contested moral principle which without being regulated will continue to be a camouflage for national 
self-interest by the powerful countries in the weaker countries. 
SECTION B: Recommendations for a Future Balanced Humanitarian Military Intervention 
 
From the interview responses, it was established that while HMI is riddled with contentious issues, it is a 
necessary evil which should be evoked in some extreme cases when there is gross violations of human 
rights and when the genocide and war crimes are being committed. The thesis noted that even less 
powerful countries that quickly rush to invoke the concept of state sovereignty have in some cases 
accepted the need for HMI. The AU Constitutive Act accepted that while the continental body held up the 
concept of state sovereignty, that right will only be enjoyed by legitimate leaders and those committing 
gross human rights violations will be subject of HMI. Leaders of countries like Uganda and Rwanda, 
Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, respectively, spoke on support of HMI mainly because their 
countries experienced mass atrocities perpetrated by the state. 
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In light of all the observations and contributions from the research and interviews the study recommends 
the following: 
• That the conduct of HMI should be regulated by the use of regional organisations and non-
interested parties with the UN acting as the supreme regulator. Coupled with this should be the 
production of an agreed upon HMI template to regulate the conduct of the intervening countries 
and their service personnel in order to limit or curtail abuses of HMI. For HMI to have some 
ethical standing, the missions should not destroy more lives than those previously threatened 
and should leave the subject country in a better position than what is had been before the 
intervention. From this point of view it is recommended that the amount of force to be used and 
the nature of the weaponry should be regulated to limit civilian casualties as well as military 
personnel casualties of the intervening countries. After the mission the international community 
through the regional communities and the UN should work to rebuild the administrative as well 
as physical institutions for sustainable peace. The End-state of any HMI should be to restore 
peace and security in the country to its original form before the manifestations of compelling 
reasons for intervention or even better. 
• The creation of an international HMI fund that will be accessed and used in HMI. This fund will 
help reduce the reliance only on powerful countries that have the financial capacity to undertake 
HMI. Hence, one can argue that the fund will liberate HMI from being an adventure of a few 
privileged powerful countries to being a genuine ethical practice that can be delegated even to 
service personnel from less powerful countries as is the case with UN peacekeeping missions.  
This would be ideal to ensure that, those countries which harbour national self-interests are 
prohibited to intervene. 
• Special training on the conduct of HMI to military as well as civilian personnel. This 
recommendation was influenced by the fact that in the conduct of HMI is different from 
conventional warfare. Hence, just as peacekeeping forces are given special training on their 
missions, there is also need to do the same for other personnel undertaking HMI. 
• That the pursuit of national self-interest within the community of nations should be done only 
through the authorisation of the UN if it is to promote the interest of the whole nation state.  This 
recommendation implies that regardless of how powerful a state is, HMI should be undertaken 
after authorisation.  This is to ensure that states do not abuse or camouflage their national 
interest under the guise of HMI. 
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• The establishment of rules and regulations that would also allow for the prosecution of personnel 
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Letter of Informed Consent 
Dear Participant 
My name is Michael Chaminuka, a student in the school of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, pursuing 
PhD studies in the Department of Ethics studies at the University of KwaZulu Natal (UKZN). The topic of 
my thesis is, Humanitarian Military Interventions in developing countries and the Role of Self 
Interest, An Ethical Critique.  
 
Humanitarian Military Interventions have taken center stage since the turn of the 21st Century. These 
interventions have been taken in the form of unilateral, multilateral and through coalitions of the willing 
with or without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Such interventions are 
usually claimed to be for humanitarian purposes that are aimed at rescuing and protecting people in a 
foreign territory from gross violations of human rights. These interventions have been undertaken by 
powerful nations in developing countries at global and regional levels.  
 
The activities of foreign powers in Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992-93), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1993-
95), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999), Sierra Leone (2000-01) and Libya (2011) can all be classified as 
humanitarian military interventions, in the sense that they were at least partly designed to prevent national 
authorities from perpetrating human rights abuses.  However, in contrast to the above, there were large 
scale human rights abuses including genocide that occurred in Rwanda (1994) than in most conflicts 
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mentioned above but no humanitarian military intervention took place. Instead, the only intervention was 
operation ‘Turquoise’ by France which was carried in support of the perpetrators of the genocide rather 
than the victims. There have also been civil wars, foreign invasions and large scale human rights abuses 
in Angola, Burundi, former Zaire (DRC), Mano River Union region (West Africa), Palestine, Western 
Sahara, and Kashmir, but humanitarian military intervention has not been undertaken in these regions. 
This has, thus, raised questions and debates from scholars, political commentators and analysts as to 
why interventions are conducted in other regions and countries and not in others. The selective and 
inconsistent nature of interventions by the intervening countries leaves a number of moral and ethical 
questions unanswered. One can therefore argue that humanitarian military interventions have been 
undertaken not necessarily for humanitarian or ethical considerations, but to pursue national self-
interests.  
Currently, the assistance that is given to the rebels in Syria by United States of America (USA) has 
brought a new dimension on the analysis of the question of humanitarian military intervention and the 
role of self-interests. The actions by the USA and her allies of sponsoring rebels in other states, for 
instance, in Syria and Libya in order to create instability and insecurity for the civilians and at the same 
time bringing the case to the UNSC as a humanitarian catastrophe and calling for humanitarian 
intervention is an illegal and immoral act. These cases of unethical practices will form an important part 
of the research in order to discuss the role of national self-interests by powerful states. 
 
There have been scholarly policy debates on the rationale behind the undertaking of humanitarian military 
interventions in developing countries by powerful nations. Questions have been raised as to whether 
these interventions have been carried out to safeguard international norms related to human 
catastrophes as propounded by the intervening countries.  
 
Attempts have been made by powerful nations to lobby for support at the level of the UNSC and convince 
the world that any humanitarian military intervention undertaken is meant for safeguarding human 
security. A case in point is the UNSC Resolution 1973 against the Libyan government in 2011. Whilst the 
resolution mandated NATO to enforce a no-flying zone over the territory of Libya as primarily part of 
humanitarian military intervention carried out on moral and ethical reasons, and in this case to protect 
the air bombardment of Libyan civilians by the Ghaddafi regime. Criticism has been leveled against the 
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NATO coalition intervention in Libya as a pursuit of national self-interests camouflaged as humanitarian 
military intervention. Arguments can also be raised as to how NATO intervention in Libya could be 
justified as having been undertaken in the context of ethical considerations given the number of civilian 
casualties as a result of the NATO air bombardment. It can be argued that national self-interests were 
the major motivating factor given the fact that NATO prematurely pulled out from Libya leaving the 
civilians more insecure than they were during the Ghaddafi era while companies from the intervening 
states got preference in oil concessions. This is due to the fact that no disarmament and demobilization 
had been done to both the armed rebel factions and the Ghaddafi ‘loyalists’. If one therefore contrasts 
the Libyan and Syrian crises, it can be argued that the veto wielding states pass or veto a UNSC 
resolution based on their national self-interest. Therefore, any humanitarian military intervention by the 
intervening states has been used as a camouflaged for intervention by the powerful states. 
In the context of this research, questions will also be examined that, if ethical considerations are the 
guiding principles for humanitarian military interventions, why is it that notably most of these interventions 
are carried out in some developing countries whilst catastrophic insecurity situations in some of these 
developing countries do not draw the attention of these powerful nations to undertake humanitarian 
military interventions?  
On the other hand, if humanitarian military interventions are undertaken due to ethical considerations, 
the research will seek to unearth the reasons for the premature exit of intervening states that would leave 
the conflict zone in a more deplorable state or without having achieved the stated results at the entry 
time.  
The research is guided by the following objectives, 
1. Conceptually analyse the ethical considerations that are purportedly used by powerful nations in 
undertaking humanitarian military interventions.  
2. Analyse how national self-interests remain a determining factor in the context of humanitarian military 
interventions. 
3. To determine whether self-interest is compatible with humanitarianism.  




You are kindly requested to participate in the interview given your academic, political, NGO and/or military 
experience and exposure in international relations, specifically in areas of humanitarian interventions 
operations, with Multilateral Institutions, Coalitions of the Willing or unilateral interventions. I am aware 
of the busy work schedule of your office, thus I humbly request that the interview takes 60 minutes of 
your time.  
 
I will ask you questions related to the topic and the set objectives. You should feel free to honestly answer 
the questions to the best of your knowledge. However, you may choose not to answer questions which 
you may not be comfortable with. I may ask follow up questions as follow up to given answers in order 
to broaden the scope of the thesis.  
 
In order for me to capture your answers and not to distort information obtained I will be taking notes and 
request that I record the interview. 
 
Your participation sir/madam is on voluntary basis. If you decide to withdraw from the interview you may 
do so without prejudice. 
 
The results of this study may be published in journal articles or presented at the post graduate 
conferences. KwaZulu Natal University may also use these information/findings for future studies of 
similar interests. Confidentiality will be maintained throughout using pseudonyms and nicknames, hence 
personalities’ identity will be kept as anonymous as possible.  
 
If you have any questions regarding the study, you may contact the researcher at the University of 
KwaZulu Natal, School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, contact number, (+27731631241), or you 
may also contact Dr Munyaradzi Murove at the University of KwaZulu Natal, School of Religion, 
Philosophy and Classics, contact number (+27332606056). 
 

















If you have any queries, contact, 
 
Researcher      Supervisor 
 
Michael Chaminuka                Dr. Munyaradzi Felix Murove 
University of KwaZulu Natal               University of KwaZulu-Natal 
School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics                     School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics 
Private Bag X01                Private Bag X01 
Scottsville, 3209                Scottsville, 3209 
Pietermaritzburg                 Pietermaritzburg 
South Africa                   South Africa  
E-mail, michaelchaminuka@gmail.com               Tel, +27332605560 
       Fax, +27332605858 









I_________________________________________(full names of respondent) 
 
Hereby confirm that I understand the contents and the nature of this study and agree to participate.  I 
understand that I am participating freely and without being forced to do so.  I also understand that I can 
withdraw from this interview at any point should I not wish to continue. 
 
I understand that my name will remain confidential. 
 
 
___________________________                                          __________________________ 
 




___________________________       ___________________________ 
 




Appendix 3   Structured Interview Guide Questions 
 
PhD Thesis: Structured Interview Guide Questions for Academics, Politicians, Political Analysts, 
Security Practitioners and Analysts 
 
Sir/Madam, please kindly provide analytical answers to the questions. 
 
Section 1 
1.1 Kindly state your designation.  
• Professor,  
• Senior Lecturer/Researcher.  
• Politician/Political Analyst 




To conceptually analyse the ethical considerations that are purportedly used by powerful nations in 
undertaking humanitarian military interventions. 
 
2.1 What are the general ethical considerations that are purportedly used by powerful nations in 





2.2 In your view which specific case studies have ethical considerations been purportedly used by 






















2.4 In your view, what is the likelihood of having national self-interests continue being key factors in 



















To determine whether self-interest is compatible with humanitarianism. 
 
2.6 How have ethical and moral factors been used by intervening countries to camouflage national 






2.7 In your view, what have been the effects of the camouflaging of national self-interests on the 






2.8 Using case studies, where have ethical and moral factors been used by intervening countries to 







Offer scholarly suggestions on future humanitarian military interventions from an ethical perspective. 
 








2.10 What are the key policy suggestions on the conduct of future humanitarian 




















Appendix 4   List of Interviewees 
 
Serial Name Designation 
1. Gen Paulino Macaringue Commander Mozambique Armed Defence 
Forces 
2. Mr Ibbo Mandaza Political Analyst, Academic and Director of 
SAPES Think Tank and Publisher 
3. Ekwealor C T  
4. Ambassador Salim Ahmmed Salim Former OAU Secretary General and 
Tanzanian Ambassador to UN 
5. James Tsabora Legal Officer 
6. Colonel (Dr) M J Chinyanganya Senior Directing Staff, National Defence 
College Zimbabwe 
7. Ambassador Issac A Moyo Zimbabwe Ambassador to the Republic of 
South Africa 
8. Webster Zambara Senior Project Leader 
9. Dr S T Sekeramayi Minister of Defence, Republic of Zimbabwe 
10. Ashton Murwira Lecturer University of Zimbabwe 
11. Squadron Leader Mhandara Researcher University of Zimbabwe 
12. Dr Donald Chimanikire Chairman Political and Social Science 
Department University of Zimbabwe 
13. Nakaha Stanisley Political Officer AU Department of Peace 
and Security 
15. Mr Simon Badza Political Officer AU, Department of Peace 
and Security 
16. Ahmed Shide State Minister  
17. Ambassador Albert R Chimbindi Zimbabwe Ambassador to Ethiopia 




19. Melody Siangombe Programme Officer Peacemaking Unit – 
ACCORD 
20. Charles Nyuykonge Senior Researcher – ACCORD 
21. Baffour Ankomah Editor – New African 
22. Major General Samaila Iliya Consultant – Peace and Security 
Department AU Commission 
23. Colonel Kabenga Nsa Kaisi (Rtd) Chairman of the Board  
24. Jeffrey Mapendere Senior Mediation Expert 
25. General (Dr) C G Chiwenga Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces 
26. Ambassador C Mutsvangwa Former Ambassador of Zimbabwe to the 
Peoples’ Republic of China and Minister of 
Government, Zimbabwe 
27. Dr M Mtisi Senior Researcher – ACCORD 
28. Dr Jide Martyns Okeke Head Policy Dev Unit Peace Support 
Operation Division (AU) 
29. Sunday Ayodeji Regional Civil-Military Coordination Officer 
(OCHA) 
30. Prof Jameson Kurasha Senior Lecturer Zimbabwe Open University 
31. Dr A Kambudzi Secretary to the Peace and Security 
Council of the AU 
32. Dr Munyaradzi Kereke Member of Parliament Zimbabwe and 
Political Analyst 
33. Dr J Kurebwa Senior Lecturer, University of Zimbabwe 
 
